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Abstract

History and Politics in the Thought of Karl Jaspers
by
Nathan Wallace

Advisor: Richard Wolin

A relatively overlooked but important work, The Origin and Goal of History, by Karl
Jaspers is examined with regard the intellectual history of its development and influence, and
its structure and prospects for contemporary and future relevance for political theory.
Emphasis is placed on the argument that the central aspect of the work has been neglected in
recent, important literature: its connection of a universal historical narrative with a theory of
contemporary politics.
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Introduction

I.

Universal History and Political Thought

In the Origin and Goal of History and elsewhere, Karl Jaspers argues for the necessity
of a universal history of humankind for his conception of a just society. But this was
overshadowed. The influential turn against universal history came with the condemnations
of Marxist thought delivered by Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin. For both, universal history
was equated with inexorable laws of human destiny and was to be rejected because human
affairs necessarily involve human choices which cannot be reduced to law-governed natural
phenomena. Both shared the view that this conception of universal history contributed to
authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Postcolonial theorists have associated the narrative of
universal history with colonial oppression. Later liberal thinkers, such as Rawls and
Habermas, any explicit connection between universal history and preferred conceptions of
justice is absent. Gandhi's political thought and action seem to share this disregard. Can the
conceptions of justice in the works of Rawls, Habermas and Gandhi be reconciled with or
complemented by Jaspers' view on the relation of universal history to conceptions of
justice? Jaspers avoids equating universal history with a collection of causal laws that

determine the inevitable shape of society in the future, rather he presents universal history as
a unifying narrative that can contribute to creating a common ground of understanding across
all groups that can serve as a location for the debates inherent to a politically liberal order.
Moreover, this universal history is empirical and subject to further investigation and
conceptual revision. Thus, he appears to avoid the criticisms Berlin, Popper and the
postcolonialists. As examples, I will assess practical difficulties with Rawls' concept of
justice as fairness, Habermas' discourse ethics and Gandhi's civil disobedience and argue
how a conception of universal history could possibly complement these and similar
conceptions. Robert Bellah, in his own extensive work that relies heavily upon Jaspers'
historical thesis, stresses the importance of history as narrative and not as a system of
inevitable laws. Expanding upon Bellah's conception of universal history as narrative will
provide the basis for my argument that Jaspers' universal history might possibly complement
these other similar conceptions in a valuable way.
For Hegel, universal history necessarily culminated in the constitutional state with its
governing hereditary "universal class" whose class interests corresponded with the universal
interests of humanity. 1 Marx connected universal history to inevitable, universal and total
human emancipation, a condition in which Hegel’s elitist state would no longer exist.
Marx’s proletariat, like Hegel's "universal class", was both destined by historical laws to rule
and was in possession of true universal interests. Marx showed how powerful the narrative
of universal history can be for motivating action – and reaction. It was time to change the
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Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, sections 152-153
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world rather than merely interpret it. The changes were given absolute sanction in the form
of historical necessity. Between the state as the instrument of the bourgeoisie and the
elimination of the state, the intervening period would involve the seizure and use of state
power by the proletariat. 2 These characterizations of Hegel and Marx may be a matter of
debate, but they generally encapsulate the difficulties as seen by those who suggested the
turn away from universal history.
That totalitarian or authoritarian systems followed upon the application, or mistaken
application, of Marx’s conception became the clearest, primary cause of the turn against
universal history in twentieth century political thought. However, critics of universal history
also objected to elements of historical determinism and elitism in fascist theories of racial
superiority. This line of reasoning first took shape in the influential works of Karl Popper and
Isaiah Berlin, which expressed liberal views of politics that sought to avoid the perfectionist
views of a just society along the line of Hegel or Marx. In 1945, Popper argued that Marx’s
thought combined universal history with a set of desired social norms to create a “myth of
destiny”. 3 Against this, Popper argues for a “scientific” approach to politics, which, for him,
means a less ambitious, “piecemeal”, approach that seeks practical reform of extant liberal
democratic institutions in favor of democratic pluralism rather than universal revolution. 4
For Popper the egalitarianism or any other aspect of Marx’s desired society is not the
problem, the theory of how a just society can and necessarily will be achieved is. He sought
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Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. (Princeton University Press) 7-8.
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to show: “how we can become the makers of our fate when we have ceased to pose as its
prophets.” 5 In the 1950s, Berlin expressed a similar view, particularly in his essays
“Historical Inevitability” and “Two Concepts of Liberty”. While recognizing that history
displays intelligible patterns, this fact should not be directly employed as a basis for
arguments for how a just society, a pluralist society for Berlin, can or should be attained. 6
The way that Hegel and Marx applied their conceptions of universal history to their
conceptions of a just social order was perfectionist; it offered a notion of “a final harmony in
which all riddles are solved, all contradictions reconciled.” 7 This, for Berlin, was a fatal
deception. For both Popper and Berlin, universal history had led to pathological outcomes.
It had to be quarantined.
Another line of the critique of universal history has been drawn more recently in
postcolonial thought. 8 Here the focus is on the combination of the advocacy of principles of
negative liberty, egalitarianism and democracy with a view of civilization as the result of
universal historical progress that has not yet reached all peoples. This served as a
justification of oppression by liberal societies, such as Great Britain, over other societies,
such as India. Because of his great influence on nineteenth and twentieth century liberal
thought, John Stuart Mill can be seen as the exemplar of this broad trend. Mill accepted
Auguste Comte’s theory of universal history in which modern European society was seen as
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For example: Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton University Press, 2000), Uday Mehta,
Liberalism and Empire (University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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more advanced than other types of societies. From his father, James Mill, he inherited a
belief in the superiority of British culture relative to that of India. It was upon such
conceptions that Mill would argue that the principles of liberty that he advocated were not
yet suitable for non-European societies, which he thought to be at an objectively lower level
of development. For such societies, Mill advocates oppressive rule: “a vigorous despotism is
in itself the best form of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to
render them capable of a higher civilization.” 9 The fact that Mill can justify a complete
reversal of his liberal principles upon what he takes to be universal historical criteria
demonstrates the very compelling power, maybe even the primacy, of the latter for his
thought. Again, the question arises, or is at least implied, in postcolonial thought whether it
would be better to quarantine universal history entirely.
Thus, the main lines of criticism of universal history since the 1940s have diagnosed
that concept with tendencies towards domestic totalitarianism or authoritarianism and
imperial domination. These criticisms are compelling. For many, these would indicate that
universal history is not only irrelevant for any desirable theory of a just society, but also
potentially harmful.
When Francis Fukuyama announced that contemporary liberal democracy is the “end
of history”, this thesis was met with surprise by many – by 1989 who had ever heard of such
a thing as universal history? An intellectual sensation that evoked a great deal of disapproval
on widely varying bases, Fukuyama’s thesis nevertheless began to lift the taboo. What
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John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in Three Essays. (Oxford University Press, 1975) 66.
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Fukuyama began to reveal was merely the tip of the iceberg. Fukuyama’s primary concern is
the opposite of Marx’s, to interpret the world rather than to change it. He does not connect
universal history to the process of thinking about what a just society would look like and how
to achieve it. Mistakenly depicted by many as an optimistic prophet of triumphant
neoliberalism, his conclusion is: “The end of history will be a very sad time.” 10
Fukuyama’s end of history thesis led to the postcolonial critique as well as to works
that similarly ascribed to universal history a useful role in describing the realities of
contemporary societies and global affairs. While the postcolonial critique was intended to
serve as a warning based on lessons drawn from the combination of universal history with
instances of oppression, the latter type of studies follow Fukuyama’s pattern by using
universal history as a tool to interpret the situation of the present. There eventually arose a
third type, that in which universal history is conceived of as having a practical role in the
conceptualization and realization of a just society. Thomas McCarthy and Robert Bellah are
the proponents of this view. McCarthy argues that a conception of universal history, what he
calls a theory of “human development”, is needed despite the criticism that that concept has
faced since at least 1945. The postcolonial critique is important for McCarthy; he
incorporates its concerns into the framework of what a universal history with a practical
intent should look like. 11 He, however, does not mention the very influential work of Popper
and Berlin on the subject, explaining the disappearance of universal history by pointing only
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to the lack of belief in progress after the horrors of the Second World War and Holocaust.
McCarthy’s point is that while the postcolonial critique of universal history is valid, it does
not condemn the genre itself, but can help reorient it towards new values by showing the
oppressive aspects of earlier formulations. Most importantly, he argues that aspiring to a
“unity of history” should be done, “from a point of view oriented to practice: grand
metanarratives give us an idea of the kinds of a more humane future for which we may hope,
but only if we are prepared to engage ourselves in bringing them about.” 12 But he does not
explain why this is the case, how the link from such metanarratives to the hope for a more
humane future is brought about. For McCarthy, rather, the point is to orient the
metanarrative of universal history towards those values that are considered just, chief among
them “basic human rights and personal and political autonomy, or non-domination.” 13 For
him, universal histories, human development theories, can, “marshal empirical and
theoretical knowledge in the interest of realizing valued outcomes.” 14 Therefore, the values
to be attained precede, or seem to precede, the construction of the narrative proposed, which
then serves as a justification of those values.
That there is not only one way to conceive of universal history from a practical point
of view is implied by Bellah in his book Religion and Human Evolution: From the
Paleolithic to the Axial Age. Bellah agrees with McCarthy that orientation of universal
history should be towards practical goals, rather than only as a tool for understanding the
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contemporary situation. Both would, however, agree that such interpretive universal history
can never be completely separable from how practical aims are or can be pursued, as for
instance in the way one could argue that Fukuyama’s view could be used as a rationalization
for forced “democratization” by military intervention. Religion in Human Evolution is a
massive work, much longer than Jaspers’ The Origin and Goal of History from which it
derives its basic framework. Unlike McCarthy’s, Bellah’s work is not just a theory of
universal history; it is a universal history itself. Bellah calls this a “history of histories, a
story of stories.” 15 He has two practical aims: warning of ecological crises and the
consequences of ethnocentrism. 16 He assumes that this history can illuminate: “the moral
situation humans are in today and the changes we need to make.” 17 But one cannot simply
say that Bellah chooses what to include in this “story of stories” and what to exclude only on
the basis of what he explicitly values and wants to achieve. Rather, he thinks that trying to
tell the broadest possible story of the human experience, while basing it in facts, in itself
leads to a framework of understanding in which there is likely to be agreement upon his own
values. In other words, the process of telling a story and listening to it is assumed to be the
engine by which agreement on those specific values can be generated. Bellah observes that
most communication in daily life is in narrative form. Narrative is crucial in the cognitive
development of children. Narrative is constitutive of both individual identity and social
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identity. 18 What Bellah is aiming at with his universal history is a common human identity –
not by constructing it but by contributing to awareness of it through an empirical universal
narrative. To do this he links the theory of evolution, the most widely held narrative of
human origins in modern times, with the framework of universal history offered by Jaspers.
He sees both of these as not containing the dichotomies that pervaded earlier universal
histories – dichotomies separating the “superior” from the “inferior”, the “civilized” from the
“savage”. The implication of this is clear: in Bellah’s view, to abandon universal history is
to forego a means for the expression and understanding of human identity, leaving the field
open to the competition and clash of particular identities, likely ones informed by absolute
claims to truth. Since Bellah’s narrative stops around 2,000 years ago, it cannot be said that
he has followed McCarthy’s advice and let his values guide his historical account. The
contemporary values that he says he hopes his history will promote, an awareness of the
threats of ecological disaster and ethnocentrism, do not directly relate in their contemporary
forms to any of the events considered. But can such a universal history really lead to a
discussion about common human values?
It is Jaspers’ assumption in The Origin and Goal of History that it can. First
published in 1948, that work developed in intellectual atmosphere of intense and profound
rethinking that led to Popper and Berlin’s condemnations of universal history – the Second
World War, Holocaust and beginnings of the Cold War. But unlike the latter two, Jaspers
decided to deliver an entirely new version of universal history. The stark contrast here is a
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superficial one. All three were very disturbed by the way that universal history had been
handled by Marx. All three believed that its use by Marx had contributed to totalitarianism.
But while Popper and Berlin sought to quarantine universal history or simply leave it behind
in pursuit of a practical and pluralistic politics, Jaspers thought that the same or similar ends
could not be achieved without it. Jaspers uniquely sought not only to move beyond previous
versions of universal history, he sought to replace them. The result was a universal history
that avoided the structural aspects that had plagued earlier versions: determinism and
elitism. This was not a denial that determinism and elitism have played a very major role in
human history, which, of course, they have played and still play.
The literature on The Origin and Goal of History has neglected that the work is more
than a universal history. It was written with a specific political vision in mind, one that
Jaspers thought others could more readily share after reading the historical narrative.
Briefly, Jaspers wants to suspend any efforts to pursue a “perfectionist” vision of “absolute
liberty” for now, and, instead, wants to foster the value of negative liberty. In this he and
Berlin and Popper again overlap. His other major political concern to counter the threat of
“world empire” with the concept of “world order” as, “the continuation and universalization
of political freedom.” 19 In later works, he elaborates these conceptions by insisting that mass
civil disobedience up to and including a willingness for self-sacrifice is essential for the
attainment of political liberty. His universal history does without any concept of progress or
determinism, so it is not as if these values should be held because they have been proven by
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history. In that sense his history does not simply provide a blueprint for the sort of values or
actions that he prescribes. Overall, it is hard to describe how his historical narrative directly
connects with his values. However, it is clear that he wanted to supplant any kind of
deterministic and total universal history such as that drawn up by Marx. He also wanted to
popularize universal history. This was a book written with the intent to reach a large public
audience. It is not burdened with academic jargon. This is evidence of its egalitarian intent.
The narrative focuses on singular moments in the past that affect everyone in the present: the
shift from prehistory to the literate ancient civilizations, the breakdown and transformation of
the ancient civilizations in the Axial Age, and the cyclical persistence of empires since.
There is no concept of a hierarchy of “civilized” versus “savage”. This structure is meant to
avoid presenting a total, final account of humankind’s history. 20 Rather, it is meant to
present a framework of understanding of universal history that is widely accessible and does
not operate as an ultimate doctrine. It is entirely empirical, not, as for instance in St.
Augustine’s version, an attempt to make universal history intelligible as the work of God in
the world. But it does not require an entirely secular view, ascribing the ultimate question of
the origin of consciousness to the empirically unknowable, or to God. In these features, it
seems Jaspers’ intent was to foster a participatory readership, where insights from a reader’s
own life are welcome, even necessary. Jaspers, in fact, holds the same view as Bellah on the
connection between narrative and individual identity, universal history and human identity,
though he does not flesh it out as much. This is evident when he writes, “It is not heredity
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that makes us human, but always the content of a tradition.” 21 Tradition, or narrative, in this
view, operates at a deeper level of the human psyche than concepts. As Jaspers puts it:
“there is a trend away from… tradition and toward the point of mere thinking, as though
something could be brought forth out of this insubstantial work of reason. It is
enlightenment which,tself, no longer enlightens anything, but leads into nothingness.” 22
Jaspers and Bellah agree that the Axial Age was an age of universalization. From
China, through India and into Greece there was an abundance of small states or relatively
autonomous regions of the ancient empires. It was an age of military and economic turmoil,
increased commerce and, as a result of those factors, an increasing awareness of cultural
diversity. The result was an erosion of the power of ethnocentric concepts of identity. The
evidence of this universalization can be found in the universal religions that arose during this
time and never before in human history. For Jaspers, it is very important that this
universalization took place alongside a growing awareness of history. The turmoil of the age
led people to question existing institutions. This questioning led to awareness of the past, a
search for the reasons why such institutions existed and not others. There was a trend toward
delegitimization of extant hierarchical institutions. For the first time, egalitarian concepts of
social order become important. Egalitarianism here follows from the trend of
universalization. Throughout the vast region, in scope and depth it was a time of questioning
and innovation such as had never happened before. People began to think universally,
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extending their understanding of what is human beyond their own cultures. And they began
to think historically – in the terms of common sense, empirical history.
These changes were not because of some inexplicable factor, like a random collision
of a cosmic ray with human brains. It was not an advance in biological evolution. It
happened because a monolithic structure of power in the ancient empires could not adapt to
slow but persistent technological advances and their dissemination. Literacy would likely
have been the most important factor. But these changes were not determined by technology,
either. Rather new technologies gave a new platform to the fundamental human capacity to
call into question and resist the unjust imposition of power. Under the same circumstances,
it would have happened in the Andes or in the Kalahari Desert. From these factors alone,
one might think the result would have been an understanding of the validity of both a
common human identity and individual and cultural particularity.
The Axial Age ended, or was interrupted, with the rise of new empires throughout the
Axial regions. Concomitant with the rise of these empires was the development of the
universal religions. Each of these reflects the two essential Axial breakthroughs:
universality and history. They also reflect the egalitarianism of the Axial Age. But they all
do so in combination with an exclusive claim to absolute truth. Universality has been
transformed into the universality of all believers in the correct doctrine. History has been
transformed from empirical history to an elitist and determinist history – primarily the
history of those who believe correctly and what their ultimate rewards will be.
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The critiques of universal history by Popper, Berlin and the postcolonialists all share a
common target, one that they, however, do not fully recognize. That target is the false
universality that informs the universal histories of thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Mill and
others. In the case of Hegel and Marx, universal history is deterministic and elitist. The
variance is on who is in the elite, a “universal class” or the proletariat, and what end is
determined. For Mill, following Comte, it is a European ethnic, “civilized” elite that history
shows to be superior to others. None of these can be said to be truly empirical, though they
all involve empirical elements to suit their purposes. None of them can be said to function as
a narrative framework for all humanity. The universalize only what they want to. If Bellah
and Jaspers are right about the way that narrative fosters identity, then none of these can
foster a human identity. Conceiving of the Axial Age and differentiating its innovations
from their subsequent incorporation into doctrines of absolute truth is in itself an important
way that universal history can show what is false in the claims to universality in Hegel,
Marx, Mill and others. However, in their critiques, Popper, Berlin and the postcolonialists
do not conceive of the possibility of an empirical universal history, i.e. one that is neither
determinist nor elitist and, to the greatest extent possible, lets the facts speak for themselves.
Jaspers and Bellah have shown that such a history is possible.
The result of the criticism of Popper and Berlin has been to implicitly deny that
universal history has any relevance for thought and action that aims to contribute to a just
society. Coming decades later, the postcolonial critique reinforces this position. The result
has been that for thinking about justice, universal history has become an irrelevance, at best.
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Countless examples of this trend exist. Two prominent academic examples can be found in
the thought of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Another example is the thought and action
of Gandhi, who is particularly interesting not only for the uniqueness of his approach, but
also for his evident effectiveness in real world politics, the actual extent and quality of which
is, however, debatable. Though still prevalent and virulent today in the forms of ethnocentric
and nationalistic politics and religious fanaticism: understandably, elitist, ethnocentric and
deterministic social thought has largely fallen out of fashion in most educated circles around
the world. These three thinkers are no exceptions to this trend. They all promote universalist
and egalitarian values and ways to work for a world in which these values can be actual.
They all, however, appear to do so in a historical vacuum. In the case of Habermas, this may
be changing, probably partially due to works such as those of McCarthy and Bellah.
Nevertheless, in his formulation of discourse ethics, universal history was not explicitly
involved.
Therefore, Rawls, Habermas and Gandhi can serve as examples of contemporary
political thinkers for whom universal history is unimportant. In the cases of Rawls and
Habermas, it is certainly the influential trend exemplified by Popper and Berlin that accounts
the absence in their work of consideration of universal history. In the case of Gandhi,
accounting for this absence is possibly less clear, though it probably owes something to the
influence of Leo Tolstoy, who himself both advocated civil disobedience and reacted against
the trend of connecting universal history with political doctrine, a trend exemplified by
Marx. For Rawls and Habermas, universal history is simply not present; it is not important
15

for the cases they wish to make. Gandhi is more explicit. For him, the essential basis of civil
disobedience is satyagraha, or truth-force, something he claims is equally accessible to
everyone a priori. When describing this central, universal concept, he excludes the
relevance of universal history: “History then is a record of the interruption of the course of
nature. Satyagraha, being natural, is not noted in history.” 23 For all three, the universalistic
and egalitarian goals they wish to achieve are seen as, or hoped to be, achievable by people
with no necessary knowledge of universal history. Ironically, wherever such prime examples
of this position are found, they are held by intellectuals who are themselves in possession of
a very great amount of historical knowledge.
All three of these thinkers understand universal history to be essentially a purportedly
definitive knowledge of a set of facts. On the other hand, for Jaspers and Bellah, universal
history seems to mean: the best possible empirical narrative of all events of the past with
influence for all humanity that we can recount given the present circumstances of our
knowledge of the facts. This is, in other words, a framework for an ongoing collective
project of research, debate and rearticulation, rather than a finished product. This contrasts
with the tradition of universal histories that Tolstoy, Popper and Berlin opposed, a tradition
whose exemplars propounded definitive and complete knowledge.
What then would be the result if such a conception of universal history as narrative
were to inform political thought and concepts of justice? No one knows because it has not
really been tried. Jaspers’ formulation has been largely ignored and Bellah’s has only
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recently appeared. The most essential point is whether narrative fosters identity, whether
universal history fosters human identity. Whether, as Bellah puts it, “the self is a telling.” If
this is accurate, then universalist and egalitarian values would likely be more amenable to
popular comprehension and adoption and in possession of greater motivating capacity. This
would be the case because of how narrative functions within the human mind – at a level
deeper than concepts – as seen in the frequency of its use in everyday communication and its
intrinsic role in children’s mental development.
More should be said about human identity. Human identity would seem, by
definition, to be universalist and egalitarian. Bellah’s conception would imply that narrative
alone is constitutive of identity and that identities of all kinds, individual identity, group
identity or that of humanity as a whole, are possibly not even concepts at all, strictly
speaking, as they might be understandable or attainable only through narrative, or through a
certain kind of narrative. A more elaborated discussion of this topic, including whether or
not these assumptions are true, cannot be encompassed here.
Rawls, Habermas and Gandhi, as examples, propose values or actions that would
seem to necessarily depend upon human identity. Such values and actions in the case of each
are not specific to any particular group, but essentially universal. This is not to say that each
one did not communicate messages that were primarily intended for only one group at times.
Even in the case of Gandhi, whose legacy is so closely tied to Indian independence, much of
his thought was communicated with the intent and full awareness that it would reach a world
audience. But while these thinkers seem to depend upon implicit background understanding
17

of human identity, they do not rely upon the narrative of universal history for the popular
comprehensibility of their proposals. However, all three themselves possessed a very
expansive knowledge of world history, possibly the narrative background for their
conceptions of justice. If Jaspers and Bellah are right, then this state of affairs would mean
that the proposals of these three should exhibit practical difficulties, particularly in terms of
popular comprehension, popular adoption and motivating capacity. But if these proposals do
exhibit such difficulties, that should not automatically mean that Jaspers and Bellah are right,
since their approach remains basically untried.
The proposals of Rawls, Habermas and Gandhi do exhibit these sorts of practical
difficulties. Each of these proposals has been prominent for decades and relatively widely
disseminated through institutions of higher education. In the case of Rawls, his first principle
of justice as fairness is one of “equal basic rights and liberties.” These are not dissimilar
from the rights and liberties found in the United States Declaration of Independence and Bill
of Rights. At first glance these principles would seem to enjoy wide popular
comprehensibility and support in the United States and much of the world, at least since the
civil rights movements since the 1960s. However, in the United States, the attitudes of
whites and blacks concerning treatment by the police has always showed a large disparity in
public opinion polls – with blacks always reporting far less confidence in fair treatment by
the police. 24 This persistent disparity, which has shown no significant improvement in
decades, would not be the case if the principle of equal basic rights and liberties was in fact
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deeply accepted by the American populace as a whole. Another of Rawls’ principles, the
imperative to reduce inequality of economic outcomes, has garnered only a modest increase
in support in the United States public opinion since the 1970s. 25 However, over the same
period, income inequality has increased dramatically. Rawls postulates that gradually
increasing shifts in public opinion around the world could possibly converge upon an
“overlapping consensus” that supports Rawls’ proposed substantive concepts of justice. This
trend, if it exists or will exist, should be investigated empirically. In such studies, it would
probably be easy to overestimate actual support for these substantive concepts of justice,
because voicing support for them could be socially preferable and in conformity with their
endorsement by regimes of power, while authentic understanding of them and deep
attachment to them may be difficult for most people to achieve given the systems of
domination and indoctrination in which they live.
In the case of Habermas’ principles of discourse ethics, it is difficult to ascertain
public opinion towards fair rules of public discourse. Empirical studies of this would be
warranted, but as of now such studies do not seem to exist. Probably only around a quarter
of the US adult population attends even one meeting on local or school affairs each year. 26
Whether or not the force of the better argument alone should be given credence is the opinion
of what percentage of those who participate in such meetings is impossible to say. For most
Americans, the question never arises. If national politics is any indication, the force of the
better argument is not a factor held in high regard by most in the US. In the 2016 US
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presidential general election, 76 percent of all television advertisements related to the
election were based not on issues but solely on the character of one or both of the
candidates. 27
Gandhi was probably the world’s most important theorist and practitioner of civil
disobedience. Not only was he able to motivate an effective mass movement that led to
independence for India, he was emulated in other movements, maybe most notably the
struggle for civil rights for blacks in the US. One could make an argument that, of all
political thinkers who were firmly devoted to both universalist and egalitarian values, he
achieved the greatest level of success in practice. Civil disobedience, though it occurs now
with much greater regularity in many parts of the world than it did before Gandhi’s time,
cannot be said to have accomplished anything substantial with regard to threats that have
long posed a clear and present danger to humanity generally, such as global climate change
and global economic inequality. Only a tiny fraction of all people ever engages in civil
disobedience. What might account for this ambiguous legacy?
This is not the place for an exhaustive consideration the vast number of possibly
relevant circumstances. However, it seems that one factor might be Gandhi’s peculiar and
contradictory relationship to universal history. Following the advice of his well-known
mantra: “Be the change you wish to see in the world,” he himself enters into universal
history. Evident to anyone who considers him critically, here is someone who clearly intends
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to effect, and does to a certain degree effect, a change that is relevant to everyone, in the
form of his theory and practice of civil disobedience and its results. Further, since this
change is universalistic and egalitarian in intent, it seems to speak to a common human
identity. Gandhi himself, in the story of his words and deeds, offers people a glimpse, a
relatively brief glimpse, of universal history, a cohesive narrative of humanity. This
probably accounts for why some people have wanted to emulate him, and have done so in
effective ways. Those relatively few who take the trouble to learn about him can obtain a
considerable understanding of his values through the avenue of relatability to him that the
narrative of his theories and actions provide. On the other hand, Gandhi refused to enhance
the understandability of his values and actions with any significant reference to universal
history. A more detailed look than can be afforded here would probably explain this factor
with reference to the sharp dichotomy between universal history and justice that is proposed
by Tolstoy, a great influence for Gandhi in this respect. Tolstoy’s doctrine amounts to the
proposition that people simply have the automatic ability to pursue justice, in terms of
universal and egalitarian values, without any narrative background understanding of their
circumstances, including those circumstances that run contrary to these values. What is
required is the catalytic persona of the “enlightened” or charismatic leader. Tolstoy’s
preferred model for this role was Jesus, as interpreted by Tolstoy. This program was
Tolstoy’s alternative to the prominent formulations connecting universal history with politics
of the nineteenth century, which to him appeared to be obviously disastrous. This model
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proposes that civil disobedience be conducted by a few “enlightened” or charismatic leaders
and a mass of automata who merely emulate without understanding. On this point, Tolstoy
and Gandhi agree by implication. From this perspective, it is not hard to see why Gandhi’s
model of civil disobedience, or something like it, has not enjoyed more success than it has.
The examination of these three cases suggests the conclusion that each proposed set
of values or actions likely suffers from practical difficulties in terms of popular
comprehension, popular adoption and motivating capacity. The alternative, which relies
upon the assumption of the unique capacity of narrative to foster identity and understanding
at a deeper level than concepts can, would seem to possibly provide an effective means to
address these difficulties. Apart from in the thought of Jaspers and Bellah, this conception of
narrative has not been considered by any other thinker in this field. Jaspers here provides the
prototype, one that Bellah actually does not consider very thoroughly. The central
assumption here, however, concerning the capacity of narrative is brought into much sharper
focus in Bellah’s work; though it is present, if mainly by implication, in Jaspers’ work.
In terms of orientation towards universalistic and egalitarian values, Jaspers’ thought
is compatible with the three cases examined. Like Gandhi, Jaspers, in writings appearing
after The Origin and Goal of History, elaborated his political theory to place great emphasis
on the necessity of civil disobedience. Further, Jaspers and Bellah both seek to enhance the
understandability of their proposals with reference to universal history. They do so,
however, in a way which should be acceptable to the critics of universal history, as examined
above, the liberals Popper and Berlin and the postcolonialists. In this view, universal history
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appears as a modest framework of understanding, based on empirical fact, open to debate and
revision as the circumstances of knowledge of the relevant facts expands through research
and changes through critical appraisal. In other words, it differs from all earlier versions by
abandoning the pretenses of elitism, total knowledge and prophetic insight into the future.
Whether this approach can effectively address the practical difficulties examined above
remains to be seen. There are sufficient reasons to assume that it may be able to do so.

II. Jaspers and Politics

Karl Theodor Jaspers began, before the First World War, as an “unpolitical man” for
whom political intervention by intellectuals was properly a matter of rarified aesthetics, in the
manner of the George-Kreis, but he ended, half a century later, by calling for a nonviolent
revolution “from below” based on mass civil disobedience. 28 This later aim would seek a liberal
sphere of democracy supportive of cultural and religious diversity and popular participation.
Toward that end, he presents a theory that connects his philosophical conception of the radical
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freedom of the faculties of consciousness and conscience to practical political action. This
theory is not expressed all at once, but develops from his earliest to latest political writings.

From his psychological work before the First World War until the height of his political
involvement in the 1960s, Karl Jaspers’ wrote about a vast range of topics of the human
experience. Jaspers’ political thought is written from the perspective of one who lived through
and was swept up in the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century: the two World
Wars, the fascist and communist totalitarian regimes, the Holocaust and the dropping of the
atomic bombs. The reflections upon these events in Jaspers’ political works appear there with a
high degree of clarity and palpability that, arguably, no other author of that period achieves.
Jaspers achieved early fame with this seminal psychological work, General Psychopathology,
which sought to establish the new field of psychiatry upon foundations cleared of elements of
vagary and pseudo-science current within the broader field of psychology. Here one can find his
most penetrating critique of Sigmund Freud. Freud was considered by Jaspers to have developed
an approach that was wholly dependent upon interpretation of images and experiences to the
exclusion of the factual findings of psychology as a science of human behavior. Freud had
mistakenly reduced the free human consciousness to animal instincts and drives, much as Marx
had reduced it to sheer economic factors. Moreover, Freud was condemned for ruling his school
dogmatically and excommunicating dissident psychologists. For Jaspers, Freud’s psychotherapy
was the consolatory prison of a vain but hopeless shadow of bourgeois life. After the Second
World War, Jaspers would characterize Freudianism as “totalitarian” alongside fascism and

24

communism. 29 Jaspers argued here for an approach to therapy which integrated scientific
knowledge of human psychology with a sensitivity to the uniqueness of each patient, an
awareness of his or her biographical self-understanding. Jaspers was commissioned to write this
work primarily because, among his colleagues in psychiatry, he simply had the greatest ability to
devote the massive amount of time required by such a broad project. His clinical duties were
highly limited owing to his chronic and disabling bronchiectasis.

General Psychopathology, the first edition of which was published in 1913, seems to
have immediately attracted the attention of Max Weber, with whom Jaspers subsequently
became a close friend. It was in the circle of intellectuals around Weber during the years of the
First World War that Jaspers began to consider politics as a field for intellectual intervention.
Jaspers attained an appointment to the Heidelberg faculty of philosophy, a move which was
made with the embryonic intention to ground his developing political thought in a credentialed
philosophical basis. Even until his death, however, he remained for the most part an outsider in
German academic philosophical circles, despite his later, immense fame – or, perhaps, to some
extent, because of it. Weber’s untimely death shortly preceded Jaspers’ appointment to the
philosophy faculty. Jaspers would always remain haunted by Weber’s last words, uttered as he
slipped into incoherence and died: “The true is the truth.”

The relationship between the political thought of Weber and Jaspers stands in need of
clarification. Scholars are notoriously divided as to how to classify Weber’s political
thought. Weber was in favor of parliamentary democracy with freely-contested elections,
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but he also advocated a form of “charismatic leadership” based on his sociological theory of
charismatic legitimacy. He decried the “bureaucratization” of contemporary society as a
trend leading to anomie and authoritarianism. However, he has also been characterized as
authoritarian himself, e.g. by Jürgen Habermas who characterized the decisionist Carl
Schmitt as Weber’s “legitimate pupil”. 30 Jaspers writes that Weber’s politics “coined my
own”, Jaspers qualifies this statement by stating that he had never followed Weber’s
nationalistic or militaristic tendencies. 31 Jaspers was a regular participant in Weber’s
“Sundays at home” in which Heidelberg intellectuals would meet to discuss political affairs
of the day. The liberal-democratic orientation of this colloquy was well-known at the time.
It was during this period, from 1913 to 1920, that Jaspers, inspired by Weber’s example, put
aside the role of the “unpolitical man” and began to see politics as a legitimate field for
public intellectual activity. A problem arises, however, when one seeks to connect Weber’s
political thought with that of Jaspers. Jaspers’ thought should not be open to the same
controversies that characterize the scholarly appraisal of Weber’s thought. There are no
grounds to characterize Jaspers’ political thought as nationalistic or authoritarian in intent.
While Jaspers’ writings about Weber are unique for their effusive praise – Weber is the
“Galileo of the Geisteswissenschaften” – nevertheless the influence of the latter for Jaspers’
own political thought should not be overestimated. That influence primarily involves two
factors: the basic motivation toward public intellectual activity and the desire to warn
against ideological extremes and their totalitarian tendencies. Jaspers recounts a meeting of
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Weber and Joseph Schumpeter in a Vienna coffeehouse. Schumpeter remarked how pleased
he was with the Bolshevik revolution, owing to the fact that now communism would provide
a “fine laboratory” in which it would prove itself to be a disaster. Weber became angry and
appalled at this, asserting that it could only be “a laboratory filled with mounds of corpses.” 32
The association implied by Weber here, connecting extremist ideology and totalitarianism,
would become a constant structural feature of Jaspers’ political thought. Jaspers wrote to his
parents: “Since I am neither right nor left, I place a value on being connected with the name
‘Max Weber’.” 33 Unlike Weber, however, Jaspers would advocate in his late writings for
mass civil disobedience as the foundation for freedom in a democratic community. This late
position, from The Future of Germany, published in 1966, was only foreshadowed in his
most extensive treatment of politics in his The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind
(1958), though there he stressed the necessity of democracy, the dangers of a political culture
of blind obedience and the intrinsic value of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. In that work,
he wrote an uncharacteristically unclear, even partially contradictory, assessment of Gandhi’s
political use of mass civil disobedience. At this point, he was undecided as to whether he
should likewise promote mass civil disobedience or not. There he wrote, on a single page,
that Gandhi gives the “true answer” and “no answer”. 34 In The Future of Germany, he
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delivered his most scathing critique of what he perceived to be the hypocrisies of German
politics in the Federal Republic, declaiming: “We are getting nowhere with the web of lies at
the core of our national existence.” 35 He called for “spontaneous popular action wherever
possible” and “a ‘legitimate’ nonviolent revolution from below.” 36 Jaspers is emphatic that
these movements must come “from below”, and this is not in keeping with Weber’s
conception of “charismatic” leadership by exemplary individuals. That concept, however,
was never intrinsically involved in Jaspers’ political thought. But, on the other hand, neither
was any advocacy of mass civil disobedience before 1966. However, Jaspers would not have
found his practical position on civil disobedience in 1966 to be inconsistent with his more
theoretical earlier political work. That earlier work, Man in the Modern Age, revolves
around questions of how to conceive of freedom – timely questions in a Germany on the
brink of totalitarianism – whereas, in this later work, Jaspers seeks to describe practical
measures. Overall, Jaspers’ great admiration for Weber only translated into two chief
components of his political thought: its emphatically public orientation and its opposition to
any variety of ideological extreme. Jaspers’ reception should escape the same sort of
controversies that surround the interpretation of Weber’s political thought. Jaspers cannot be
characterized, as Schmitt has, as an heir to any authoritarian strand in Weber’s thought,
because in Man in the Modern Age, there are no practical prescriptions for action and, in his
later works, he emphasizes participation and civil disobedience.
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After the death of Weber, Jaspers soon turned to the young, and as yet unknown, Martin
Heidegger. Despite what would later emerge as their irreconcilable differences, the primary
factor that welded together the friendship of these two men in the early 1920s could only have
been their common self-conception as outsiders within philosophical academia. Jaspers recalls
that his first philosophical work, Psychology of Worldviews, earned him the reputation in some
quarters of being a “dangerous nihilist”. From Heidegger’s critique of that work, comes his
conception of the “destruction” of Western philosophy. Both sought in the early 1920s to set out
upon radically news paths of thought, and, for several years, this orientation was enough to
sustain a friendship. As Heidegger’s thought began to coalesce towards Being and Time,
however, their differences began to emerge and their friendship began to disintegrate. Jaspers’
judgment upon reading a manuscript of Being and Time was that the work was “dictatorial” in
orientation. 37 In his 1945 letter officially recommending that Heidegger be barred from
teaching, Jaspers described his relationship with Heidegger before 1933 as “complicated.” And
that is certainly not an understatement given that, as early as 1922, Jaspers recalls being
disappointed with the direction Heidegger’s thought was taking. Jaspers recounts a friendship
with Heidegger in the 1920s that was fraught with tension. 38 In the early 1920s, Heidegger
submitted Jaspers’ Psychology of Worldviews to a critique that Jaspers felt was merciless and
unjust. Jaspers recalls many conversations in which Heidegger was inexplicably moody or
taciturn. Though Heidegger dedicated Being and Time to Edmund Husserl, he had privately
expressed his contempt for Husserl to Jaspers. However, Jaspers also recalls that he and
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Heidegger thought to share a unique orientation towards philosophy that, for a time, provided a
common ground for their friendship. In a particularly striking instance, Jaspers describes
showing Heidegger a letter full of misspellings and grammatical errors from a woman who was
clearly going insane. Heidegger shared Jaspers’ empathy for the writer’s simplistic, yet honest,
expression of her anxiety and despair of death. Jaspers concluded that only he and Heidegger
among German intellectuals would take such a letter seriously. For Jaspers part, this attitude was
in continuity with his appreciative studies of schizophrenic creativity, e.g. in Strindberg and van
Gogh. But what would take shape as an early aspiration to together form a radical new approach
to philosophy would soon devolve for the two men into a panoply of irreconcilable personal,
political and philosophical differences.

After publishing Psychology of Worldviews in 1919 and then assuming a chair in
philosophy at Heidelberg in 1922, Jaspers published nothing for more than a decade, with the
exception of works he had prepared before Psychology of Worldviews and a short treatise on
university education. The latter work, which promoted academic freedom and a distancing of the
university from nationalism, Heidegger was rumored to have criticized shortly after its
publication as: “the most irrelevant of all irrelevancies of the time.” 39 Jaspers’ lack of
publications during this period lead some of his colleagues to the opinion that he was “done for”.
However, during this period, he was nevertheless preparing two projects which would be
published in the early 1930s: Man in the Modern Age and the three volumes of Philosophy. As
a new professor of philosophy – the rare exception of such without a doctorate in philosophy in
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Germany – Jaspers devoted these years to an extensive reading of the texts of Western
philosophy and to teaching courses associated with his new approach. For this period, there is
little evidence to document the development of his political views. But it is not hard to find
continuity between the inspiration he drew from Weber and his circle and Man in the Modern
Age. That continuity consists of, as mentioned above, a motivation for public intellectual
activity and an opposition to the ideological extremes that commonly characterized politics of
the period. Nevertheless, one indicator of Jaspers’ political orientation during this period comes
in the form of his signature on Magnus Hirschfeld’s second petition to repeal paragraph 175 of
the German penal code which criminalized homosexuality. 40 As the perhaps the most prominent
voice of psychiatry in Germany, this signature can only be seen as an important public statement,
insofar as homosexuality was not only criminalized but also considered a form of mental illness
at that time.

Also during the 1920s, Jaspers was working on his first political work, Die Geistige
Situation der Zeit, translated into English as Man in the Modern Age. The aim of that work was
to base a criticism of totalitarianism, in both its fascist and communist forms, upon an existential
conception of the human condition, i.e. upon a basis that does not postulate a true and essential
human nature but rather upon the premise that being truly human, and hence being truly free, is
uniquely dependent upon conscious decision, and thus open to infinite interpretations of what it
means to be human. Somehow, Jaspers thought, an order in which such differing conceptions
can peaceably coexist must be attained. With this Jaspers sought to replace Marx’s conception
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of alienation, a conception that necessarily implied a true, essential and singular human nature
from which all humans are historically alienated. Such a view, Jaspers thought, cannot but
support an unfree social order, insofar as it serves as a claim to exclusive access to the “science
of society” which would serve to bring about universal and total emancipation from all
oppression, but at the cost of eliminating all differing conceptions of the meaning of being
human. Though he does not use the term, this is the first work to attempt a theoretical critique of
totalitarianism. His aim here is primarily critical – he does not prescribe any particular
institutions or actions to meet the threat of totalitarianism. There is no endorsement of
organized, mass resistance or of liberal democratic order. The absence of any such prescriptions
surely owes itself to the fact that, in the turbulent atmosphere of the late 1920s, there was no
entirely certain understanding of how the pandemic economic excesses and crises and the
tremendous social inequalities of industrialized countries could be addressed without violence.
On the contrary, extremist ideologies prescribing violent means of reform were all too common.
It was only later that the innovations of the contemporary welfare state and organized, mass civil
disobedience gradually developed as formulas for addressing the economic turmoil and social
inequalities that stemmed from the profound transformation of societies that underwent
industrialization.

Jaspers has been characterized as an opponent of parliamentary democracy in Man in the
Modern Age. No criticism of parliamentary democracy appears in that work, however. There is
a sharp criticism of parliamentary democracy in his works from the Federal Republic period, but
that criticism is based on his view that parliamentary democracy in Germany was, at that time,
hypocritical in the sense that it was not democratic, i.e. not representative, enough. The claim
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that Man in the Modern Age presents such a criticism is based on the implication that Jaspers
was, in some fashion which goes unelaborated in these accounts, an authoritarian opponent of
democracy at this time. In an essay on Jaspers’ appropriation of Kierkegaard, Istvan Czako
claims that Man in the Modern Age contains a “carefully worked out critique of parliamentary
democracy.” 41 Chris Thornhill in his book, Karl Jaspers: Politics and Metaphysics, makes the
same claim; that there is, in his words, an “attack on parliamentary democracy” in Man in the
Modern Age. 42 Neither Czako nor Thornhill provide any quote or citation that substantiates their
claim – and this is due to the fact that such a passage cannot be found anywhere in that book.
One would think that such a remarkable claim would at least warrant one quote or citation.
Moreover, Thornhill tries to characterize as Jaspers as expressing a conservative ideology here,
claiming that Jaspers, “shows a certain proximity to the ideas of Schmitt, Spengler and
Heidegger.” 43 This is also mistaken insofar as those thinkers did not articulate a criticism of
totalitarianism while Jaspers did so. Furthermore, parts of Man in the Modern Age can just as
easily, and misleadingly, be favorably compared with some elements of Marxist thought, insofar
as Marx also decries the oppressive nature of mechanical regimentation in society. In fact the,
still erroneous, comparison with Marxist thought would be closer to the truth than the
comparison with right-wing thought, owing to factors such as the complete lack of any “blood
and soil” nationalistic element in the work at all and the presence of a penetrating condemnation
of “anthropological” theories of racial hierarchies. But neither comparison is useful in
characterizing Jaspers’ political thought here, because what Jaspers is explicitly trying to argue
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for is an orientation of thought that avoids ideological extremes. Scholarship on Jaspers’
political thought should avoid trying to ascribe a position for him in any one ideological camp or
another.

The tendency to make such an ascription may have started with Hans Gadamer, who
presents the only such characterization by one who actually knew Jaspers. For that reason,
Gadamer’s characterization is all the more remarkable. Gadamer, in an interview, stated that
Man in the Modern Age “smacked a little of Nazism” and that “Jaspers did satisfy certain
requirements of the Nazis” in that book. 44 This characterization is unfair, however. Jaspers
explicitly intends the work to form a warning against the totalitarian results of undemocratic
ideologies:

Bolshevism and fascism present themselves as easier possibilities [than a simple
sense of mundane responsibility]. Let us learn once more to obey without
question; let us content ourselves with a set of easy catchwords; let us,
meanwhile, leave action to some all-powerful individual who has seized the reins
of government! These forms of dictatorship are substitutes for true authority,
achieved at the cost of renouncing, on the part of almost all of us, the right to be
ourselves. 45
Nothing in the work qualifies this essential statement of clear opposition to both fascism and
Bolshevism. Gadamer’s opinion in this case must be seen alongside his completely false claim
that Jaspers was the driving intellectual force behind Heidegger’s 1933 rectoral address. That
claim can be proven to be false through examination of the correspondence between the two
men. This issue is examined in detail, below. Even without evidence from the correspondence,
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nothing in Jaspers’ works is similar to Heidegger’s rectoral address. The basis for Gadamer’s
comments, if it does not arise from some lingering personal animosity, appears to be
inexplicable.

While Man in the Modern Age presents no practical prescriptions for political action, a
closer look at the work in the context of the development of Jaspers’ thought shows that the
allegation of authoritarian intent is untenable. Jaspers recalls that the politically liberal
orientation of his father and family left an indelible mark on him. Jaspers’ father was a
prosperous banker and held various political positions in Oldenburg. When asked to stand for
election to the Reichstag, he declined, however, owing to his distrust of the idea of a German
Reich in general and his loathing for Bismarck and Prussian militarism in particular. It was such
sentiments that led his father to the opinion that Oldenburg should have been part of the
Netherlands. The circle around Weber, despite a very dense complexity of views, was
predicated upon a basic, shared conception of the legitimacy of at least some degree of
parliamentary democracy. In the late 1920s, Jaspers wrote to Heidegger expressing his
admiration for the United States, implying that Jaspers might rather live in the United States than
in Germany. This sentiment was met with silence by Heidegger, but it could have only provoked
his disapproval, given his characterization of the United States as a dismal product of the broad
trend of “Western nihilism”. In this work, Jaspers does not provide any suggestions for political
action. It seems unlikely that he could have envisioned anything like the call for mass civil
disobedience that he issued in the 1960s at this time. What comes closest to a criticism of
democracy here is Jaspers’ warning against mass public opinion – but only insofar as it is itself
illiberal and undemocratic. Much of the work is devoted to criticism of the “bureaucratization”,
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in Weber’s sense, or mechanical regimentation of society, a trend, in Jaspers’ view, the outcome
of which is a priming of the masses of the people for unthinking submission to ideological
demagogues. In these regards Jaspers was quite prescient of 1933 and Hitler’s rise to power
through democratic means. Similarly, in 1935, a plebiscite in the Saar region, then under League
of Nations control, resulted in 90.8 percent of votes in favor of joining Nazi Germany, against
the urgings of anti-Nazi Germans who had migrated to the region to escape Hitler’s regime.
Jaspers warns against “successful demagogues able to intoxicate the masses”, but he does not
think that the mass of the population is inherently and essentially unfit to govern itself, given the
existence of adequate democratic institutions. Rather, he locates the factors that are deleterious
to liberal democracy in forms of oppression, i.e. mechanical regimentation of society or
“bureaucratization”. His outlook is prescient of the rise of totalitarianism under Hitler: “the
state-will becomes a dictatorial re-establishment of unity, authority, and obedience, as a result of
which (the sense of the state having become fanatical in its intensity) human liberty will be lost,
and there will remain nothing but the force of crude brutality.” 46

In May, 1933 Heidegger assumed the office of rector of Freiburg University and joined
the Nazi party. In late June, he visited Heidelberg to deliver a speech to a student association
entitled “The University in the New Reich”. 47 Jaspers describes the speech as a “program for the
National Socialist renewal of the universities.” While the student audience fêted Heidegger with
an ecstatic standing ovation, Jaspers, disgusted by the speech, remained seated in the front row
and did not applaud. That night, Heidegger stayed at Jaspers’ house. Over dinner, Jaspers
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thought to confront Heidegger with pointed questions about his recent allegiance to the Nazi
party. When asked about the Nazis’ propaganda concerning the “elders of Zion”, Heidegger
responded that: “there really is a dangerous international fraternity of Jews.” And, when asked
how someone as uneducated as Hitler could lead a nation of culture such as Germany, Heidegger
responded: “education does not matter. Just see his wonderful hands.” 48 This would be their last
meeting.

This conversation is the immediate background of Jaspers’ most problematical political
work, his “Theses on University Reform”. Its twenty-seven typed manuscript pages bear some
resemblances to Heidegger’s rectoral address, “The Self-Assertion of the German University.” It
can only be these resemblances that led Gadamer to claim in an interview that: “a portion of
Heidegger’s rectoral address stems from Jaspers… It’s common knowledge that the ideas of
labor service, military service, education service and so on – all of that is Jaspers.” 49 The
correspondence between the two men shows, however, that Jaspers wrote the “Theses” only after
reading Heidegger’s rectoral address. Moreover, he notified Heidegger that this document had
been written, but he did not send it, but instead filed it away and waited to send it should
Heidegger request it. Heidegger did not request the document, indicating that he was not
interested in Jaspers’ views. 50 The “Theses”, however, were written by Jaspers in order to
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influence Heidegger’s policies as rector, and, hopefully, through him, to influence university
education throughout Germany. Since Heidegger never read the “Theses” and since Jaspers
wrote the document after Heidegger’s rectoral address, Gadamer’s claim that Jaspers was
influential for Heidegger’s address cannot be valid. The “Theses” document remained in
Jaspers’ files and unknown to the public until after his death.

Jaspers wrote the “Theses on University Reform” in July, 1933 when Jewish faculty of
Heidelberg University, including two of Jaspers’ friends, had already been removed from their
teaching positions by the regime, new deans acceptable to the regime had taken office and new
restrictions upon Jewish students were already in place. 51 A government notice of reward had
already been issued by this time publically calling for the murder of Theodor Lessing, a critic of
the regime and Jewish former student of Edmund Husserl who had recently fled to
Czechoslovakia. Jaspers’ letter to Heidegger concerning the “Theses” asserts that the document
is, “not in conflict… with the proposals heard up until now from the government side.” 52 The
new anti-Semitic policies go completely unmentioned. Nothing in the document is explicitly
opposed to the oppressive measures already underway against Jews in German universities nor
opposed to the new constitution of the University of Heidelberg which was instrumental in
handing power over the university into to the Nazis. This has led Hans Saner, Jaspers’ last
research assistant, biographer, and editor of his correspondences and notes, to claim that this
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document stands as evidence of the fact that Jaspers, “not only misjudged reality but suppressed
it.” 53

How could Jaspers, with his repugnance for Heidegger’s Heidelberg June, 1933 speech
outlining plans to advance the Nazi takeover of the universities, and his polemic against
totalitarianism in Man in the Modern Age, suddenly decide to work in cooperation with the
Nazis? It is as if Jaspers had asked himself: “how can one convince the Nazis to structure
education policy in such a way that is both attractive to them and that provides a space for
resistance to them?” The “Theses” are Jaspers attempt to answer this question, the premise of
which is itself impossible. If this document had been presented before 1933 or after 1945, it
could not have been seen, as it rightly has been by Saner and others, to represent a “suppression
of reality” on Jaspers’ part and, hence, an intent to contribute to authoritarianism. The
similarities with Heidegger’s rectoral address and the few words of praise that Jaspers expressed
to Heidegger about that address, when compared with the substance of the “Theses” are attempts
at superficial ingratiation while the proposals of the “Theses” themselves attempt to insulate
universities from political control and promote academic freedom. Had any of Jaspers
suggestions actually been adopted, however, it seems highly unrealistic to assume they would
have produced any of his intended effects at all given the totalitarian nature of the regime.

The differences between Heidegger’s rectoral address and Jaspers’ “Theses” reveal that
these two documents arise from opposed political orientations. On the surface, Heidegger’s
address is full of nationalistic references evocative of, in his words, the “soil and blood” of the
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German Volk. 54 Jaspers “Theses” on the other hand only contain a few, vague nationalistic
overtones, e.g. “German science”. The central issue is their difference on the concept of
academic freedom, since where any of their plans intersect the plane of actual politics is at the
point where the question arises whether the universities are to retain any academic freedom or
not. For Heidegger, this question is decided wholly in favor of control of the universities under
the totalitarian Führerprinzip. As he says:

The much praised ‘academic freedom’ is being banished from the German
university; for this freedom was false, because it was only negating. It meant
predominantly lack of concern, arbitrariness in one’s intentions and inclinations,
lack of restraint in everything one does. 55
Jaspers, on the other hand, is unequivocal in his principled defense of academic freedom:

Since ancient times scholars have demanded that their research and teaching be
free. This freedom means that scientific development can receive its
commitment, its goal and its path only through itself out of the ground shared by
the people, for whom there can be no authority other than the illumination brought
about by true knowledge itself. 56
Jaspers even goes further, recommending a more democratic and egalitarian notion of academic
freedom than that extant in the already compulsively hierarchical German university before the
Nazi seizure of power:
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The bond based on freedom between teacher and student cannot come about
through coercion. It needs, instead, a relationship that is Socratic in intention,
without authority, but with both parties formally on one level. 57
Jaspers’ concrete recommendations even extend to measures which would be considered
progressive by twenty-first century standards:

The number of attendance hours at lectures and workshops must be reduced for
the individual student… It is necessary to do away with all obligatory syllabuses,
required course sequences, and attendance records. 58
For Jaspers, these plans are, as he says, “aristocratic.” For Jaspers that term did not equate to any
kind of imperative for the leadership of a hereditary caste of nobility – such a concept is nowhere
to be found in Jaspers’ political thought. This term, which also crops up in his correspondence
with Heidegger and Man in the Modern Age, can easily be a source of confusion. What Jaspers
meant by the term “aristocracy” is more properly understood in the literal sense of “rule by the
best” or “meritocracy”, presupposing a background of democratic equality of opportunity.
Jaspers’ recommendations that professors and students be considered “formally on one level”
and his proposals that would have radically loosened the academic strictures upon students are
elements of this liberal and egalitarian intent. On the quintessential issue of academic freedom,
Jaspers’ proposals could not be more opposed to Heidegger’s desire that the university become a
mechanism of “the new Reich that Chancellor Hitler will bring to reality.” 59

Aside from the issue of academic freedom, comparison of Heidegger’s address and
Jaspers’ “Theses” can become confounded upon their similar uses of the terms “labor service”
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and “military service” or “military sport”. What is essentially at issue here is whether students of
German universities could be further disciplined and regimented along authoritarian lines. As
mentioned above, Gadamer credits the presence of these terms in Heidegger’s address to Jaspers.
Despite the fact that this is not possible because Heidegger never saw, nor wanted to see,
Jaspers’ “Theses”, these terms had already been introduced into university life before either man
wrote about them. Hans Saner writes that the application of these terms to university life stems
from Heidegger, although this is implausible since even in the late 1920s these concepts were
part of Nazi party programs. But when Saner depicts Heidegger as their foremost academic
ideologue, he is likely correct, insofar as Heidegger’s May, 1933 rectoral address emphasizes the
necessity of these elements in university life in grandiose terms. 60 German student associations,
following the Nazi Party line, instituted compulsory labor service for university students in June,
1933. When Jaspers wrote the “Theses” in July, 1933, he accepted these new, authoritarian
measures, but sought to limit their impact on student intellectual development. It seems
reasonable to assume Jaspers thought he stood no chance of expressing outright opposition to
these measures. He writes:

The discipline and attitude brought about by labor service and military sport are
not to be imitated or repeated in scientific education… a separation in time will
become necessary… between the labor service and military service on the one
hand and the period of study on the other. 61
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Saner interprets Jaspers on this point as saying: “there you have drill and coercion, both of which
are inimical to intellectual labor.” 62 Heidegger, in contrast, thought these measures should
“pervade all of student existence” and would thereby contribute to the “Volksgemeinschaft”. 63

The question remains, however, to what extent is his “Theses” document in the situation
in which it arose indicative of Jaspers’ own political views and the development of his political
thought? It is clear that, despite its intent to protect academic freedom, the timing of the
document could only have contributed to strengthening a regime that would invariably have bent
any and all measures it adopted to its own ends. Further, if anything from the document was
adopted, this could only have compromised Jaspers’ own intellectual reputation by involving
himself with the regime. As Saner says, the fact that Jewish faculty had already begun to be
removed when Jaspers wrote this document signals Jaspers’ sheer “suppression of reality.”
Unlike at any other time in his career, this incident represents a contradiction between his
political thought and his practical activity. There is nothing to signal that either the polemic
intent of his prescient Man in the Modern Age or his generally liberal democratic outlook of
earlier years had diminished. Nor would his later political writings centering on themes of
reason, responsibility and liberal democracy present any theoretical reversal of the liberal spirit
of the “Theses”. Still, how can such a tremendous suppression of reality in practice not, at least
to some degree, call into question his invariable opposition to authoritarianism in theory?
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Jaspers’ inchoate career as a public intellectual was brought to an abrupt halt by the rise
of the Hitler regime in Germany. Published in 1931, Man in the Modern Age would be Jaspers’
last explicit foray into the political realm until after the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Allied
forces. Jaspers was forced into retirement in 1937 and banned from publishing in 1943. But,
even during the decade between Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 and his publishing ban, Jaspers
felt that any overt public resistance on his part to the Nazi regime would endanger the life of his
Jewish wife, Gertrude, as well as his own. Officially requested by the government to obtain a
divorce, and while other such marriages between Germans and Jews were terminating under
political pressure, Jaspers refused to abandon his wife. Though he and Gertrude made attempts
to arrange suitable conditions for emigration, all of these ultimately resulted in failure.
Conditions of life were meagre for German exiles in many cases, and, compounded with Karl
Jaspers’ already frail health, he and Gertrude felt his life under such conditions would be gravely
endangered. Jaspers later recounted that he felt his best chance for exile, appointment to
Princeton University, had be stymied by Albert Einstein’s refusal to write the requested letter of
recommendation. He and Gertrude concluded between themselves a suicide pact, to be carried
out when their deportation to the camps became imminent. They were narrowly spared this fate
by the liberation of Heidelberg in March, 1945 by American forces.

Determined not to be left “empty-handed” should Germany be liberated, Jaspers used the
years from his forced retirement in 1937 until 1945 to work on the foundations of his later
thought. The period from 1945 until his death in 1969 would see his assumption of the
paramount role of a virtual Praeceptor Germaniae and his rise to fame throughout the world
except for in those countries under communist rule. His numerous works of this period would
44

regularly top the popular best-seller lists. Not long after 1945, he remarked to Hannah Arendt
that the massive sales figures of his books had pushed him into the highest tax bracket. After his
death, however, his name almost immediately sank virtually everywhere into complete oblivion.

After the war, Jaspers and Hannah Arendt resumed their exchange of letters. Arendt,
despite her own limited resources, regularly sent food and medicine to Jaspers and his wife. This
act of kindness, more than any other factor, led to a close, life-long friendship. After he and
Gertrude moved to Basel, Switzerland in 1948, Arendt would pay them numerous visits in the
subsequent two decades. Arendt was greatly instrumental in facilitating the translation and
publication of many of Jaspers’ works in English. However, an examination of their
correspondence indicates that their development of their political works proceeded
independently. In his last letter to Arendt which includes any substantive discussion of political
thought, Jaspers was still struggling to explain aspects of Max Weber’s thought that had be
foundational for his own thought. Jaspers would always continue, as he humorously put it, to
play “schoolmaster” to Arendt. What emerges from the correspondence as uniting Jaspers and
Arendt more than any aspect of philosophy, and despite political differences, seems to be a
shared sympathy for the struggle for civil courage in times of crisis.

A pivotal moment in Jaspers’ thinking can be seen in correspondence with Arendt from
1953 concerning Senator Joseph McCarthy’s investigation of intellectuals suspected of holding
communist sympathies. Jaspers writes: “an unimaginable stupidity must have taken hold in the
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USA. It frightens us because we are familiar with it.” 64 At this time Jaspers was one of the
honorary presidents of the Congress on Cultural Freedom, an office held at one time by other
prominent intellectuals including John Dewey, Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre. The
Congress for Cultural Freedom was active at the height of the Cold War in promoting an
international intellectual culture of liberal democracy in countries not under communist control –
it was later revealed to have been secretly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. Jaspers
became disillusioned with the organization as some of its leaders, e.g. Sidney Hook, publicly
expressed toleration for McCarthy’s activities and condemnation of his critics such as Albert
Einstein. In a letter to Arendt from May, 1953 Jaspers expresses his lack of confidence in the
Congress for Cultural Freedom. 65

This expression of this sentiment corresponds to a shift in the development of Jaspers’
political thought after the Second World War. While the persistent themes of authoritarianism
and totalitarianism that are involved in all of his political thought continue up to the end, at this
point, his thinking, which up until now had placed great weight on “reason, this comprehensive
power of communication,” 66 would begin to shift, following upon his increasing skepticism of
liberal democracy, toward his major final political work, The Future of Germany, with its acute
criticism and call for civil disobedience. His political works from the latter half of the 1940s,
The European Spirit, The Origin and Goal of History, and Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time
can be characterized as constituting his period of “communicative reason”. The earliest
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indication of this shift comes from his 1954 article, “The Political Vacuum in Germany,” in
which, concerning the prospects of democracy in the Federal Republic, he admits to, “being
overcome by a terrible pessimism.” 67 This work follows shortly upon the correspondence with
Arendt concerning McCarthyism. In this work he took the unpopular stance of opposing
German reunification and plans underway for West Germany’s rearmament. He took the urge to
reunification, which was in fact impossible given East Germany’s role as a Soviet satellite state,
to be a “longing for the glory of the past Reich” rather than based upon a public opinion that
supported genuine democracy. Jaspers finds that political culture in West Germany had yet not
overcome its deeply-seated desire for a “great leader”. 68 His implication is that, in such a
situation, reunification and rearmament could only work in favor of the perpetuation of that
cultural trait. In terms of the development of his political thought, here for the first time one can
see Jaspers discuss themes of obedience and participation. He contends that the Bismarck’s
suppression of domestic democratic tendencies resulted in a culture of obedience that persists in
the present, while neighboring countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland, though culturally
similar to Germany, escaped this fate. 69 He introduces for the first time in his works a
dichotomy between a culture of political participation and a culture of obedience:

Popular participation in politics may be part of daily life, reflected in the general
attitude, in the acceptance of joint responsibility, in equal rights, in
neighborliness; or politics may remain outside daily life due to the emphasis on
hierarchies or because political intercourse consists of giving and obeying
orders. 70
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The echoes of the principle of this dichotomy would intensify into his later advocacy of civil
disobedience. For a short time, as a president of the Congress for Cultural Freedom he would
play the role of a standard bearer for the “free world”, but in the early 1950s he ceased to fit that
part as his political thought assumed a more skeptical and radical dimension.

An early signal of that later attitude, however, appears immediately after the Second
World War in the form of his Schuldfrage, or as it has been translated into English, The Question
of Germany Guilt. This marks his departure from the style of Man in the Modern Age, which
was directed at the Bildungsbürgertum, and the adoption of a literary style that sought “the
broadest possible audience.” The book is based on a series of lectures Jaspers delivered at
Heidelberg University in the months following the end of the war. Its contents include a
description of various types of guilt he thought relevant to the situation in Germany following
the Holocaust. The most important of these for his later political thought is the concept of moral
guilt. He argues that the absence of a capacity to feel moral guilt is a necessary factor in
maintaining the culture of obedience that he sees solidifying under Bismarck and permeating
German politics up to the present. The picture he presents is one in which the majority of the
German population is conditioned by an attitude of unquestioning obedience to state power, a
situation in which indifference and irresponsibility toward political reality prevail. 71 His
association between unquestioning obedience and the inability to assume a sense of
responsibility foreshadows his later political thought:
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Political unfreedom… obeys on the one hand, and feels not guilty on the other.
Feeling guilty and hence knowing oneself to be liable is the beginning of the inner
upheaval which seeks to actualize political freedom. 72
His Guilt lectures packed the auditorium at Heidelberg, but he was dismayed by the audiences’
reactions, complaining to Arendt, “never before 1937 did I experience so little of a kindly
attitude toward me in the auditorium as I do now… Communists call me a forward guard of
National Socialism; the sullen losers [the Nazis], a traitor to my country.” 73 He also received
numerous appreciative private letters and reviews in the press. 74 Continuing in the vein of Man
in the Modern Age, he adopts an orientation that eschews ideological extremes. On the question
of moral guilt, he was clearly aiming at ordinary Germans who had collaborated or inactively felt
solidarity with the Nazis (the Nazi officials themselves he classified under political or criminal
guilt). Subsequent research has shown what could only have been common knowledge in
Germany at that time: that a large portion of Gestapo investigations had arisen from
denunciations made by ordinary Germans. 75 His emphasis on his theoretical connection between
consciousness of moral guilt and political liberty, which appears for the first time here, would go
on to play a prominent role in his political thought from 1953 in its central conception of
responsibility. His attitude of radical moral confrontation, first displayed here but held in
abeyance for the rest the 1940s and early 1950s, would again become manifest in the period of
his Atom Bomb book and his Future of Germany. In the late 1980s, German intellectuals would
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debate the interpretation of Nazism and the Holocaust in Germany’s history. Jürgen Habermas,
playing a leading role in what would become known as the Historikerstreit, would claim that
Jaspers’ conception of collective moral guilt for the tragedies of that period should continue to be
affirmed by Germans. 76 Jaspers’ conception of moral guilt has subsequently contributed to other
countries’ discussions of coming to terms with histories of atrocities and other forms of
oppression. In that regard it has been by far the most actively received aspect of Jaspers’
political thought – where almost the entire remainder has gone virtually completely unnoticed,
both in the public sphere and in academia, since his death.

In his 1957 work, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind, Jaspers orients a broad
survey of contemporary world politics around the pivotal question: how can political liberty
endure in a global situation where the risk of totalitarianism is, where not already manifested in
extant communist regimes, always a potential lurking beneath the surface of constitutional
democracies? For Jaspers, the problem with democracy is that democratic institutions and
democratic politicians are never alone sufficient for its preservation. Jaspers observes in
democracies a suicidal tendency which can lead to the loss of liberty through its own procedures,
looking to the free elections of 1933 in Germany as a prime example, concerning which Hitler
gloried in having, “defeated insane democracy by its own insanity.” 77 This leads him to
conclude that: “No democratic form of government can guarantee the democratic idea.” 78 Thus
Jaspers seeks a factor outside of democratic government, beyond its institutions and politicians,
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which must serve as its foundation. In so doing, one can see him continuing to develop the
theme of contrast between a culture of obedience and a culture of participation that he broached
in “The Political Vacuum in Germany”. But, at this point, he is not yet ready to call for a
nonviolent revolution based on civil disobedience. What one observes here, rather, are the
principles that framework that later appeal. As Jaspers was writing this book, he observed with
bitter anguish the brutal Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. He also took
inspiration from the courage of the Hungarian resistance, writing to Arendt: “I wouldn’t have
thought it possible that a people could still do today what the Hungarians have done… It will
have consequences.” 79 Hungary was an example, he thought, of a struggle for freedom that can
serve as a foundation which makes democracy possible. Such struggles necessarily involve the
courage to risk or sacrifice one’s own life on the part of individuals, and not merely to obey
orders or to avoid punishment, but, crucially, in the service of one’s own conscience and in
solidarity with others. The other side of this view was his earlier position that the culture of
obedience in Germany since Bismarck had the tendency to supplant following one’s own
conscience, in full acceptance of the responsibility for the consequences, with a tendency to
merely obey the orders of established power. That culture of obedience, Jaspers thought,
detached individuals from a sense of responsibility for their own actions. Individuals should be
motivated to participate in politics on the basis of something that they view as above politics, for
Jaspers’ the “suprapolitical”, or what their conscience tells them is right. This, he argues, is
unlike the role of the religious fanatic, who, also willing to die for what he thinks is right, would
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do so without a sense of responsibility for the community and world in which he lives. 80 Such a
religious fanatic might be thought of merely rigidly obeying a law that he thinks is of divine
origin and thus not essentially different than an obedient political subject. Likewise, a sacrifice
of one’s life would be a waste if it is done in circumstances where it could not become known to
others, where its purpose would go unknown in the absence of publicity and solidarity. 81
Gandhi’s non-violent civil disobedience is presented as an exemplar, though not one that Jaspers’
thinks is practical when faced with totalitarianism. Gandhi, nevertheless, risked his life to
promote civil disobedience in face of possible state violence by a “liberal” British Empire and
was effective under those circumstances. When faced with totalitarian oppression, however,
only violent means of revolt stand any chance of being effective:

The subjection of Hungary has shown to the dullest eye that the totalitarian
Russian terror would have preferred Hungary as a desert to Hungary free.
Against total violence there is no help in less violence, nor in non-violence. 82
The kind of struggles, violent or non-violent, that Jaspers points to as exemplars all involve a
struggle for freedom against oppression, motivated by reasons of conscience that are publically
displayed, at the real risk of life, and in solidarity with others. The power of such struggles, he
claims, and they must involve all of those factors, is that they send a message of ultimate
responsibility, responsibility to reasons of conscience even at the expense of one’s own life.
Whether they are or are not effective in achieving their immediate ends, they set an example that
commands attention and inspires emulation:
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Hence the convulsion that spread suddenly through Europe and America after the
Hungarian revolt, the all but unprecedented unanimity in the awakening
consciousness of human dignity and the experience of its total peril! Such an
experience is like a hurricane sweeping the minds… Conscience stirs the world
over, though politically and militarily the world is just looking on. Independently
of religions, classes, and interests, man responds to the event as a human being. 83
Though the Hungarian uprising was not successful, it surely cast doubt upon Jaspers’ earlier
contention, in The Origin and Goal of History, that totalitarianism cannot be overcome from
within. Jaspers’ point here is that, even when it is unsuccessful, such an uprising’s effects spiral
beyond the immediate locus of the event – its immediate defeat may lead to its ultimate success.
And, one might argue, that Hungary’s ultimate consequences were the revolutions of 1989 in
communist countries. The principle of emulation here extends to democratic regimes. It is not,
therefore, for Jaspers, the institutions and leaders of already democratic regimes that ensure
democracy, though they are necessary for its operation. It is rather a political culture shared by
the populace that, in emulation of such struggles for freedom, cycles continuously between
responsibility and criticism. In solidarity as a democratic community, the people must accept
joint responsibility for their state’s actions, even at the possible risk of their lives. 84 But, on the
other hand, they must criticize the state and be poised to struggle against it, here too at the
possible risk of their lives. 85 Though democratic education plays a role in this, it is not so much
such planned education that Jaspers sees as crucial as it is the spontaneous process of emulation
which simply happens through public communication. 86 Jaspers’ conception of democracy is
appears to be one that presupposes a universal background for democracy in human conscience
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that is stimulated in instances of struggle for freedom. These principles set the framework for his
later advocacy of civil disobedience, however here they seem to be presented in an inchoate state
of their formulation, demanding that the reader piece together themes from distant chapters of a
very densely detailed book.

His 1966 work, Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?, translated in English as The Future of
Germany, presents the final position in the development of Jaspers’ political thought. Notably,
after its publication, he would advocate for gay liberation in Germany by contributing an original
essay to the 1969 volume which became the bible of that movement, Weder Krankheit noch
Verbrechen. Jaspers, aged eighty-six, died in 1969 in Basel. He remained politically active until
the end. Upon renouncing his German citizenship in protest of the former Nazi Kurt Georg
Kiesinger’s appointment as German chancellor, he became a citizen of Basel in 1966. The
Future of Germany contains scathing, detailed criticism of the Federal Republic’s foreign and
domestic policies. In a letter, Arendt showered Jaspers with effusive praise. She publically
reviewed the work as “the most important book published in Germany since the Second World
War”. East German head of state Walter Ulbricht promptly banned the book in East Germany,
based on excerpts appearing in Der Spiegel before publication. The book immediately became a
media sensation in Germany and topped the bestseller lists. But Jaspers lamented to Arendt that
it had sold only one fifth as many copies in its first month as had another recent bestseller, Peter
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Bamm’s biography of Alexander the Great entitled, Alexander: Power as Destiny. 87 Jaspers’
ironic aside here is reminiscent of a passage from The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind:

Struggles for independence become exemplary for political ethics, deeds of
Alexander’s or Caesar’s type only for later conquerors and for the impulses of
violence. Admiration for them by frenzied enthusiasts or powerless malcontents
prepares the way for blind participation in political evil. 88
Not everyone in Germany, however, was more interested in rehashing the life and times of a
long-dead megalomaniacal autocrat than in rationally coming to terms with the pressing demands
of the day. Jaspers notes that the book had resonated well with students. 89 In 1968, students, the
68er-Bewegung, at campuses throughout West Germany, engaged in massive protests and
endured frequent police brutality. Later joined by others, the protests culminated in Bonn where
80,000 people protested the new emergency legislation that had been the prime target of Jaspers’
polemic. Germany’s long-standing trend of nationalism and authoritarianism predominating
among university students was at an end. The massive protests of 1968 would catalyze the
formation of the political culture of a rising generation that placed greater value in democratic
participation. Jaspers’ political thought contributed to this transformation.

The goal of The Future of Germany is democratic revolution. It represents the
culmination of Jaspers’ political thought. It stands in continuity with Jaspers existential
conception of the human condition from Man in the Modern Age, with which he opposed
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totalitarian thought that he described as always presupposing a reduction of free reality of human
consciousness, and conscience, to a determinist doctrine of essential human nature. The concept
of moral guilt from The Guilt Question surfaces here in his contention that an ethic of
responsibility on the part of individuals is necessary for democracy. Jaspers returns to his
emphasis on the necessity of an understanding of the past that clarifies the reality of the present
situation and avoids falling into a formula for prediction based on a supposed causal necessity.
In this, he resumes the polemic of The Origin and Goal of History against Marx, whom he
accused of turning history into delusional prophecy. 90 The necessary role of the courage for civil
disobedience in a democracy in this work was prefigured in The Atom Bomb and the Future of
Mankind.

The political message of The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind, which is presented
there only in outline, is stated succinctly in The Future of Germany. The possibility of political
liberty and democracy is founded upon civil disobedience:

There can be no free state and no free citizenry without the possibility of a
‘legitimate’ nonviolent revolution from below, whether by political strikes, by
mass protests, by a majority’s refusal to vote, or by some other kind of direct
popular action. The true revolution is a revolution in our way of thinking. It
seeks to convince, not to compel. 91
Two years before the massive protests of 1968, Jaspers saw Germany charting a course for
authoritarianism. The two chief German domestic political problems Jaspers identified were the
proposal of new emergency laws and the role of the major political parties, insofar as they
appeared to offer no effective democratic opposition when not in government. Under pressure
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from the Allies, who had not yet withdrawn from West Germany, German politicians had begun
to consider amending the German constitution with measures that would add new governmental
powers in case of a national emergency. Jaspers saw this as the greatest threat to the Federal
Republic’s fledgling democracy. The emergency measures would be added to the constitution in
1968, after passage by a Bundestag controlled by a “grand coalition” of the Christian Democrats
and the Socialists. Jaspers saw a growing shadow of the same legal basis through which Hitler
seized power. For him, the chief problem with the proposed emergency laws was their ability to
license government suppression of dissent:

Do we want emergency laws to make a popular uprising against war impossible?
Do we want a terroristic control mechanism to exclude the chance that people
might resist everywhere? Such a revolt would be magnificent, and it is possible…
A rational people’s hearts and minds can defy the irresponsibility of the
government and military. The police can rise against the government, the soldiers
against the generals. 92
The political parties, Jaspers laments, when in opposition, often seek to collude with
governmental power. The lack of an effective politics of opposition in parliament led Jaspers to
predict that a “grand coalition” may eventually take power. He was prescient – under former
Nazi chancellor Kiesinger in late 1966, months after this book was published, such a coalition
did form. It then went on to pass the proposed emergency legislation. This would spur massive
democratic unrest; the ultimate results fit into Jaspers’ proposals very well, insofar as this unrest
would introduce a vastly more participatory political culture in Germany. Some extreme parts of
the protest movement went far beyond Jaspers’ visions, adopting exemplars such as Che Guevara
and Ho Chi Minh. Such extremes, however, did not last – a more participatory culture did. In
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that result, Jaspers, had he lived longer, could have only been at least partially satisfied, insofar
as he had advocated “spontaneous popular organizations” and a culture where political
representation is in touch with the people: “a grass-roots democracy, a party structure with its
basis among the people, rather than in the bureaucratic party machines.” 93 Ultimately, in cases of
the threat of authoritarian rule, he advocates for outright revolt. He cites the Kiel mutiny of 1918
where German sailors defied orders to go into battle, thereby prompting the German revolutions
of 1918. Uprisings such as the Kiel mutiny show, he says, that “reason can prevail by
disobedience.” 94 The case of Hungary in 1956 indicated to him that circumstances may
sometimes warrant violent revolt. From 1954, with his disillusionment with the Congress for
Cultural Freedom, which sets the stage for his essay “The Political Vacuum in Germany” of that
year, Jaspers began to a series of polemics generally united by opposition to political culture of
unquestioning obedience in general, and its Bismarckian strain in Germany in particular. These
efforts reach their culmination in The Future of Germany. There is nothing to indicate that he
thought that the principles of these polemics applied only to Germany, however.

“He was born for the ways of a democratic republic”, Hannah Arendt said of Jaspers in
her speech at the memorial service after his death in 1969. 95 His legacy will likely bear out the
truth of these words. Because his works were massive bestsellers during his lifetime, his
influence on political culture is undoubtable. Within academia, he has fallen into oblivion,
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however. The exceptions are to be found in Habermas’ appropriation of isolated elements of
Jaspers’ thought, concepts of guilt in the context of the Historikerstreit and, along with others
such as S. N. Eisenstadt and Robert Bellah, the concept of the Axial Age from The Origin and
Goal of History in works concerning religion.

Shaken out of the intellectual complacency characteristic of an “unpolitical man” by the
First World War and through his intense intellectual friendship with Max Weber, Jaspers aimed
his first political polemic against the specters of totalitarianism encroaching upon the European
horizon in the early 1930s. His prescient early political work sought an audience among the
German Bildungsbürgertum. Later, by contrast, he sought to reach the “broadest possible
audience” with his political works after 1945. His works are a model of the struggle for the
clarity and integrity of thought in times of crisis. In the second half of the 1940s, he advocated a
politics of communicative reason, plurality and negative liberty. Hannah Arendt then referred to
him as a “citizen of the world”. This title best fits his orientation during this period of his work.
From roughly 1953, Jaspers’ political thought centers on the construction of a theory of
democracy that takes its basis in individual participation, courage and responsibility. His late
political works are radical. Civil disobedience becomes equated with democracy itself, and his
comments on 1956 in Hungary affirm violent political struggle against totalitarianism. These
later positions are the logical outcomes of his Man in the Modern Age. His intellectual resistance
to totalitarianism there would translate into these later prescriptions for practical action. To
understand this connection, it necessary to avoid ascribing to Jaspers any ideological orientation.
For years, he hesitated and agonized about whether to explicitly draw out these conclusions. His
political thought will continue to provoke enduring questions such as: how can humankind’s
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history clarify the scope for individual and collective political decisions in the present and help
achieve aspirations for the future? How can individuals recognize their responsibility for their
communities’ actions? How can the courage for civil disobedience become actual in the
populace? How can conscience ground the ethics of responsible political action?

The Origin and Goal of History in the Development of Jaspers’ Political Thought

The Origin and Goal of History, published in 1948, comes from the distinct period of his
thought in the half-decade that immediately followed the Second World War. In this period
there is no mention of the necessity of civil disobedience in his works. His Schuldfrage stands as
somewhat of an exception, but not by promoting civil disobedience, rather by emphasizing the
necessity of a conception of shared moral responsibility in a democracy. That effort to confront
individuals concerning their own responsibility would lay the foundations for a key element of
his later political thought, the necessity of individual participation. On the other hand, in the
Origin and Goal of History, much more weight is carried by the concepts of negative liberty,
communicative reason and pluralism. In that regard, this work fits into the pattern of his other
works from 1945 to roughly 1950. However, Jaspers clearly became unsatisfied with leaving his
political demands there. In that work, Jaspers connects a survey of world history to
contemporary political problems. His answer is that only in a general sphere of negative liberty,
can various projects of positive liberty be effectively realized. He is addressing the question:
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why do the efforts of humankind to realize their various visions of a just community often, or
always, produce unintended results, results contrary or detrimental to the initial aims? His
chapter in The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind entitled “Historico-Political Knowledge”
attempts to explain how his study of world history fits into his broader political thought. There,
he presents his survey of world history as an attempt to locate the “basic process” of history not
in any causal factor, as Marx and his predecessors had done, but in freedom itself:

Let us repeat the great question that determines our sense of being and the manner
of our responsibility. Is there a basic process of doom and salvation, objectively
existing and cognoscible to the human mind? Or does the basic process lie in
freedom itself? That is to say: does it result from human decisions – decisions
which have not been finally made? 96
Jaspers makes it clear in this that his history is based on the second assumption, unlike the
premises of Marx’s in the causal factors of “class struggle” and “alienation” or Hegel’s in the
working out of the “absolute ideal”. Such accounts detach historical events from the decisions
that made those events actual. Individuals, Jaspers thought, do not come to a real sense of their
own responsibilities when they accept such historical views as valid. But, by this time he wrote
those lines in The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind, he had begun to emphasis those
elements which would later coalesce into his advocacy of civil disobedience, elements not
present in The Origin and Goal of History. By grounding world history in freedom, as human
decision, Jaspers attempts to put history in the service of democracy. For democracy to be viable,
it must be aware of the decisions in the past that made it possible, and the conditions, both
favorable and contrary, that surrounded those decisions: “Democracy can realize its idea only if
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it constantly illuminates its own past.” 97 The pivotal moment in Jaspers’ history, arguably, is that
of the victories at Marathon and Salamis, in which he sees as the genesis of political liberty.
Later, Jaspers would cite struggles for political liberty in medieval Britain, and Western Europe.
However, such examples are not extensively discussed in The Origin and Goal of History. Had
Jaspers already adopted the explicit advocacy of civil disobedience, his world history would have
looked somewhat different. However, as it is, one can already see the framework of his later
political thought taking shape in The Origin and Goal of History. In short, a world history that
postulates no essential and ultimately necessary causal connection between events, whether ideal
or material, but rather emphasizes the role of conscious human decisions, provides the basis for
Jaspers’ argument that, ultimately, it is only the responsible participation of everyday individuals
that is decisive for the life of democracy.

III. Thesis

Unlike recent scholarship taking its point of departure from The Origin and Goal of
History, Jaspers’ thinking in that work amounts to more than just the concept of the Axial Age.
Rather that concept, as well as Jaspers’ history as a whole, must be seen as intrinsically
connected to his political thinking. My analysis is designed to argue for how that connection can
be properly understood. Why did Jaspers’ write a survey of world history? Primarily because he
thought Marx’s history had got it wrong, and that Marx’s errors had contributed to an influential
and unsatisfactory political program of action. Why did Jaspers seek to define the role of science

97

Ibid., 310.

62

and technology in the history of humankind as a whole? In that regard, his effort is also political
– he seeks to prove the neutrality of science and technology. In short, it is not science and
technology that are at the root of unsatisfactory conditions of human life. Why does Jaspers
ultimately connect his world history to his central argument for negative liberty? Marx’s
conception of history which is based on an assumption of alienation from true human nature. It,
therefore, leads to positing a singular and universal conception of liberty. But, for Jaspers, there
is no such “true human nature” and no “alienation” from it – the antinomy driving the causal
basic process of Marx’s history. History is, rather, a record of conscious decisions made by
humans. In a time when universal and singular conceptions of the “right” order of human affairs
had led to the rise of fascist and communist totalitarian regimes, Jaspers sought to provide an
alternative to such monolithic, total conceptions. Jaspers’ history seeks to show how no single
and universal concept of human nature is the basis for a causal basic process of history. Those,
like Marx, who would posit such a conception, end up positing a total doctrine of positive
liberty. Actual history, for Jaspers, does not bear out those conceptions. Instead, what he argues
that one finds, is the potential for a plurality of conceptions of the good life, the meaning of
being human. To argue for a space for such plurality, a sphere of negative liberty, follows from
his political intent to oppose the totalitarian views that became influential in the twentieth
century.

Chapter 1 examines the important, recent secondary literature stemming from The Origin
and Goal of History as well as discussion of structuring themes from Jaspers’ broader oeuvre and
from that work in particular. The following chapters present a more detailed analysis of the
political theory that structures The Origin and Goal of History (Chapters 2 through 5). My focus
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in these chapters is on his political thought, specifically upon the way in which his historical
thought serves as a basis for his political thought.
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Chapter 1

The Development and Influence of The Origin and Goal of History

Karl Jaspers' Origin and Goal of History stands on the threshold of the imbrication of
philosophy of history and anthropological science. The concept of human cultural evolution
denotes an epistemic orientation that is based on the philosophy of history while seeking to
incorporate the findings of anthropological science. With this, the philosophy of history
gains cognitive traction in the contemporary intellectual context; it speaks partially in the
idiom of contemporary science. However, the foundation remains its basic orientation
towards consciousness. The primary field of such investigation remains the thoughts and
actions of individuals and groups, their mutual relations and their relations with nature. No
amount of data on, for example, how the human brain specifically differs from those of other
organisms gives rise to the primary questions of the philosophy of history. Such knowledge
can only play a supporting role. The data of history, for example when settled agriculture
first arose for a given society, provide a matrix for the questions of primary concern.
Observations about the biological structures involved and the material and technological
conditions involved speak to how events occurred not directly to why. For an approach to the
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why questions, one must attempt to recover what men thought about themselves, i.e. what
their values and identities were. In short, the primary field of investigation is that of
humanity's ethical orders, of ethoi. The intermediate result of investigation is formulation of
principles, general to all or to some ethoi or specific to any given one, concerning their
existence, diversity, relation, chronology, and transformation. The end results of the
philosophy of history are propositions that seek to clarify the present and open avenues of
expectation for the future.

The work of subsequent scholars on Jaspers’ concept of the Axial Age, a period from
roughly 800 to 200 BC, occurs in something of a mutual conversation. The product of this
decades-long conversation has largely been a deepening of the understanding of cultural
phenomena of the Axial Age. Charles Taylor summarizes the consensus: "Any view about
the long-term history of religion turns on an interpretation of the Axial Age." 98 Jaspers
would likely be dismayed that six decades after The Origin and Goal of History, scholarly
attention to that work remains so insulated within the study of religion, albeit where it
provides a useful conceptual framework. Jaspers’ own liberal political thought has been
overshadowed. Arguably, no thinker arising from the tradition of German philosophy of
history after Marx has made such a systematically-elaborated connection between history
and politics. It should therefore be no surprise that Marx is always present, though usually
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implicitly, in the structure of The Origin and Goal of History, both as opponent, and, perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, as contributing interlocutor. For future work on Jaspers' political
thought, the study of his philosophy of history will prove to be essential. This study is
written with the hope to contribute to such future work. The extant literature on Jaspers
makes no systematic connection between his philosophy of history and his political thought.
An analysis of Jaspers' political thought would include, at least, his early work on Max
Weber, Man in the Modern Age, The Question of German Guilt, The Origin and Goal of
History, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind, The Future of Germany, various essays
from The Great Philosophers and various short essays on politics. The general foundations
of his political thought, however, can be found nowhere so clearly and completely expressed
than in The Origin and Goal of History. The path towards any cogent criticism of Jaspers
must start there, and it is a very long path. Meaningful criticism must be tailored to its
object, and thus not all criticism proceeds alike. The beginning of such a path is undoubtedly
the notion that there is something worth criticizing, which is, for the rational mind, always
accompanied by the notion that there is something worth appropriating. These tasks must be
preceded by reconstruction of the argument in its essential aspects, exposition of its
implications and orientation of the resulting essential schema toward facility of criticism and
appropriation.

Recent and ongoing appropriations have focused on Jaspers' Axial Age thesis. As
there is relatively broad consensus among these, I will consider only those offered by
Eisenstadt, Bellah and Habermas. Jaspers’ correspondence with Martin Heidegger can draw
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the former’s philosophical connection between history and politics into clearer view.
However, it should be noted that the thesis of the Axial Age itself, when taken in the context
of the book as a whole, is not Jaspers' chief concern. His other concerns include: the
argument for political liberty, the conception of consciousness as the origin and goal of
history, the conception of modern nihilism with its totalitarian consequences, and the
conception of the age of technology. Jaspers covers a vast spectrum of human affairs in this
work -- from the origin of the species Homo sapiens to the unknowable horizon of the far
future with its shadow of the possible nuclear destruction of humankind. The main pillar of
this work is his appropriation and reworking of the Western philosophy of history, but this is
accompanied by his reception of Eastern philosophy and the histories of India and China as
well as based in a conception of human nature borrowed from anthropology and
supplemented with contemporary political economic thought. That pillar supports his chief
concern which is to argue that the will to power and the will to knowledge must share the
world of humankind in a fluctuating order of political liberty.

Martin Heidegger

In the literature concerning the Axial Age, a brief but illustrative passage occurs in an
interview with Jürgen Habermas. He says:

Heidegger... is suspect for me even as a philosopher because, during the
1930s, he interpreted Nietzsche in precisely the neo-pagan fashion then in
vogue... I regard Heidegger's botched "Seinsdenken"... as a leveling of the
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epochal threshold in the history of consciousness which Jaspers called the
"Axial Age". On my understanding, Heidegger betrayed that caesura that is
marked, in different ways, by the prophetic awakening of Mt. Sinai and by the
enlightenment of a Socrates. 99
This can be compared with Robert Bellah's sentiments:

I doubt that any of us would rather want to live in a tribal society than in one
whose beginnings lie in the Axial Age; I know I would not. Yet it is a heritage
of explosive potentialities for good and for evil. It has given us the great tool
of criticism. How will we use it? 100
It is as difficult to draw any clear and detailed picture of how daily life must have transpired
for the average human of prehistoric or archaic times as it is easy to see that without
authentic criticism and all that that term entails, the press of the necessity both of nature
herself and of humankind's artificial second nature would have been markedly stronger in
general before the Axial Age. Heidegger wrote to Jaspers concerning The Origin and Goal of
History in 1949:

You reject the thought that modern technology has the character of an assault,
but it does have this character and, therefore, modern natural science and
modern history also have it. It seems to me that the relationship between
modern natural science and modern technology is not sufficiently clear to you,
but, in essence, both are grounded in the essence of technology. This essence
is, as far as I can see, the completed essence of Western metaphysics. The
unfolding of the essence of technology begins... with the idea of Plato. 101

It is inconceivable how a subjective principle, e.g. the Platonic idea of the good, can
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essentially coincide with technology of any age, which is always something instrumental in
essence. That archaeology can recover the instrumental function of a prehistoric implement
but, in the absence of any linguistic evidence from the prehistoric period, can recover nothing
of the subjectivity of those who may have used that implement is one demonstration of this
cognitive dichotomy. That any such subjective principle can be a conditioning factor in the
everyday role of instrumental objects is a given, but that is clearly not Heidegger's point.
Jaspers' conception of technology is an ethically neutral one, it is essentially abstract
instrumentality and, wherever it is active, its role is conditioned by whatever values shape its
particular context. However, and this will be elaborated in Chapter 2, modern society can, to
an extent, appear technologized -- Jaspers uses the term "global factory" -- but this is, of
course, only an analogy, since social relations depend primarily upon a communicative rather
than upon an instrumental rationality, which Jaspers clearly recognized. One might still ask
whether there is something substantial behind Heidegger's diametrically opposed assertions.
Perhaps the dichotomy between meaning, a function of subjectivity, and instrumentality, a
function of objectivity, is false -- perhaps it is conditioned by a heretofore unaccounted
factor. No such systematic account of any such factor emerges in Heidegger's work,
however. Jaspers’ notes on Heidegger, which he contemplated turning into a book, contain
several specifically intended to respond to views of Heidegger's like the one expressed
above, which is characteristic of Heidegger's later work generally. Here Jaspers portrays
Heidegger's flight from the subject-object dichotomy into unio mystica:
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Heidegger differentiates between philosophy and science in the following:
Science arrives at correctness of statements while philosophy is where the
truth of Being is at stake -- this statement is in itself "correct," but now the
question of thinking concerns that which lets the truth of Being be revealed-such thinking itself can only take place within the subject-object dichotomy...
or it is transformed into the unio mystica that is itself no longer thinking in the
sense of differentiating, speaking, imparting... 102
It was clear to Jaspers that Heidegger's mystical, arbitrary coincidentia oppositorum
constituted, for the latter, an endemic theme. Richard Wolin also identifies this theme and
further characterizes its consequences with precision:

Heidegger's penchant for dogmatic historical judgments and the equation of
incomparables... Such travesties of historical reasoning... go to the essence of
the judgmental incapacities of the doctrine of the "history of Being" as a
framework for historical understanding. 103
There are some notes from Jaspers on Heidegger in which Jaspers depicts Heidegger an
important "rival". Far from indicating that Jaspers thought that there were mutually fruitful,
constructive tension, these comments merely reflect Jaspers' opinion that the public might
benefit from some corrective clarification of Heidegger's arbitrary, but all too sophisticated
and influential, ex cathedra pronouncements. He would surely have formulated and
presented such a work as a diplomatic engagement with a worthy adversary, especially given
his own verstehende approach to mutually immersive therapeutic dialogue in the practice of
psychotherapy. However, such an approach, which several of his notes show he was
preparing to adopt, would have not have essentially altered his blunt, yet empathetic, basic
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view. From Jaspers’ notes:

This savagery against humanitas... against culture, against education... this
affirmation of barbarism... All this is Heidegger but is not he himself--he
becomes its creature. 104
Moreover, Jaspers observes that, after Heidegger became a Nazi, his thinking underwent
somewhat of a transformation: from such opaque terms as "decisiveness", which goes
unelaborated, and "Being towards death" to the no less opaque "Being in Nothingness" and
"the event of Being". The latter pair reflecting, in Jaspers' view, "the passivity of opening
oneself up, of acceptance." To Jaspers, this was not a substantive "turn" but merely a new
modality of the same basic "dictatorial" premises. 105 Behind the opacity of the terms, Jaspers
was confronted by a vivid example of Heidegger's "passivity" and "acceptance" in a letter
from 1950:

Stalin doesn't need to declare war any longer. Every day he wins a battle, but
one doesn't see it ... every piece of writing is a counterattack... In this
homelessness there occurs not nothing, but an advent conceals itself there,
whose furthest hints we may, perhaps, still experience in a light breath and
which must be captured in order to preserve them for a future that no historical
construction, especially today's, which thinks technologically, will decipher. 106
Jaspers' wrote in response: "My horror grew when I read that." The dark implication of
Heidegger's words is that this "homelessness", or the inevitable conquest of West Germany
by Stalin, would provide that arena in which Heidegger's writings can lead to an eventual
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"advent". It was not lost on Jaspers that this amounted to Heidegger's admission that he still
sought to place his thought in a complimentary relation to totalitarianism. "With things like
this, one wonders about authorization and rehabilitation," Jaspers writes, casting doubt upon
the process by which Heidegger was eventually denazified and permitted to resume teaching
in the Federal Republic. Heidegger's expression of spiritual capitulation to Stalin provoked
Jaspers' harshest lines in their correspondence:

How is it that somewhere you allowed a very positive judgment of Marxism to
be published without clearly saying at the same time that you recognize the
power of what is evil? ... Is not this power of evil in Germany also what has
constantly grown and, in fact, what prepares Stalin's victory: the concealing
and forgetting of the past... the return of the old ruts of thinking and all the
ghosts which destroy us, even though they are empty? ... Is Stalin not
victorious precisely through all of this? Is not a philosophy that surmises and
poetizes in sentences such as your letter, that produces a vision of something
monstrous, is this not, in turn, something that prepares the victory of
totalitarianism by separating itself from reality? Just as, before 1933,
philosophy to a great extent actually made ready the acceptance of Hitler? 107

Jaspers never wrote the book on Heidegger which he had contemplated and for which
he compiled notes, which have been posthumously published as the Notizen zu Martin
Heidegger. The point of such a work would likely have been that, despite their erudite bases,
the positions of the later Heidegger -- the one quoted above is characteristic -- are determined
by no one factor more so than by the arbitrariness of their author:
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How, then, is community possible? Are we merely reduced to mutually
incomprehensible monologues, reproaches, absurdities? The form information
takes in language is that things must be asserted and substantiated. The
meaning of both can be realized only when the field of scientific theses,
proofs, and argumentation is acknowledged, presupposed and referred to--not
as something alien, not as something secondary, but as a desire to know; and
the recognition of both is not founded in anything beyond themselves. Only
on this foundation is it possible to liberate logical thought, as authentic
philosophizing, from arbitrary power play. 108
There is a tremendous tension between Heidegger's erudition, on the one hand, and the
complimentary relationship between the arbitrary bases of his thought and totalitarianism, on
the other. Caught in an inner dialectic, Heidegger reduces consciousness to a mystical
phantasm for which he is the only oracle. This comes with the unenviable feature that there
can be no argument with an oracle.

S. N. Eisenstadt

Eisenstadt employed Jaspers' conception of the Axial Age as the basis for a
sociological research program which has spanned several decades and involved scholars
from various disciplines. To a great extent, this approach necessarily detaches the thesis of
the Axial Age from the larger context of The Origin and Goal of History. This detachment is
a requisite for a focus upon empirical studies of the Axial Age civilizations in their early
stages. Robert Bellah has done more than anyone other than Eisenstadt to further this
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research. It is not possible to give an overview of the vast amount of empirical detail
covered in these studies. Nevertheless, these studies have resulted in their authors'
reformulation and clarification of some of the central principles of the historical dynamics
involved in the period. These are summarized here. None of the authors involved in this
literature raise doubts about the principle structure of the investigation as framed by Jaspers.
However, their restatements of the principle historical dynamics are amenable to further
clarification in line with a reconstruction of Jaspers' essential argument of The Origin and
Goal of History that extends beyond the Axial Age thesis itself. Of Eisenstadt's voluminous
writings on the Axial Age, one early essay and one late essay provide the most
comprehensive outlines of his conception of the essential dynamics of the period: "The
Axial Age: the Emergence of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of Clerics" and "The
Axial Conundrum between Transcendental Visions and Vicissitudes of Their
Institutionalizations". Among Axial Age civilizations, i.e. those of the West, India and
China, Eisenstadt sees a basic uniform historical trend. However, he goes much further than
Jaspers in describing the various institutional differences among these instances. The
question of these differences, however, remains secondary to the basic similarities, and for
Jaspers' philosophy of history, which is primarily concerned with principles, these
institutional differences are likewise of, at most, secondary importance.

Eisenstadt isolates three definitive aspects of the Axial Age transformation: (1)
ontological dichotomy, (2) soteriological restructuring, and (3) new epistemic elites. Another
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factor is the resultant relationships of these three factors with various, particular modalities of
(4) legitimation.

(1)

The concept of ontological dichotomy is the most essential: "the emergence,

conceptualization and institutionalization of a basic tension between the transcendental and
mundane orders." 109 Before the Axial Age, in the periods of prehistory and the ancient
civilizations for Jaspers, Eisenstadt observes, instead of this "disembedded" or dichotomous
relationship, one that he describes as homologous:

In pre-Axial Age "pagan" civilizations this higher world has been symbolically
structured according to the principles very similar to those of the mundane or
lower one. Relatively similar symbolic terms were used for the definition of
God(s) and man; of the mundane and transmundane orders... In most such
societies the transmundane world was usually equated with a concrete setting,
"the other world", which was the abode of the dead, the world of spirits, and
not entirely unlike the mundane world in detail. 110
The basic principle of the Axial Age transformation is a cognitive shift away from that
homologous model:

By contrast, in the Axial Age civilizations, the perception of a sharp
disjunction between the mundane and the transmundane worlds developed.
There was a concomitant stress on the existence of a higher transcendental
moral or metaphysical order which is beyond any given this- or other-worldly
reality. 111
Axial Age worldviews... include a broadening of horizons, or an opening up of
potentially universal perspectives, in contrast to the particularism of more
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archaic modes of thought; an ontological distinction between higher and lower
levels of reality; and a normative subordination of the lower level to the
higher. 112
The cognitive introduction of this new ontological dichotomy between transcendental and
mundane levels of reality furthered ongoing questioning of extant homologous social orders
and led to both a resultant legitimacy crisis and the attempts to reconstruct social order on
new bases. The direction of the shift, described above in its principle, was general, while the
subsequent new institutional patterns varied in detail. The broad institutional shift from a
homologous social order to a dichotomous one was nowhere instantaneous, nor did it
anywhere involve the complete abandoning of all aspects of cultural life where these
revolutions took place.

(2) A process of soteriological restructuring began:

The development of these conceptions created a problem in the rational,
abstract articulation of the givens of human and social existence and of the
cosmic order. The root of the problem lies in the fact that the development of
such conceptions necessarily poses the question of the ways in which the
chasm between the transcendental and mundane orders can be bridged. This
gives rise to the problem of salvation -- to use Weber's terminology. 113
This soteriological restructuring occurred across the entire spectrum of life in society. On
the individual level:

Purely personal virtues such as courage, or interpersonal ones such as
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solidarity, have been taken out of their primordial framework and are
combined, in different dialectical modes, with the attributes of the resolution
of the tension between the transcendental and mundane orders. 114
Family and kinship associations had existed in a closer identity with their particular society
in the homologous, pre-Axial stage. Now they became more differentiated from that
homologous context, which, in Eisenstadt's somewhat complicated terminology, is here
equated with "broader ascriptive formations" and, elsewhere, with, what amounts to the same
thing: "primordial ascriptive collectivities". There is perhaps some difficulty locating the
line between prehistory and the ancient civilizations with Eisenstadt’s terminology.

A parallel development was in the transformation of family and kinship
relations, to some extent also economic relations. They often emerged as
distinct autonomous symbolic and institutional arenas, disembedded from
broader ascriptive formations and the criteria and modes of justification
governing them. 115
Once the cognitive coherence undergirding the modalities of legitimacy of homologous
social orders, or "primordial ascriptive collectives", had begun to be eroded, the cognitive
potential for soteriological restructuring of collectives upon hypothetically universal
principles became possible:

It is a one of the most important features of these broader civilization
frameworks that they are not tied to one political or ethnic collectivity. They
could encompass many different collectivities, could impinge upon existing
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political, territorial or kinship collectivities and institutions. 116
Whereas in the world of the ancient civilizations, life was set within a monolithic order
which had the character of something permanent and which reconstituted itself almost
unchanged through all disturbances, such as natural catastrophes and barbarian invasions, the
Axial Age brought a new social dynamic of continuous, cyclical constitution, breakdown and
reconstitution of social orders:

Insofar as the political sphere is perceived as relevant to "salvation", political
conflict in particular has been affected as well. New dimensions have been
added to the processes of conflict... These new levels of conflict generated
new processes of change and continuous reconstruction of the social order. 117
Eisenstadt links this "continual reconstruction and transformation of the premises and
contours of the different collectivities" after the Axial Age transformation to the replacement
of homologous social order with the dichotomous model:

The new societal centers, institutional frameworks, and distinct "civilizational"
collectivities were no longer taken for granted; they were no longer perceived
as "naturally" given, either by divine prescription or by the power of custom.
They could become the object of contestation between different elites and
groups. 118
The result of this shift was:

...the possibility of principled, ideological confrontation between hegemonic

116

Ibid.

117

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “The Axial Age: The Emergence of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of
Clerics,” European Journal of Sociology 23, no. 2 (1982): 304-305.
118

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “The Axial Conundrum between Transcendental Visions and Vicissitudes of
Their Institutionalizations,” in The Axial Age and its Consequences, ed. Robert Bellah and Hans Joas
(Cambridge: Belknap, 2012), 281.
79

and challenging groups and elites, of the continual confrontation between
orthodoxy and heterodoxy (or sectarian activities), and the potential
combination of such confrontations with political struggles over power, with
movements of protest, with economic and class conflicts... 119
With the introduction of this dynamic, detailed cognizance of past events became relatively
more desirable than it had been in the ancient civilizations where change in social conditions
was minimal. Whereas the relatively glacial pace of social change in the ancient civilizations
could be efficiently cognized with only the most abbreviated historical records, in addition to
records such as king lists, now the relatively rapid succession of important events, and the
consequent increased complexity of historical factors with bearing upon the present,
necessitated a new mode of historical cognizance in which the individuality and personality
of actors had to stand forth in far greater acuity.

(3)

Thus, for the first time, intellectuals, various sorts of new epistemic elites,

appear in history:

The development and institutionalization of the perception of basic tension
between the transcendental and mundane order was closely connected with the
emergence of a new social element. Generally speaking it was a new type of
elite which was cited as the carrier of models of cultural and social order.
Examples would include the Jewish prophets and priests, the Greek
philosophers and sophists, the Chinese Literati, the Hindu Brahmins, the
Buddhist Sangha and the Islamic Ulema. 120
In the case of all these new epistemic elites, the basic principle around which their
collectivity was organized was specifically Axial, in the sense that it was disconnected from
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the prior, homologous social order, the "major ascriptive framework" of pre-Axial societies,
and expressive of the basic ontological dichotomy:

They tended to become disembedded from the major ascriptive frameworks; at
the same time, they claimed autonomous access to the new order promulgated
by an Axial vision, which resulted in continual contestation about their status
in relation to the new order... They did not think of themselves as only
performing specific technical or functional activities--for example as scribes—
but indeed as carrying a distinct cultural and social order manifest in the
prevailing transcendental vision of this society. 121
The dissolution of homologous social orders led to other ramified outcomes that follow some
general tendencies, despite wide variation between particular instances. These changes
represent a growing autonomy of different spheres of social life that began in the breakdown
of the homologous social order -- the source of Eisenstadt's concept of "autonomy"-- brought
about by the introduction of the ontological dichotomy:

Meanwhile, the growing--if, by comparison with modern societies, still
limited--autonomy of the major institutional formations led to the parallel
developments of relatively autonomous media of exchange--power, money,
influence, and solidarity--especially as they became attributed to particular
societal sectors. 122
(4) Compared with the relatively stable modalities of legitimation in ancient
civilizations, Eisenstadt describes a shift in such modalities in the Axial Age in favor of a
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pattern of relatively greater instability. His "primordial" criteria are what for Weber are
"traditional", i.e. legitimation by virtue of belief in precedent or "what has always existed",
which is: "the most universal and most primitive case."(130-131) "Sacred" criteria of
legitimacy for Eisenstadt equate to Weber's conception of oracular legitimation, the origin of
which Weber locates in the period of the ancient civilizations -- where Eisenstadt likewise
locates the origin of "sacred" legitimation. That this oracular version is derivative of
traditional legitimation is evident:

In times of strict traditionalism a new order, that is one which was regarded as
new, could, without being revealed in this way, only become legitimized by
the claim that it had actually always been valid though not yet rightly known,
or that it had been obscured for a time and was now being restored to its
rightful place. 123
For Eisenstadt "ideological criteria" of legitimacy equates to Weber's conception of rational
or legal legitimacy, i.e. legitimacy based upon a cognition of correctness in conformation
between a general principle and particular instances. The principle of such legitimacy is one
intrinsic element of the concept of soteriological restructuring. For Eisenstadt, "traditional
charismatic" legitimacy arises in the pre-Axial period and represents a fusion of both of these
types. Eisenstadt's conception of the types of legitimacy follows upon Weber's – although it
is regrettably not as clearly conceived. He describes a shift in the dynamics of the modalities
of legitimation in the Axial Age:

If the legitimation of social order in most of the great pre-axial civilizations
was based on some fusion of sacred and primordial criteria of traditional
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charismatic legitimation, the picture became more complicated with the
institutionalization of the perception of the tension between the transcendental
and mundane order. In these post-axial civilizations, there developed first a
strong tendency to a continuous oscillation between primordial criteria on the
one hand and sacred or ideological ones--defined in terms of the attributes of
salvation--on the other; and the concomitant tendency to ideologize or
"sacralize" the primordial attributes or to vest the sacred with primordial
attributes. 124
In sum: Eisenstadt characterizes the Axial Age as a pattern of social transformation in the
West, Middle East, India and China during the first millennium BC in which new epistemic
elites, all holding some version of a transcendental concept of order, sought to
instrumentalize their various versions of such a concept, resulting in a historically diverse
and ramified but patterned fluctuation in modalities of legitimation. These constitute what
Eisenstadt considers the general and essential factors of the Axial Age transformation. Much
of his work concerns various particular developments that emerge on the basis of this
framework. Eisenstadt's narrowing of Jaspers' larger theoretical agenda in The Origin and
Goal of History is effective as a framework for focused empirical research in that it, in its
separation from the broader history of consciousness, increases the acuity of the principles
endogenous to the historical period upon which it focuses.

Robert Bellah
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The portion of Bellah's work that is relevant to the Axial Age seeks to accomplish two
chief aims: a detailed historical study that connects the social and intellectual trends of the
period and a theoretical view which seeks to place the development of the Axial Age in
anthropological context. Bellah considers this project his "universal history." 125 In Religion
in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age, Bellah succeeds in organizing a
massive amount of historical detail into a coherent depiction of the chief currents of the
Axial Age in each of its three regions. However, due to his general blurring of the line
between history and anthropology, between understanding and explaining, between
subjective and objective orientations, Bellah's study should not be considered a "universal
history". He writes:

There has been an effort to distinguish evolution and history: evolution occurs
in nature, history occurs in culture. This distinction is... a somewhat modified
version of the old distinction between Naturwissenschaft and
Geisteswissenschaft... I believe this whole distinction is misplaced: evolution
is historical; history is evolutionary. 126
The problem, of course, is that before the inception of human consciousness -- a point in time
both empirically unknowable and absolutely presupposed by any valid universal historical
conception -- there was no history because there was no meaning of events and no human
instrumentality. All other species of the genus Homo are extinct, and, even if archaeology
reveals that some such other hominid species possessed instrumentality, evidenced by tool
use, this affords no evidence of or access to the linguistic dimension, which, if it existed at
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all, may not have even shared the same universal grammar that conditions human
intersubjectivity. It is ironic that directly after these comments, Bellah quotes Habermas on
"social scientific neoevolutionism" -- something that Habermas rejects. Bellah, however,
does not seem to recognize the clear difference of views, and even provides a quote from
Habermas that barely touches on the issue, the invalidity of reducing interpretation of
meaningful social phenomena to merely naturalistic explanation. Elsewhere, Habermas
clearly characterizes "the spread of naturalistic worldviews" and their consequences:

Advances in biogenetics, brain research, and robotics driven by therapeutic
and eugenic motives are being successfully presented in a positive light. This
program is designed is designed to facilitate the spread of ways of
understanding ourselves in terms of the objectifying categories of natural
science into everyday contexts of communication and action. Habituation to
forms of self-objectification that reduce all meaning and experience to what
can be observed would also dispose individuals to corresponding forms of
self-instrumentalization. 127
Bellah's attempts to integrate evolutionary and historical approaches in the first few chapters
of Religion in Human Evolution ultimately remains unsystematic and, instead, relies upon a
gestural bricolage of observations drawn from popular science interspersed with erudite, but
fragmentary meditations on classics of philosophy and social theory. Altogether these
observations do not even stay true to Bellah's explicit principle of naturalistic reduction -though they do not entirely avoid it, either. In their accounts of human cultural evolution,
both Habermas and Jaspers avoid the naturalistic reduction into which Bellah falls by using
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the findings of anthropological science as an idiom that is particularly useful for displaying
the distinction between what is universally and distinctively human and what is nature -- a
distinction on which the contemporary anthropological idiom does not have a monopoly.
Despite one, completely unelaborated, instance of asserting that humans are "really different"
from animals, Bellah generally leaves the line quite indistinct throughout his
observations.(83) Furthermore, it is on the basis of this naturalistic principle that Bellah tries
to explain the origin of human ritual as sharing an essential continuity with animal practices.
The fundamental error of this conception is evident to Habermas:

Whereas chimpanzees do not point to things or teach things to conspecifics,
human beings learn both through cooperation and through instruction. In their
dealings with existing cultural artifacts, they also discover for themselves the
functions embodied in them. The kinds of traditions, rituals and tool use that
are also encountered among chimpanzees do not reveal an intersubjectively
shared cultural background knowledge. Without intersubjective
understanding, there can be no objective knowledge. 128
That the chimpanzee, humankind's closest biological relative, has no history would
contravene Bellah's explicit principle of naturalistic reduction that: "evolution is historical;
history is evolutionary". A fundamentally different conclusion is reached by Habermas, and,
in fact, it is identical with Jaspers' view. Habermas writes:

Only socialized brains, linked up with a cultural milieu, become bearers of
those highly accelerated, cumulative learning processes that have become
uncoupled from the genetic mechanism of natural evolution. 129
In light of this fundamental difference, I can only consider Bellah's overall account of
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"universal history" as one suffering from a catastrophic defect. Bellah stresses the
observable similarities in the practice of "play" between animals and humans. His point is
that practices of play exhibit conditions where natural compulsion is not immediate for both
animals and humans. That might seem generally true, but it seems unlikely to even hold for
all observable cases, especially in cases of human children, who are uniquely susceptible to
natural compulsion due to their unique vulnerabilities and who, at the same time, very
commonly exhibit playful behavior. In the case of human children, the role of natural
necessity is very different, much greater, than among young animals. Humans also routinely,
consciously overcome natural constraints in order to play, such as, for example, in the case
of athletes with physical disabilities. Animals, on the other hand, only overcome natural
constraints on the basis of instinct. Furthermore, all cases of human play proceed, as all
human activity does, from some meaningful relationship of thought and action while animals
never display any awareness of meaningful associations in terms of any activities or in terms
of any phenomena at all. The blurring of the distinction between human and animal,
between culture and nature, follows directly from Bellah's own explicit naturalistic reduction,
which obfuscates the role of consciousness, a unique and universal human attribute, the
source of historical meaning, and, hence, presents a structural incompatibility with Bellah's
self-proclaimed task of writing a "universal history". Unfortunately, Bellah's work on the
Axial Age, in addition to these problems, is profuse with vague phrases, such as "the self is a
telling", and unclear and unsystematic incorporation of theories or findings drawn from the
natural and human sciences. He even mistakenly refers to Jaspers' book as "The Meaning
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and Goal of History." 130 Copious insightful references to classics of social theory, e.g. to
works of Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, suffer from confusion radiating from the other
components. Future work in this area should not build upon these bases.

In The Origin and Goal of History, as in the subsequent theoretical work of Eisenstadt
and Habermas on the Axial Age, relatively little attention is given to the actual texts from the
period that are indicative, in fact partially constitutive, of the transformational developments
of the period. Such textual support is provided by Jaspers in his Great Philosophers.
Bellah's wealth of portrayals of the meaningful connections between these texts and social
conditions of the period are illuminative. Furthermore, despite the intrinsic difficulties of his
"universal history", his basic characterization of the period is not really contradictory, in
principle, with the conceptions of Jaspers, Eisenstadt, or Habermas. The massive chapters of
Religion in Human Evolution are filled with exegesis of various texts from the period across
the three great regions. The new epistemic elites that Eisenstadt describes are, in Bellah's
terminology, "renouncers". They renounce the extant homologous social order in favor of a
transcendental one. Bellah evocatively recounts a story from India of the period depicting
such renunciation. From Bellah's summary of the story:

There was a king of Benares who ruled justly... Indra, king of the gods, took
pity on him and sent the future Buddha to be born as a son to his chief queen.
The child was named Temiya... Temiya remembered his previous births,
including that in the past he had been king of this very city and that, as a result
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of his actions, he subsequently spent 80,000 years in an especially terrible
hell... He determined that this would not happen again, so he pretended to be
lame, deaf and dumb... When he was 16 the soothsayers told the king that he
would bring bad luck to the royal house and should be killed... Temiya was
sent in his chariot to the charnel ground, where he was to be killed, but the
gods saw to it that the charioteer took him to the forest instead. At that point
Temiya revealed his true self, showing himself to be strong and fit... and
declared his intention to become an ascetic... When Temiya's parents received
the news they rushed to the forest where he was and overwhelmed with his
new self, proceeded to renounce the world themselves. Soon the whole city
had come out to the forest and everyone became a renouncer... Soon a
neighboring king, hearing what had happened, decided to annex Benares... but
once in the city he felt an overwhelming impulse to find the ascetic prince and
his parents. Upon finding them, he, too and his subjects following him,
became renouncers. Another king followed his example. Soon it was clear
that Temiya was, after all, a cakravartin, a universal ruler. 131
The first theme is that it is now only outside the extant homologous order that true kingship
would be realized. Kingship as it has previously been conceived had been revealed to be
false, insofar as it did not conform to an insight from above and beyond the world,
inaccessible to any but the Buddha and only to others through him. The second theme is that
diffusion of that message to others. Soteriological restructuring of whole kingdoms follows.
The true king, by virtue of his transcendental insight, can no longer be a king according to
the extant homologous order. Bellah describes the thematic analogues in the other traditions:

Plato tells the Athenians not to look at Achilles... (Achilles was a kinglet and
his mother a goddess) but at Socrates, not an aristocrat at all but a stonemason
and a busy body... For it is Socrates, the lover of wisdom, the philosopher,
who should be king. ... In China, it is Mencius who tells us that Confucius, the
failed official who gathered a few followers as he traveled from state to state
in ancient China... was the uncrowned king. ... In Israel, the tension between
God and king was endemic in the period of the monarchy: at times God seems

131

Ibid., 584-585.
89

to have made an eternal covenant with the House of David... but often kings,
are portrayed as sinners or even enemies of Yahweh. 132
These examples based on texts of the period indicate a new, dichotomous pattern replacing
homologous "old unity of God and king" in each case. 133

Jürgen Habermas

In his essay “The Sacred Roots of Axial Age Traditions”, Habermas seeks to broaden
the sociological conception of the Axial Age after its narrowing by S.N. Eisenstadt. While
Eisenstadt’s approach brings into greater clarity the historical principles endogenous to the
Axial Age transformation, a valuable clarification which serves as a basis for detailed
comparative studies, this approach must simultaneously focus chiefly upon what is original
to the period, rather than upon general historical continuities. Habermas’ intent is not to
undermine Eisenstadt’s approach, with which Habermas has expressed agreement. Rather,
and in this respect Habermas is in agreement with Jaspers, the conception of the Axial Age
itself rests upon a broader conception of the history of consciousness. Eisenstadt focuses
more upon the Axial Age, while Habermas focuses more upon “the sacred” as one chief and
continuous feature in the history of consciousness generally. In Jaspers’ original conception,
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these two foci are combined in a comprehensive formulation. Both Eisenstadt and Habermas
go a long way toward making their respective aspects of Jaspers’ original conception more
clearly focused.

Habermas seeks to elucidate how “the sacred” serves as a source of normativity
distinct from the function of secular thought, which, in his terminology, is synonymous with
“postmetaphysical thinking”. The sacred for Habermas is the essential and enduring
proprium of religious traditions extending across human history:

The worldviews of the Axial Age inherited their relation to cultic practices
from a much older complex composed of mythical narratives and ritual
actions. This sacred complex had laid the foundation for the alliance between
rulers and priests already in the archaic high cultures. Here the amalgamation
of religious traditions and practices with self-representation of political power
had prepared the ground for the legitimation functions that were later
performed by the religious and metaphysical worldviews for the politics of the
Ancient Empires. 134
This sacred complex, consisting of mythical narrative and ritual action, arises from a
particular mode, myth, of dealing with risks presented by both nature and culture:

Myths invariably serve as the function of coming to terms with the existential
experience of being exposed to the contingencies of an un-mastered
environment. The causes of uncontrolled risks and dangers demand an
interpretation in terms of the available narrative framework of communication,
social and instrumental action… “the invisible causes and forces which give
rise to and regulate the non-human world (nature) or the human world
(culture) assume the attributes of man, i.e. present themselves
spontaneously… as beings analogous to men, but different in that they know
what man does not know, they do what man cannot do, they control what he

133

Ibid., 72.

134

Jürgen Habermas, “The Sacred Roots of Axial Age Traditions.” (unpublished essay), 8.
91

cannot control… 135
A conceptual distinction of this particular mode of consciousness from consciousness
generally seems justified on the basis of the modality of instrumentality that arises from
myth:

Almost anyone can communicate with anyone and anything with anything, can
express feelings or wishes, intentions and opinions, and they can influence one
another reciprocally. For communicating means exerting influence. From our
perspective, the performative attitude in which a first person relates to a
second person in order to communicate with her becomes blurred with the
instrumental attitude towards an impersonal or superpersonal power on which
one can exert causal influence, and thereby force them to act in a certain
way. 136
Such instrumentality arising from a mythical conception is not the same as that found in
ordinary use of tools or any form of technique, generally. Habermas does not make this
point explicit, however I think this distinction is implied in his account. The sort of
instrumentality that arises from a mythical conception cannot be equated with humankind’s
original instrumentality by which he overcomes natural necessity. The picture of
instrumentality here, that deriving from myth, leads Habermas to the conclusion that: “a
bridge leads from myth itself to rites.” 137 Thus the element of the sacred complex that
consists of ritual enactment arises from myth and, therefore, is not an inheritance that
persisted across the evolutionary threshold that distinguished humans from their nearest
relatives among other species.
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Habermas argues that if one considers only the trend of “disenchantment” that
accompanies Axial Age thought, one misses the cognitive element that explains the
persistence of religious traditions, generally. Disenchantment involves the shift in emphasis
towards rational criteria of legitimation, the shift away from what Eisenstadt calls the
homologous order and what Bellah identifies as the unity of “god and king”. The agreement
between two things, here, specifically, between a general concept any given particular
instance, becomes preferred relative to traditional or charismatic criteria of legitimation.
That the logic of disenchantment would have long since delegitimized mythical cognition
entirely leads Habermas to suspect that the persistence of post-Axial mythical analogues is
owing to the impermeability of ritual practices with which such views are conjoined and
which constitutes the “sacred core” of religious traditions:

In conclusion, postmetaphysical thinking will miss what is proper to religion,
the constitutive moment of a religious understanding of the world, as long as it
focuses exclusively on the cognitive structures that emerged during the
worldview revolution of the Axial Age. This focus fails to do justice to the
sacred complex which consists in both, in the doctrinal contents handed down
in scriptural form and dogmatized through interpretation, and in the communal
ritual enactment of the lived articles of faith. 138
For Habermas, religious rites form a cultural element that remains essentially constant
through the great transformation of the Axial Age. While postmetaphysical thinking can
criticize the legitimacy of myth and its modern pseudo-scientific analogues, in the sacred
complex, mythic thinking insulates itself against criticism with religious rites which, in
Habermas’ account, act as a normative stimulus of social solidarity different from that arising
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from the legitimating presence of an intersubjectively shared “lifeworld” which constitutes,
for Habermas, the unique evolutionary achievement of Homo sapiens.

The dialectic in Marxism and psychoanalysis

Jaspers criticizes both Marxism and psychoanalysis in both Man in the Modern Age
and Reason and Anti-Reason. His main criticism of psychoanalysis can be found in General
Psychopathology. The two systems of thought become aberrant in different directions, both
with different dehumanizing results: Marxism deifies humanity, psychoanalysis reduces
humanity to animalistic existence. The former totalizes knowledge, while the latter reduces
everything to the instincts and drives. Both tend toward closed systems, resistant to outside
criticism and real dialogue. Both are founded upon essentially valid and valuable insights.
Freud brings the psychopathological reality of repressed sexuality into clear view. Marx
contributes to sociology and political economy, but has his central insight in the dialectical
conception of history. Both explode their central insights, respectively owing most
immediately to Hegel and Nietzsche, into an all-embracing conception of human nature
which petrifies in dogma. Both Marx and Freud took on the character of men who wanted to
be leaders of obedient followers who would turn their interpretations into action, and this,
says Jaspers, is at the heart of their unscientific character. Marx is famous for his vitriolic
public attacks on those who disagreed with him. Freud adopted a similar, but more subdued,
attitude:
94

Psychoanalysis wants to bring into consciousness what has been repressed in
psychic life and he who passes judgment on it is himself a man who has such
repressions... such resistance easily finds itself disguised as an intellectual
rejection... we frequently find the same thing in our adversaries as we find in
our patients. 139
In the case of both, Jaspers is in agreement with their central motive insights, but,
nevertheless classifies both as totalitarian. Totalitarianism for Jaspers has two poles: rule of
force and fear at one pole and nihilation into animalistic existence at the other. Neither Marx
nor Freud consciously set out for such extremes, but in the spiritual situation of their times,
such systems of thought could only contribute to that polarization which was already
underway. Their common point of departure is a concern for freedom, their paths diverge in
terms of formulation of the central dominated element, but, then, caught in inner dialectic,
each converges again into closed systems of dogmatic assertion of truth, finally blending into
broader social trends of power and nihilation. Much of what Jaspers has to say about
technology and work is parallel to if not derivative of Marx. There are acknowledged
influences of Freud in General Psychopathology, more prominently in earlier editions.
Indeed his criticisms of Marx and Freud operate on three levels, criticism of the thinkers'
respective systems of thought, but more importantly, criticism of both as prominent
representatives of aberrant outcomes of modern science and, through both thinkers, criticism
of endemic social trends. This comparison first appears in Man in the Modern Age, but, is
drawn again in Reason and Anti-Reason shortly after the Second World War. It is much
easier to gain insight into Jaspers’ own thought through this comparison that it is through, for
example, his comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as the twin prophets of nihilism.
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Both Freud and Marx are for him archetypes of science gone astray -- in this comparison we
see in microcosm the problematic relationship of power and knowledge which is the central
issue of Jaspers' historical thought. But while, outside of this illustration, Freud is really only
of relatively limited importance for even the psychological Jaspers, Marx is of great
importance for Jaspers' philosophy of history and earns Jaspers’ severe disapprobation:

Marx exercises no conscious control over his will to power... He appeared as
the herald of science, but of a science that is not a science at all. He came as
one who commands in the name of history... only destruction and purposeless
violence can spring from the attempt to give reality to an absurdity. 140

Understanding and explaining

In his General Psychopathology, Jaspers describes a pluralistic method of inquiry in
which knowledge of meaning and knowledge of causation are combined: "We understand
psychic connections from within as meaning, and we explain them from without as regular if
not essential accompaniments and sequences." 141 The concept of causation for Jaspers
consists of conditioning through circumstances, precipitating factors, and forces productive
of decisive effects. In general, explanation is the linking of cause and effect: "for instance...
alcohol and delirium tremens; season of the year and suicide rate; thyroid disease and
excitability; cerebral hemorrhage and speech disturbance..." Treatment cannot be based on
causal knowledge, alone, however: "The significance and limits of causal knowledge are
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perhaps most clearly seen in relation to therapeutic possibilities." Causal knowledge should
not be divorced from consideration of meaning in psychotherapy:

The tendency to make causal speculation the main thing has a disastrous effect
on our empirical knowledge of psychic abnormality. The world of objective
knowledge--causally inexplicable as it may be--is abandoned in favor of empty
constructs. 142
Finally, causal knowledge is, of course, indispensable, but it not the decisive element,
knowledge of which is the task of the understanding:

Causal knowledge is always faced by something which no matter how we
operate it implies that in the end all the well-being of man is still dependent on
something decisive in himself, which is only approachable if we understand. 143
Jaspers defines understanding in psychiatry in contrast to explaining:

In the natural sciences we find causal connections only, but in psychology... a
quite different sort of connection. Psychic events 'emerge' out of each other in
a way which we understand. Attacked people become angry and spring to the
defense, cheated persons grow suspicious. The way in which an emergence
takes place is understood by us, our understanding is genetic. Thus we
understand psychic reactions to experience, we understand the development of
passion, the growth of an error, the content of delusion and dream; we
understand the effects of suggestion, an abnormal personality in its own
context or the inner necessities of someone's life. Finally, we understand how
the patient sees himself and how this mode of self-understanding becomes a
factor in his psychic development. 144
That the concept of the understanding has a relativistic character can been seen in clear terms
in Johann Gottfried Herder's early exposition of the concept in Yet Another Philosophy of
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History (1774):

Have you ever noticed how inexpressible is the individuality of one man, how
difficult it is to know distinctly what distinguishes him, how he feels and lives,
how differently his eyes see, his soul measures, his heart experiences,
everything? What depth there is in the character of a single nation... you must
enter the spirit of a nation before you can share even one of its thoughts or
deeds... plunge yourself into it all and feel it all inside yourself -- then only
will you be in a position to understand; then only will you give up the idea of
comparing everything, in general or in particular, with yourself. For it would
be manifest stupidity to consider yourself to be the quintessence of all times
and all peoples. 145
Johann Gustav Droysen is credited as the first to explicitly distinguish between
Verstehen and Erklären, understanding and explaining, as means of investigation. Droysen
describes understanding:

The method of historical investigation is determined by the morphological
character of its material. The essence of historical method is Verstehen by
means of investigation… The possibility of this understanding arises from the
kinship of our nature with that of the utterances lying before us as historical
material. A further condition of this possibility is the fact that man’s nature, at
once sensuous and spiritual, speaks forth every one of its inner processes in
some form apprehensible by the senses, mirrors these inner processes, indeed,
in every utterance. On being perceived, the utterance, by projecting itself into
the inner experience of the percipient, calls forth the same inner process. Thus
on hearing the cry of anguish we have a sense of the anguish felt by him who
cries. 146

In his General Psychopathology Jaspers cites Droysen’s distinction of Verstehen from the
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methods of the natural sciences that structured his approach. 147 Raymond Aron describes
Jaspers’ concept of the distinction between explaining and understanding:

Jaspers… proposed to separate understanding… entirely from causality…
That the weak may hate the strong, the unfortunate envy the rich, that the illfavored individual should care little for higher values, we understand quite
clearly, immediately, without reference to a rule or law. On the contrary, we
note that according to the law of sequence, syphilis brings on general
paralysis, but we do not understand it. 148
Aron depicts the influence of Jaspers upon Weber:
Weberian science is defined, therefore, by an effort to understand and explain
the values men have believed in, to explain and understand the works
produced by men. 149
The Weberian idea of understanding is largely borrowed from Karl Jaspers, at
the time when Jaspers was a psychologist, or, rather, a psychopathologist. In
his youth, Jaspers published a treatise on psychopathology… The heart of
Jaspers’ psychopathology is the distinction between explanation and
understanding. 150
Weber turned Jaspers’ conception into the question: “How can there be an objective
science—one not distorted by our value judgments—of the value-charged productions of
men?” 151 Jaspers takes this development a step further in The Origin and Goal of History.
On the one hand the result is a history based on meaningful connections, rather than a
conception of a causal process akin to nature, and, on the other hand, a political theory of
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negative liberty, which, following the principle of the understanding, is a bridge mechanism
between otherwise separated spheres of value. Marx, on the other hand, positing a universal
conception of positive liberty, does so on the basis of an explicit rejection of the principle of
intersubjective understanding:

Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself,
so we cannot judge of such a period of transformation by its own
consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained
from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the
social forces of production and the relations of production. 152
In Jaspers’ psychological and historical approaches, this conception is diametrically reversed.

From history to liberty
Work on Jaspers by scholars such as Eisenstadt, Bellah and Habermas has mainly
focused on themes related to the Axial Age. Eisenstadt’s approach effectively narrows the
focus and distills principles with which empirical investigations can proceed. Habermas’
approach points to the limits of the Axial Age thesis in terms of the understanding of broader
historical continuities. Jaspers’ own conception prefigures both of these approaches.
However, a consideration of how Jaspers’ philosophy of history forms the basis for his
argument for political liberty has not been considered in the literature. For Jaspers, an
international framework of negative liberty is the precondition of all effective projects of
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positive liberty, all ethical orders. Here one can see, as noted above, how Jaspers developed
his earlier, psychological concept of the understanding into a political concept:

Only when positive liberty has been realized on the basis of
the legal
safeguarding of negative liberty, does the proposition apply: Man is free in the
measure in which he sees freedom around him, that is, in the measure in which
all men are free. 153
There is no universal and monocausal element that governs history. Both the origin
and the goal of history are human consciousness. Jaspers’ conception of consciousness can
really only be defined as what is intrinsically human but distinct from humanity’s biological
element and his relationship to nature generally. Consciousness, perhaps itself indefinable,
nevertheless shows up in two ways, subjectively and objectively: subjectively in the
communicative constitution of human groups and objectively in humankind’s instrumental
relationship with nature. Both features of consciousness are intrinsically and uniquely
human. This is the point where Jaspers and Habermas put such stress upon the
anthropological findings which draw this distinction empirically. That Bellah muddles this
distinction is really inexplicable, but, in the unsystematic execution of his naturalistic
reduction, he does nothing to undermine that fundamental distinction. Heidegger’s view,
discussed above, collapses the subject-object dichotomy and leaves no way for consciousness
to show up at all. He also considers “modern history”, by which he was obviously referring
to Jaspers’ history, as “an assault”. However, he presents no clear alternative view. In the
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discussion of his correspondence with Jaspers, above, one saw how the “debate” centered on
the subject-object dichotomy. Without it, one has no way of conceiving of consciousness, as
that element distinctive of humanity. Here is how Habermas puts it: “the communication
with someone about something in the world represents an evolutionary watershed between
Homo sapiens and his closest biological relatives.” 154 The best explanation of why
subsequent scholarship has not connected Jaspers’ history of consciousness with his political
argument is that The Origin and Goal of History is simply a very complex work, covering, as
it does, a huge amount of territory in a relatively brief manner.

However, the connection between the history of consciousness and the political
argument for a framework of negative liberty can be distinctly seen. It hinges on one,
admittedly brief, passage:

Briefly: Some sort of distress is always the source of planning. The most
profound distress of all, that caused by war, is the source of total planning.
The meaning and justification of such planning in times of distress are then
transformed by the fact that the State’s will to power… reaches the maximum
degree of momentary energy through total planning… Existence is staked on
military conquest, which alone is capable of reversing one’s own bankruptcy
by the plunder of others. That which is of practical value to military ventures
is established as a permanent condition, with a view to a planned or feared
war. Thereupon a fresh motive comes into being. The condition of absolute
power, necessitated by war, is to be carried over into the peace as a permanent
condition of absolute sovereignty. 155
Jaspers defines “planning”:
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Planning is any arrangement with a purpose. To this extent, planning has
formed an element in human existence from the beginning. Animals live
without plan, according to their instincts. 156
Jaspers conception here necessarily implies that the principle of “total planning” or “absolute
sovereignty” arises from war, and that this phenomenon pertains “always”, i.e. throughout
history. Planning here is synonymous with instrumentality, with the objective relationship
between humanity and nature. The fact that planning is original to the human condition is
simply another way of saying that humankind must consciously deal with natural necessity to
be human in the first place, unlike animals which exist within nature on the mere basis of
instinct. This passage shows that war is that condition where the social relationship is
transformed into an instrumental one, or, probably more accurately, the communicative
character of the social relationship is blurred with instrumentality. An artificial second
nature arises within human society. Furthermore, the social relationship is not merely
temporarily instrumentalized, but, after war, it remains so, or can remain so, according to this
conception. Instrumentality is the way in which the human consciousness deals with nature.
Drawing upon this passage, one can see that Jaspers is implying that war is a relationship
between societies that is analogous to humankind’s relationship to nature. It implies that one
group sees another as a potentially threating alien force, insofar as it is a possible source of
imposed necessity. However, at the same time, the enemy group is actually not nature at all,
but only another human group, i.e. one with which mutual understanding is possible if not
actual. It is clear from the passage that war results in the inner instrumentalization of the
aggressor group: that instrumentalization which was temporarily employed in war
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introduces a shift from an original condition to a “permanent condition” of “absolute
sovereignty”. But why this happens specifically in conditions of war among human groups
and not in instrumental dealings with nature is nowhere specified by Jaspers. Perhaps it is
that a group ceases to understand itself in the effort to refuse to understand another group.
Nevertheless, this inner instrumentalization runs counter to the other aspect of human
conscious life, namely the intersubjective relationships that constitute particular human
groups. Whatever any given group’s conception of the good life might be, it must be
subjective. What Jaspers is describing is a shift, brought about by war, in a group’s selfconception from something subjective to something taken as objective. In other words, a
group’s ability to conceive of its particular vision of positive liberty is hijacked in the inner
instrumentalization resulting from war. War is the absence of scope for negative liberty.
When a group sets out to pursue positive liberty, according to whatever conception of such it
may hold, and the result is not the desired liberty, but, instead, a new form of necessity, a
dialectic is operant. The passage on war implies the origin of this dynamic. War is not
necessary to the human condition in the same way that language use or tool use is.
Therefore, if war is the source of a dialectical dynamic whereby attempts at positive liberty
are transformed into new sources of necessity, of not a natural but a normative sort, such a
dynamic is a contingent aspect of human affairs, i.e. contingent upon the decision to wage
war. The emphasis on negative liberty as the precondition for effective projects of positive
liberty in Jaspers’ political argument arises from this historical view.
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Chapter 2

History

Introduction

Jaspers wishes to ground his political argument for negative liberty as the
precondition for effective projects of positive liberty in a general conception of the history of
mankind. To do so, he builds upon the tradition of the philosophy of history. He constructs
the most elaborated connection between the philosophy of history and politics since Marx.
For Jaspers, Marx was one who wished to “command in the name of history” by decreeing a
universal conception of positive liberty, the singular and universal ethical order of a “new
man” on the basis of a monocausal conception of history. Jaspers rejects Marx’s conception
of history:

When dialectic is understood as causality, and its “laws” are treated like
necessary causal laws… In such a case, dialectic becomes monocausality. The
total happening takes place in the form of turnabouts which are dialectically
comprehensible and recognizable as necessary, in the sense of genuine
causality. The confusion of taking what is thought dialectically as though it
were causal cognition results in expectations of what is to come and in acting
on them… If, in carrying out a total act of destruction concerning human
circumstances, I expect a new man to arise by virtue of a dialectical meaning-
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relation falsely treated as causality, I in fact execute a magical act. 157
In part, Jaspers’ philosophy of history must have been intended to offer a show of intellectual
support for liberal democracy in the Federal Republic and the West generally after the
Second World War. However, this could not be his primary aim here. In the rejection of
Marx’s monocausal history, Jaspers proceeds along an intellectual direction that he first
broached with the application of the concept of the understanding in his early psychological
work. Human history cannot be explained solely or primarily with reference to causal
connections between events in sequence, as can natural history. Evident patterns of cause
and effect in human history must be subordinated to an understanding of how men conceived
of themselves, their groups, and other groups. Jaspers’ own view can be seen by the contrast
he draws with Marx:

If I look at history as though it were a natural process in which I do not take
part, then history divides into the automatic happening and the spectator.
However, for history to happen, human beings have to take an active role…
Marx’s idea of history… can, in analogy to the confusion of intuitive
knowledge and technical application, be used in two ways: for passively
watching as things happen, or for the justification of activism. In the first
case, the attitude is “why do anything, why interfere!”… In the second case,
the tendency of Marxist ideas is to justify the use of extreme force as the
means of bringing about splendid conditions whose realization may be
expected with certainty if the ineluctable movement of history is realized. 158
Marx reduces the meaning of events in history to a causal process akin to natural history. It
is against this conception, which he calls a “fanaticism of certainty”, that Jaspers orients his
own concept of history. Jaspers seeks to do what he says Marx fails to do by attempting to:

157

Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, Volume IV (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 350.
106

Bring about a constructive ordering of actual human existence, which,
allowing for all half-measures, injustices, disagreements, still makes possible
human fulfillment, in the framework of positive—not destructive—history. 159
Nearly two decades after The Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers would echo this earlier
aspiration of his in a call for a legitimate and nonviolent revolution. 160

Schema of history
Jaspers divides his account of history into five stages. 161 The first is the prehistoric
age in which humankind attains speech, tools and the use of fire. Before this stage, the life
of humankind would have been indistinguishable from unconscious natural processes.
Speech and the most rudimentary use of technologies separate humankind from nature – but
when and how this separation occurs, and whether gradually or abruptly, will probably
always remain beyond knowledge. Recorded history begins with the attainment of writing.
History necessarily implies linguistic evidence. The earliest written records date from
around 3000 B.C.; recorded history has lasted approximately 5,000 years. In the second
stage, the ancient civilizations develop in a vast but relatively narrow strip of land spanning
from Mediterranean Europe through North Africa, Asia Minor and the Middle East to India
and China. Much later, and in isolation despite intriguingly apparent similarities,
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civilizations develop in Central and South America. During the third of Jaspers' stages, the
Axial Age, a period from roughly 800 to 200 B.C., the “spiritual foundation” of humankind
develops in three independent regions: in the West, in India and in China. In the fourth
period, between 200 B.C. and 1500 A.D., the West, Jaspers says, “inwardly articulates” into
Occident and Orient, as distinct from India and China which constitute the East. This
“inward articulation” is the basis of the particular fragmentation and metamorphoses that
appear only in the West, while a relatively greater uniformity appears in the East. Within the
particular history of the west this fourth stage includes the periods of late antiquity and the
middle ages. By 700 A.D., Jaspers finds the “highest seat of spiritual life of the earth” in
Chang'an, the capital of China, and only a “remarkable residue” still present in
Constantinople. 162 By 1400 A.D., a relatively uniform level of civilization can be observed
across Europe, India and China. Around 1500 A.D., however, the fifth stage begins uniquely
in the West with the breakthrough into modernity, “immediate historical matrix” of our
times. The “most extreme transcendence” is attained in the West as well as in India and in
China. However, in the West alone it is “fettered to the world of immanence”. The result is
a form of “perpetual unrest” unique to the West. Modernity brings by means of the West the
unprecedented free advancement of science and technology as well as a planetary pattern of
centripetal power.
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The East and the West

For the consciousness of the West, since the time of the ancient Greeks, the East has
taken on a symbolic form as a vast, ultimately unfathomable and essentially despotic matrix - something akin to the blind forces of nature, separate from man and potentially able to
overpower him. 163 The Greek consciousness of differentiation relative to the East -- the
barbarians and the Persian empire -- survived in the forms of the divisions between Western
and Eastern Roman Empires, Western and Eastern Christendom and the West and Islam. The
terrifying images of either savage barbarian hordes or Asiatic despotism with its
corresponding stagnant, ant-like existence of the innumerable anonymous masses is not hard
for a parochial Western consciousness to conjure up. This symbolic sense in which the
terrifying figure of the East wells up in the Western consciousness shows Western
humankind an image of himself as emerging from this gargantuan primordial matrix, and
perpetually on the verge of sinking back into it. This image is sociologically "untrue and
unjust" says Jaspers. Nevertheless there are two important avenues for the understanding
here. On the one hand it is important to relate the intellectual and sociological analogues in
the East and the West with each other -- because they are real, they point to a deep shared
civilizational substratum, and such investigation brings the history of both regions into
clearer consciousness for both. On the other hand, the Western view relative to Asia is an
image of its "emergence" from "stabilization of the spirit in fatalism" -- and there is some
essential validity embedded here -- if only as the Western version of that consciousness of
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particularity possessed by all cultures. But as a symbolic dichotomy it obfuscates aspects of
sociological reality. While the East exhibited nothing like the comparatively peculiar
Western intellectualization of political liberty stemming from ancient Greece, and nothing
like the relatively higher degree of torment and rupture in cultural reconfigurations that
characterize the West generally since ancient times, nevertheless the conscious opposition to
despotism, and the will to emerge from it, is not a solely Western characteristic. Rather:
"emergence is a universal historical process, not a peculiarity of Europe's attitude toward
Asia." 164 This amounts to saying that: where despotism exists, it does not exist in a vacuum,
but implies the will to overcome its opposition. This points to two principles: a theory of the
presence at all times of a universal human capacity for the essence of “emergence” from
despotism, the pressure for differentiation of cultural entities even where there is no freedom
for the actualization of such and, the theory of the development of the ancient civilizations in
all three regions, the Middle East, India and China from an initial stage of social orders
planned to protect settled agricultural technical peoples from barbarian incursions.
Nevertheless, the relatively high saliency of such emergence in the West partially conditions
the unique ferment of European modernity.

In Hegel's narrative the East is "the childhood of history." Max Weber, on the other
hand, focuses less upon what is universal and essential, but more upon what is particular and
contingent, a distinction expressed in his description of his inquiry in The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism into: "what combination of circumstances should be attributed
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the fact that in Western civilization, and Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have
appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal
significance and value." 165 Jaspers says that Weber presupposes a knowledge of history in
his readers; he presupposes in his readers familiarity with the Hegelian narrative, but it is
against this that he wants to bring to light an understanding of the contingencies and
differences of societies. In so doing, he took factors that, in Marxist terminology, appear
“superstructural” and assigned to them primary importance in the histories of societies.

Prehistory

Prehistory is that section of humankind's past which is partially recoverable in
explanatory terms, but where the meaning of events is unknowable because of the absence of
written records. 166 Modern archaeology and biology have extended knowledge of
humankind’s past far beyond anything comprehended by earlier periods. Humankind’s place
in process of biological evolution common to all life has been definitively established. From
bone fragments, tools, ornaments, cave paintings and primitive structures, inferences can be
drawn as to purposes of their uses, but no understanding of the meaning of these things for
the cultural life of prehistoric humankind can be drawn beyond imaginative hypotheses. One
can infer techniques such as hunting and gathering. Migrations may have occurred for
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specific purposes, but other species have spread across the globe, as well. Were there
technological breakthroughs in prehistory that were suppressed because they disrupted
existing structures of power? The understanding cannot penetrate the mind of prehistoric
humankind. For multiple tens of thousands of years, the cultural acquisitions that
archaeology can recover remain almost unchanged: humankind used tools and fire, made
various ornamentations and weapons, buried the dead, domesticated animals and, in some
places, built enduring structures of stone. The works of various groups display cultural
differentiation. In his biological nature, prehistoric humankind was identical to historical
humankind. Johann Jakob Bachofen formulated such cultural categories as the "Appolonian"
and the "Dionysian" in an attempt to penetrate the prehistoric psyche, but he could not
accomplish more than hypothetical inferences based upon patterns of meaning already
available to understanding of the historical period. All that can be known with certainty is
that the earliest historical records show that humankind understood the world in mythological
categories. The central question for prehistory is: why were the initial breakthroughs, such
as fire and simple tools, separated from further technological developments by tens of
thousands of years of intellectual stagnation? The intellect of prehistoric humankind stifled
instead of continuing the process of questioning that had given rise to these initial
developments; it did not recapture the essence of innovation and build upon these basic
accomplishments until the dawn of the ancient civilizations, which, by comparison, is
relatively recent. Such a life, one still tightly bound up with natural necessity, would have
been anything but a romantic idyll. Prehistoric humankind can be seen as unhistorical on this
account: he lost touch with that impulse of questioning his circumstances and innovative
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thought that initially separated him from nature. He could not have seen himself as
developing in time, but could have only encountered himself as he would his natural
surroundings, as something repetitive like the cycles of day and night, the phases of the
moon or the seasons of the year. It seems that humankind in that numb condition before
history, as little knowable as he is to us, was still infinitely less known to himself.

Consciousness

What is man? How does he differ from the animal? For Jaspers, humankind, even in
biological structure, is unique: "all other living creatures are at once confined and
consummate in their peculiar structure, but man is boundlessly open in his potentialities, his
being has not attained consummate shape and can never do so." 167 He cannot survive
without a conscious reflection upon his natural circumstances and the development of
techniques to avoid succumbing to its forces. Furthermore, this ability for conscious
reflection does not arise except in communication, so it implies the necessity of community,
the transmission of meanings. For animals, even the higher primates, specialized organs and
instinctual drives are all that is needed for survival in nature, except where there may be a
relatively short period of purely instinctual physical dependency on the mother. In no case
does any animal rely upon conscious transmission of techniques for living. And if any of the
higher primates have such a capacity, it is so relatively slight as to be infinitesimal. In

113

humans, on the other hand, the biological and the cultural are so intimately bound up that the
very survival of the species depends upon both. Jaspers points to anthropological theory,
specifically the work of Adolf Portmann, when he observes that the human infant physically
matures outside the womb, in interaction with others, in emulation of adults or of other
children. The relatively higher brain and body weight and unique helplessness differentiate
human infants from the higher primates, our closest biological relatives. His example is that
the spine of the infant assumes is properly mature shape through emulation, but this is no
doubt only one aspect. Noam Chomsky subsequently claimed that human use of language
develops along these lines, as well, in that language develops in a process by which the
brain's physiological structures are brought to maturity through meaningful communicative
interaction. Although Chomsky's specific insight was unknown to Jaspers, it is implied by
Jaspers’ general portrayal of human nature -- German historicism was influential for both,
probably particularly in the influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Jaspers summarizes the
fundamental interdependence of intellectual culture and human biology by saying, for
humanity: "Geist is already operative, even in the biological realm itself." 168 Human nature
is partially conditioned by conscious decisions for Jaspers, and is, therefore, inconsummate
in principle. Consciousness seems indefinite and insusceptible of definition, except insofar as
it can be defined by contrast with humankind's biological stratum, which alone would be
incomplete and incapable of physical survival without consciousness.
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The ancient civilizations

History begins in the spheres of the ancient empires of China, India, Mesopotamia
and Egypt. These societies developed writing and, hence, leave remains whose meaning can
be directly recovered, rather than merely inferred from the supposed use of unearthed
primitive artifacts. Jaspers writes: "we feel solid ground under our feet wherever a word
reaches us." 169 Along with writing, the ancient civilizations are distinguishable from
primitive peoples on the basis of the technologies of agriculture, irrigation and horsemanship.
The relatively high level of technological development, involving permanent settlement for
the purposes of agriculture, gave rise to a tension between these early areas of civilization
and their nomadic, barbarian neighbors. These civilizations had their origin in defensive
formations against barbarian incursions, but, later, they would undergo a transformation on
two levels: they became despotic and their intellectual culture, their spiritual life, took on a
stagnant character. After an initial period of technological breakthrough, which set men free
to a degree from direct submission to natural necessity, a counter-movement occurs,
establishing a human despotism in place of that of nature. There must have been power
relations with prehistoric societies that prevented intellectual breakthrough. It appears as if
something of the barbarian psyche triumphed, establishing in the spheres of the ancient
civilizations an analogue of the endless numb repetition of the life of prehistoric humankind.
Continual incursions of barbarians, conquest, revolution and natural catastrophe, were
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followed by continuation of the extant old culture in each of the ancient empires. The
civilizations of Mexico and Peru are somewhat anomalous chronologically, though they
appear to fit the formal structural patterns of the other ancient civilizations, i.e. as early
technological civilizations mired in despotism and cultural rigidity. Jaspers seems to believe
that there was probably some slight cultural connection between Asia and Central and South
America -- probably across the Pacific Ocean on account of its islands -- such as Easter
Island. In one account he says they resemble Egypt and Babylonia, in another, East Asia.

History

For Jaspers, history has three primary aspects: recollection, rationalization and
emulation. 170 Together these aspects are also basic constituents of consciousness, and hence
of humankind's at once definitive and inconsummate essence. Most fundamentally, the
human infant develops consciousness through emulation of others. Next, men must
rationalize to some degree in order to merely survive in the external natural world, by
creating at least rudimentary technology in the form of tools. Finally, both of those
processes must, at some minimal level, be transmitted in the form of intellectual recollection
of techniques from generation to generation for the bare survival of the species. At a certain
level of technological development, namely writing, the last of these processes, recollection
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or transmission, becomes infinitely more effective. The confinement of literacy to a
dominant scribe class in the ancient civilizations placed a temporary brake upon this maieutic
potential. In each of these three characteristic aspects of consciousness, humankind manifests
the uniqueness of his essence. They are at once inward, meaningful, activities and outward,
causal, activities. Altogether, history, seen in this way, is simply synonymous with conscious
activity -- but this, of course, is here built upon scientific understanding of history, i.e. that
clarification of it achieved with regard to consciousness. Conceived in this way, no human
society has ever been absolutely unhistorical. There has always been, by necessity, some
conscious activities and some transmission of the patterns of such. On the other hand, upon
this conception, societies can be seen as more or less historical by virtue of their relative
levels of the reliability and robustness of the third of these activities, recollection or
transmission. Awareness of this gradient becomes important insofar as, in various periods of
human history, humankind has been more or less historical. In prehistory, historical
transmission was at or near the barest minimum necessary for survival for several tens of
thousands of years. In the world of the ancient civilizations, initial radical breakthroughs
were stabilized mutely in place across millennia, a general span that varies in particular areas
but runs roughly from the invention of settled agriculture to the Axial Age.

The Axial Age

Jaspers’ inquiry into the period he calls the Axial Age proceeds along three lines:
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inquiry into the facts of the period, inquiry into their causes and inquiry into their
meanings. 171 The Axial Age refers to a demythologizing structural reorientation in
intellectual culture across the civilized regions during the period from around 800 to 200 BC.
Jaspers cites two scholars, Peter Ernst von Lasaulx and Viktor von Strauß, who both
sketched early conceptions of the period by noticing parallel cultural dynamics in the West,
India and China.

Lasaulx writes:
It cannot be an accident that, six hundred years before Christ, Zarathustra in
Persia, Gautama Buddha in India, Confucius in China, the prophets in Israel,
King Numa in Rome and the first philosophers -- Ionians, Dorians, and
Eleatics -- in Hellas, all made their appearance pretty well simultaneously as
reforms of the national religion. 172

Von Strauß writes:
During the centuries when Lao-tzu and Confucius were living in China, a
strange movement of the spirit passed through all civilized peoples. In Israel
Jeremiah, Habakkuk, Daniel and Ezekiel were prophesying and in a renewed
generation (521-516 BC) the second temple was erected in Jerusalem. Among
the Greeks Thales was still living, Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus and
Xenophanes appeared and Parmenides was born. In Persia an important
reformation of Zarathustra's ancient teaching seems to have been carried
through, and India produced Sakyamuni, the founder of Buddhism. 173
The events of the Axial Age occurred in three great regions of culture, China, India and the
West. The latter region encompassed the ancient Middle East, Greece, the Mediterranean
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world and Egypt. In all three regions, there was a multitude of small states and city states,
often with a considerable degree of autonomy from the ancient empires. In China the empire
was virtually powerless. In the Persian Empire, cities had some degree of autonomy. The
free poleis of Greece were archetypes of this externally independent condition. The Greek
cities fought amongst themselves and were internally constituted by their densely variegated
complex of mythological systems and mystery cults, some taken over and adapted from the
East and Egypt; imbricated with these were a diversity of systems of social stratification and
political institutions. The successful defense of Greek political liberty in the Persian War
must have left a profoundly deep imprint on the Greek mind -- it persisted for millennia as
the polarity between Occident and Orient, between the West and the East. Warfare and
economic change were endemic in all three great regions during this period, giving the era a
general character of ferment. Questions must have arisen in each of the three regions as to
the nature and legitimacy of social conditions and the established orders of ancient traditions.
Scientific inquiry occurred in all three regions, reaching greatest acuity in Greece. Men,
awakened by turmoil and change, everywhere began to ask questions, and to seek
independent answers. Awareness of neighboring peoples and cultures was evoked through
commerce and warfare. The stolid edifice of the ancient world began to crumble. In
conscious reflection, men began to wonder how life in community should be rightly ordered.
New importance was given to civic education and the planning of right institutions. Decisive
answers were sought on the basis of free reason rather than upon the prevailing, but
declining, mythological bases. Out of this intellectual ferment, in which only the relatively
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privileged and educated few could participate to any profound depth, the structures of social,
political and religious order were remolded into the basic forms which, despite significant
alterations, persist until the present. Truth was no longer the exclusive possession of priests
in the recesses of the temples, but was sought out abroad. Philosophers, prophets and
wandering spiritual teachers appeared -- in a diversity of forms, and separately in each of the
three regions, they joined the tumult of their awakening age, focusing, reflecting and
systematizing its basic conscious impulses, and, in some cases, leaving their thoughts in new
texts which would become authoritative with time. The common element of their insights
was a rejection of the whole world of mythos while attempting to lead men to an new
apprehension of reality through some inner, individual connection or transformation, be it
ascent to the realm of the ideas through reason, the resignation of ataraxia, the tao, nirvana,
or inner surrender to the will of the one God. The world of myth having been rejected, truth
claims were now everywhere to be set upon a new, right basis: a basis comprehensible by
“man as man”, one not essentially confined by culture or mediated by a priesthood, able to be
read by him, to be learned in community with others, and to be discussed in public. Plato
exposits all these basic aspects of Axial Age thought in the form of Kallipolis, the beautiful
city, which is:

A pattern in heaven, where he who wishes can see it and found it in his own
heart. But it does not matter whether it exists or ever will exist. In it alone,
and in no other society could an intelligent man take part in public affairs. 174
Alongside the new intellectual culture, the ancient empires persisted but began a process of
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terminal decline. The immediate outcome, the end of the Axial Age, in each of the three
regions was punctuated by a rebirth of empire upon a newly reformed intellectual culture.
Alexander sought homonoia, single-mindedness. Rome mirrored this synthesis in her
pantheon of all the gods. Chandragupta Maurya unified India. Qin Shi Huang unified China.
The high purity and dynamism of the ideals of the Axial Age would, in the ensuing imperial
age, rigidify in dogmatic formulations, interpenetrated with cultural remnants of the older
orders which had, nevertheless, lost their original vitality. Jaspers says the Axial Age was:
“an interregnum between two ages of great empires, a pause for liberty, a deep breath
bringing the most lucid consciousness." 175

In the person of Socrates, the West has its ultimate exemplar of the Axial Age. Three
accounts from his contemporaries, Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes, together serve to give
Socrates's personality the vitality of someone almost personally known. Nietzsche expressed
that sentiment when he writes: "Socrates is so close to me that I am almost always engaged
in a struggle with him." Historical criticism, the science of philology, cannot, says Jaspers,
form any one definitive picture of Socrates. The closer one approaches, the more fragmented
one's view becomes:

Either it concludes that a collection of arguments and anecdotes from various
sources has been transferred to Socrates, or else it disavows its own character
as science and by claiming to discover more than critical methods can justify,
and then the result is a multiplicity of incompatible images, each one
supposedly critical, in other words a result that cannot be called scientific. 176
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On the other hand, Hegel explodes the personal reality of Socrates to the absolute status of a
pure historical force:

It was in Socrates, that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the
principle of subjectivity -- of absolute inherent independence of Thought -attained free expression. He taught that man has to discover and recognize in
himself what is the Right and Good, and that this Right and Good is in its
nature universal. Socrates is celebrated as a Teacher of Morality, but we
should rather call him the Inventor of Morality. The Greeks had a customary
morality; but Socrates undertook to teach them what moral virtues, duties, etc.
were. ... Many citizens now seceded from practical and political life, to live in
the ideal world. The principle of Socrates manifests a revolutionary aspect
towards the Athenian state... on account of giving utterance to that principle...
Socrates was condemned to death... the Athenian people condemns its
deadliest foe--but... what they reprobated in Socrates had already struck firm
root among themselves, and they must be pronounced guilty or innocent with
him. 177
Neither approach is in itself sufficient, according to Jaspers. With both one proceeds
according to a law of absurdity: to fixate in knowledge a man who, above all else, attested to
the fact that he did not know. Jaspers compares the accounts given by Plato, Xenophon and
Aristophanes. In the end, he singles out Plato's account as that which puts one closest in
touch with Socrates as: "a one who speaks from inexhaustible depths, who springs from an
unfathomable source and lives toward an unfathomable end." 178 Hence, for Jaspers, the
question of Socrates should remain open -- as a provocation to authentically conscious
thought which proceeds at once independently and in respectful dialogue with others, open to
facts but without absolute arrest in knowledge or action. In open, inconsummate questioning
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and dialogue, one can see and awaken that spiritual situation of the Axial Age in which
Socrates's own questions arise. To the contrary, Plato's character Alcibiades in the
Symposium exemplifies the dogmatic approach to Socrates, which is incapable of questioning
and dialogue:

When I opened him and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him
divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a
moment whatever Socrates commanded. 179
In comparison to the intellectual cultures of the preceding ancient civilizations and
primitive peoples, those of the Axial Age are all oriented towards principles of possible
universal validity for all humankind. Despite their factual imbrication in the cultures of the
Axial Age peoples, at their spiritual heights, they are abstract and applicable to all peoples.
Whereas the ancient empires were an amalgam of cultures, there was a constant and
definitive highest culture, a domain built upon a continuous tradition in which political
power was conjoined with mythic views of cosmic order and magical rituals. The
domination of such a high culture is what made up the ancient imperial entity's singular pillar
of power. But this applied outside of the great empires, as well. Greece serves as an
example: the Greeks, though holding no vast empire, considered themselves the world's
paramount civilization. Even in Hellenistic times, the Ptolemies ruled Egypt with their
native tongue for centuries. The Persian army that was defeated at Marathon serves an
illustration of the cultural model of the ancient civilizations. In Jacob Burckhardt's words:
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A great avalanche of men, reputed to number 1,700,000 marched against
Greece. It was a senseless and ill-organized horde; the various tribes retained
their preferred national weapons and their native leaders, though these were
not considered officers but slaves, since the nominal commanders were all
Achaemenids, connected by birth or marriage with the king. 180
With the birth of Axial Age thought, universal principles became imbricated in the already
extant cultures from which they arose, but these principles would operate differently than the
myths which had informed the ancient civilizations. Their universality was never wholly
overcome by the particular cultures which embodied them, rather the opposite occurred: the
universal triumphed over the particular, despite outward appearances to the contrary.
Hellenism was not Greek civilization essentially, but was such only incidentally and
outwardly. In essence it was homonoia. In Rome this principle also ruled -- a famous
illustration is the case of Paul of Tarsus, who was both Jewish and Roman. In none of the
empires arising at the end of the Axial Age did cultural particularity cease to matter, though
in all cases the essential motive force had become universal.

Through cyclical motion in both space and time, Axial Age thought would
subsequently spread and regenerate itself. Everywhere, the older orders of intellectual
culture would be incorporated or extinguished completely. Nowhere did any lasting culture
emerge on the model of the ancient civilizations or primitive peoples after the Axial Age. In
the East, Confucianism would spread to Korea, Japan and parts of South-East Asia.
Buddhism would spread from India to China and much of the same region. Christianity is a
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complex intellectual amalgam, but its formative phase occurred in the syncretistic world of
the linguistically Greek, Hellenistic provinces of the Roman East. The definite essence of
Christianity would become a combination of Jewish piety and tradition; Greek philosophy,
science and citizenship; and Roman conceptions of order and authority. Proceeding
according to no one plan, agglomerating diverse cultural influences, Christianity wound its
eccentric way through the ancient world, arriving at the feet of Constantine, and, through
him, attained the status of a world religion. Since the Axial Age, the basic intellectual
principles of the age have endured in all three great regions, and in those areas to which they
spread. Patterns of revival in intellectual culture have always harkened back to it. The Holy
Roman Empire was conceived as a reincarnation of Rome. Islam sought to revive the
essence of Biblical faith. The Renaissance and Reformation both conceived of themselves
primarily as a return to various elements from the Axial Age -- though in the Reformation
this was complicated by the fact that Christianity took on its definitive shape after the Axial
Age. Napoleon posed in the trappings of Augustus. George Washington was painted
partially nude, loosely draped in a toga. In the East, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism
persisted and underwent periodic cycles of stagnation and regeneration. The pure ideal, in the
case of each of the three great regions, persisted as an element that could be revivified even
after centuries of slumber and disinterred from its imbrication with elements of cultural
particularity everywhere. In no case were the elements of Axial Age thought completely
supplanted by extant particular cultural formations nor eroded by changing times, social,
economic or political conditions. Axial Age thought underwent no essential inward
transformations of its own, but affected all-encompassing outward transformations. It
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transformed cultures everywhere from outside both in conjunction with imperial conquest
and through passive cultural diffusion, cycling boundlessly through space. It transformed
cultures from the inside, eternally provoking return to its essence in new movements of
ingenuity. Its essence was in thought, in reflections upon transcendence of the world.
Everywhere it informed nations, spiritual movements, and canons of art; it compromised
everywhere with the material world, but in every instance only temporarily. The empires
that served to give consummate mundane expression to this principle of homonoia,
eventually decayed, while the eternal principle moved on and began anew. In the aspects of
space and time, it structured a single sphere of world history. Though in each of its many
iterations, the paramount goal of the ideal pattern set up in heaven was never realized with
finality on Earth.

After the Axial Age

The brief fluorescence of political liberty and scientific inquiry that arose in Greece
before the Hellenistic period, achieved a tenuous, though lasting, significance in the Western
cultural consciousness. 181 Between the ancient world and the modern world, the idea of
order that manifested itself first in the unifying civic ethos of the Roman-Hellenistic cultural
complex with its relatively free sphere of cultural dynamism, became, after the third century
AD, a stolid and dogmatic theological edifice in Byzantium. The definitive symbol of the age
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for Europe was Christ pantokrator, ruler of all. This period between late antiquity and
modernity was structured by theocratic states in the broader Western sphere: in Byzantium
and its rivals, the Sasanian Empire and the Arab empire on its Islamic foundation. In the
Occident, the by which Jaspers indicates Western and Northern Europe, the same model of
theocratic unity could find no very stable foothold. On the contrary, in competition between
church and state powers, in cultural fragmentation, something obdurate in the Occidental
character found affinity and inspiration in the distant memories of Greek liberty and science.

It was through contact with this volatile Occidental matrix that scientific inquiry
within the essentially theocratic Arab empire could attain a brief fluorescence in medieval
Iberia. The extant Occidental model of fragmentation of relatively autonomous small units of
political power accompanied by a weakened central theocratic power, was the condition
under which scientific inquiry flourished in Moorish Iberia. In the East, science likewise
developed, but in a context closer to imperial power. That this was accomplished without the
loss of Moorish cultural particularity provides an early example of the cultural adaptability of
external political liberty and scientific inquiry, if only, as it definitely was there, as elsewhere
in the Occident, still in a very inchoate form. The end of Moorish civilization came not in
the Reconquista, but in the earlier, forceful imposition of internal theocratic imperial
discipline through the Almoravids. The Almoravids themselves, as nomadic Berber desert
tribesmen of the harsh Atlas Mountains region, renowned for their zealotry, could not be
more culturally opposite to the refined aesthetics of Moorish civilization. The most decisive
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impetus for the Almoravid invasion was not their own zealotry or desire for plunder,
however, but rather was one arising from dissatisfaction with the heterodox attitudes of the
relatively independent multitude of small Moorish states on the part of the Muslim theocratic
and intellectual elite, who remained beholden to the center of imperial power in the East.
Intellectual life at the Eastern extreme of the Arab Empire at this time was exemplified by alGhazali, who, in concert with the ruling theocratic order, encouraged the Almoravid
invasion.

With the end of the external political liberty of the Moorish city states, the Arab
Empire overcame its internal struggle in favor of a monolithic theocratic order. No such
lasting stability could be achieved in the Occident, where, rather, tensions arose everywhere:
between Christianity and culture, between empire and nations, between Romance and
Teutonic peoples, between Catholics and Protestants, between theology and philosophy. The
Occident became defined by internal tensions, where the opposing entities would have to
settle for the mere claim to universal truth, in the absence of any one unifying power to
possess it in fact. Jaspers writes:

Hence the West is typified by a resoluteness that takes things to extremes,
elucidates them down to the last detail, places them before the either-or, and so
brings awareness of the underlying principles and sets up battle-fronts in the
inmost recesses of the mind. 182
Out of this unstable matrix of the medieval Occident the two related forces of political liberty
and scientific inquiry would arise. When Jaspers notes that: "the classical development of
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political freedom... occurred not more than seven hundred years ago in England," he refers to
the principle of the struggles of the nobility against the monarchy that resulted in the Magna
Carta. Modern science took preliminary form in philosophy of the Paris nominalists.
Through scientific inquiry the world was opened to investigation of unprecedented scope:

During the last few centuries, a single phenomenon that is intrinsically new in
all respects has made its appearance: science with its consequences in
technology. It has revolutionized the world inwardly and outwardly as no
other event since the dawn of recorded history. It has brought with it
unprecedented opportunities and hazards... New foundations for the whole of
existence have now been inescapably laid. 183
While both modern political liberty and modern scientific inquiry arose from a common
enduring legacy of the Greek intellectual culture of Axial Age antiquity and together escaped
ultimate destruction in the Occident where the city of God and the city of man could find no
perpetual peace, in their subsequently imposed isolation, the former remained for the most
part an evanescent and tenuous question for humankind generally while the latter became the
real and universal manifestation of the destructive credo: "knowledge is power."

Interpretation

The originality of Jaspers’ account of history is owing to his efforts to appropriate in
essence, to clarify and to rearticulate the Western tradition of philosophy of history. His
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purpose was two-fold: to exhibit the essential commonality of Axial Age traditions and to
show the way in which political liberty and scientific inquiry can be understood in the
essential and conjoined stages of their historical development. The end product is a vast
survey, only venturing into detail in order to study pivotal points. On the whole, the survey
is meant to exhibit with clarity the essential determining factors of the contemporary period,
the period upon which the world had embarked with in the transformative catastrophes of the
First and Second World Wars, bringing, according to Jaspers, an age of world unity.

Jaspers himself did not conduct any extensive specialized research into the facts of
history, apart from his works on intellectual history and his history of psychiatry in General
Psychopathology. When writing as an intellectual historian, he preferred to present studies
of individual thinkers, exemplified by his monumental collection of essays in The Great
Philosophers, his Nietzsche and Descartes volumes and elsewhere. In three of his chief
political works, Man in the Modern Age, The Atom Bomb and the Future of Mankind and The
Future of Germany, he organizes his thoughts according to particular political or social
themes, rather than presenting a historical survey. The Origin and Goal of History
constitutes the only historical survey of any great length in his entire immense and diverse
oeuvre. Even working one's way through this survey one is constantly challenged by
Jaspers’ manifest disdain for anything simply chronological. The survey begins, not at the
beginning, as it were, but in the middle, with the Axial Age. He supplies not one, but two
separate schemata of world history generally -- and only for the purpose of orienting the
reader at key junctures. His survey is obviously intended to be read and re-read, for the
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reader to assemble its pieces one by one. In this respect it follows precisely Jaspers’ own
conception of how consciousness becomes active in the world. For him, consciousness
becomes active under conditions of "failure", by which he means when it encounters
circumstances that are not immediately understood, that provoke problems and that lead to
the engagement of the intellect in search of answers.

It is with Marx’s thought in particular that Jaspers has the most contentious
relationship. Jaspers’ entire aim is directed against Marx in The Origin and Goal of History - and this is largely, though probably not entirely, apart from the fact that West Germany,
and the West generally, had just embarked upon a state of anxious confrontation with the
Communist world in the Cold War. This book, appearing as it did very shortly after the
Second World War, could not have been conceived virtually overnight as a mere political
intervention on the side of liberal democracy in the West. It must have, rather, been the case
that the basic conception of this book arose out of that period before the Bolshevik revolution
when Jaspers and Weber were united in a spirit of common intellectual endeavor. Marx
wanted to interpret the world so as to dispense with interpretation entirely and enlisted the
philosophy of history in his effort toward that end. The contrary view, to put it abstractly, is
that interpretation itself should be interpreted. More simply put: what is the role of
consciousness in the world? This question, for Jaspers’ philosophy of history, is central.
Humankind has always been fully human, has always possessed history. History is
intrinsically bound up with the basic processes of consciousness in: emulation,
rationalization and recollection. Jaspers conceives of humankind as, at once, a biological and
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a conscious entity, exhibiting the unique and necessary presence of both elements -- and in
this respect unlike any other form of life. Humankind is just as much constituted by
mutually communicated meanings as he is by his particular biological causality. He is both
of these primarily, and, only secondarily, conditioned from the outside by physical forces and
the effects of human power. On this basis -- which is not speculation but rather is grounded
in empirical observation -- history takes on an entirely different aspect than that of which
Marx conceived. For example, in prehistory, from this view, one can see that conscious
innovation on the part of human communities stagnated for countless millennia -- despite
that fact this view holds that the potential for consciousness must have been there in the first
place, from the beginning. There would have been no means of self-differentiation of
humankind from natural necessity without tools, which are embodiments of consciousness in
material objects through work -- there would have been no maturation of humans outside the
womb -- there would have been nothing recognizably human. Then, the presence of
conditions which constrain consciousness, conditions of power, must be seen as secondary
phenomena, causal in nature, but not the ultimate determinants of the conditions of
humankind's existence. With the bare, purely causal explanation of history employed by
Marx, one has, at best, half the story, and, in fact, probably less than that. Jaspers clearly
wished to play a political role supportive of liberal democracy against Communism
generally, and to specifically promote liberal democracy in the Federal Republic after the
Second World War.

These aims alone however do not account for the overall scope of The Origin and
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Goal of History, which is concerned with rearticulating of the philosophy of history. In
history one can conceive of a causal framework constructed upon explanation. Such an
effort could run through the history of the West since antiquity, and could be extended to
China and India as primary spheres and could be extended to the histories of all peoples in
the world insofar as the age of technology has delivered a single context of world history.
Barring catastrophe, the philosophy of history will always be part of intellectual culture. The
form in which it developed in the West, however, must be adjusted to fit changed
circumstances. In late antiquity, thinkers had no scientific knowledge of human origins, and
only relatively scant scientific knowledge of the natural world, and they lived under
conditions in which political liberty was completely impossible, extant only as a dim
glimmer of hope from the distant past. The form that their philosophy of history took fit
these circumstances, suited their present needs to understand themselves within those
circumstances, as it were at a great remove from scientific knowledge and political liberty.
Insofar as the philosophy of history grew up in conjunction with religious traditions of faith,
it did so authentically, by holding on to the hope that humankind, enmeshed as he is in
power, can, nevertheless, overcome the effects of power upon his own consciousness and
share this freedom with others to the extent practical and possible. In these early times, the
explanatory and understanding elements of the philosophy of history were construed and
related to each other in a fashion that fit those times. Everything to be explained was at an
incredible distance. The scope for collective understanding was miniscule. With Marx the
philosophy of history maintained its eschatological proportions when it entered a world very
unlike that in which it was originally formulated, the world of late antiquity. In the Occident,
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a world conditioned already by a fragile tradition of political liberty and in which modern
science had been compelled to supply technologies that infinitely multiplied humankind 's
physical powers, a radical secular eschatology could not but become an immensely
destructive explosive force -- at once self-destructive and destructive of that collective
understanding upon which liberty and science were based. Marx's error was a poverty of
faith, to speak symbolically; to speak theoretically, it was a poverty of understanding.
Specifically, it was lack of understanding that at no point did the philosophy of history posit
that a causal, explanatory framework of historical events, and their dialectical relationships,
was the same as total determination of either the consciousness of the present or future
possibilities of humankind. Marx writes:

In the social production of the environment of their life, human beings enter
into certain necessary relations of production that are independent of their will,
and that correspond to a determinate stage of development of their material
productive forces. The totality of these relations of production form the
economic structure of the society, the real basis upon which a juridical and
political superstructure raises itself, and to which determinate forms of social
consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material life of
society conditions the socio-political and intellectual life-process generally. It
is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the
contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness. 184

On the contrary, such a theory of causation as total determination, can only serve to
obfuscate the freedom of the consciousness in the present and future -- the clarification of
which is the aim of science. Hence Jaspers’ verdict that Marx: "destroyed science in the
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name of science." 185
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Chapter 3

Science

Introduction

Central to Jaspers’ thought is the postulate that consciousness always shows up within
the subject-object dichotomy. Nature, the world of objective relations, can be conceived of
causally. Life in human communities, on the other hand, involves the perception of
intersubjectively shared meanings:

Causal knowledge is always faced by something which no matter how we
operate it implies that in the end all the well-being of man is still dependent on
something decisive in himself, which is only approachable if we understand. 186
Therefore, for Jaspers, the priority of the understanding, of subjectivity, is clear. In the
overlapping spheres of science, technology and work, the human consciousness is oriented
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toward the objective world. Jaspers perceives in contemporary manifestations of each of
these spheres a tendency towards the objectification of humankind. His purpose to assert
that each of these spheres is, in itself, ethically neutral. In other words, neither modern
science nor modern technology is, in itself, a barrier to liberty. His view of history implies
that science and technology can have a complimentary relationship to the freedom of the
consciousness. His description of the “Promethean age” implies that the conjunction of
humankind’s first use of tools was necessary to the process of hominization itself. The
inception of the ancient civilizations were in part based upon the development of agricultural
technology and writing. The relatively stagnant intellectual life of ancient civilizations was,
nevertheless, a stage of considerably greater freedom of the human consciousness than the
preceding hundred or so millennia of prehistoric human existence. The neutrality of the
sphere of science, technology and work, for Jaspers, gives each an ambiguous character.
Jaspers seeks to describe how each sphere, when detached from the guiding rein of
understanding, turns into a source of self-objectification of humankind. This description
simultaneously seeks to bracket each of these spheres in order to support his central political
argument:

Only when positive liberty has been realized on the basis of the legal
safeguarding of negative liberty, does the proposition apply: Man is free in the
measure in which he sees freedom around him, that is, in the measure in which
all men are free. 187
Negative liberty in this conception is synonymous with understanding across different human
groups. By bracketing the spheres of science, technology and work as ethically neutral
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factors, Jaspers establishes a focus on subjective factors of human existence as the immediate
sources of liberty or the lack thereof.

Philosophy and Science

Outside The Origin and Goal of History the concept of history is not subject to any
in-depth treatment in Jaspers’ other writings. Short pieces that accompany his Great
Philosophers are exceptions, as are portions of his essays on individual philosophers. Of the
latter, the most extensive, but still relatively brief, treatment of the concept of history can be
found in his Nietzsche. On the other hand, the meanings of the concepts of philosophy and
science constitute perennial concerns for Jaspers. The aim of Origin and Goal of History,
Jaspers writes, is the elucidation of the situation of the present:

The purpose of an overall philosophical view of history, such as we are
seeking to arrive at, is to illumine our own situation within the totality of
history. It serves to light up the consciousness of the present epoch and shows
us where we stand. 188
To accomplish this, the Axial Age is not sufficient. Around 1500 the West embarked upon a
great transformation of intellectual culture arising from initial developments in the form of
modern science. For Jaspers modern science is founded upon philosophy. Augustine found
that there are precisely 288 logically possible “sects of philosophy” all of which have
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differing opinions of how to attain the summum bonum. 189 Jaspers says philosophy itself
cannot be defined: "There is no definition of philosophy because philosophy cannot be
determined by something outside it." 190 However, he often supplies definitions that,
nevertheless, seem intentionally vague, such as: "Philosophical thought is inward action; it
appeals to freedom; it is a summons to transcendence." 191 Similar characterizations can be
found throughout his writings. Jaspers relates philosophy to science: "...philosophy is not
only less but also more than science, as the source of a truth that is inaccessible to
scientifically binding knowledge." 192 This latter statement that comes closest to the
definition of philosophy that is actually implied in Jaspers’ own thought. Philosophy is the
core of the sciences, insofar as it is knowledge of how the sciences obtain universally valid
knowledge. This should be distinguished from objective knowledge ascertained by the
sciences, owing to the fact that such knowledge is, according to this view, made possible by
the general clarification achieved first through philosophical inquiry. That this definition of
philosophy does not account for all forms of thought that have been classified as philosophy
is consciously presupposed by Jaspers. The contrast between philosophy and science in
Jaspers’ thought can be most clearly seen in his comments on Marx -- though this
characterization mainly serves the purpose of exemplifying a broader distinction between
philosophy and anti-philosophy, between science and pseudo-science. Jaspers is in the final
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analysis mostly concerned with using his analysis of Marx as an example what he sees as a
blind alley of thought, insofar as he is of the opinion that Marx wreaked havoc with the
fundamentals of the philosophy of history. And this is all aside from the fact that Jaspers no
doubt thought that Marx himself had never really been directly influential for existing
Communist regimes -- no one would think that Marx actually envisioned or advocated the
totalitarian horrors of Stalinism or Maoism, for example.

What Marx shared with Descartes is a conception of philosophy as total, systematic
knowledge. 193 Philosophy, having reached ultimate truth about the world, need no longer
interpret the world, but rather must serve as the necessary insights for action. Knowledge
must become power. If, on the other hand, philosophy is inquiry into how the sciences obtain
universally valid knowledge, it can really only ever interpret the world by continuously
encountering it anew in its changing aspects. The crucial difference is one of the role of
consciousness. Philosophy in Jaspers’ view is a call to consciousness -- as fluid
communication of meanings constituting intellectual culture, or Geist, essential to human life
in general, intrinsic to the physical existence of the human life-form. On that interpretation,
philosophy as constituted by the works of the great thinkers with whom it is generally
associated is a record of particularly important and hard-won insights achieved in their
particular situations, however, in a way that is not essentially different from how
consciousness generally operates for all men. For Marx, on the other hand, consciousness is a
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product of those structures that are already known absolutely, i.e. in their essentials, through
philosophy:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the
contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness. 194
Whether consciousness is a primary or secondary feature of human existence is crucial. If
consciousness is secondary, then absolute knowledge becomes possible, because the
continuous fluidity of communication of meanings is bracketed as something superfluous,
and causal knowledge of physical sequences becomes of primary importance. Then, in this
denial that how men understand their situations has any intrinsic role in conditioning those
situations, the essential laws governing all human situations can be revealed completely:

We must rather explain this consciousness by the contradictions obtaining in
the material life of the time, in the conflict existing between the social forces
of production and the social relations of production... The bourgeois relations
of production are the last of the antagonistic forms of the social process of
production... With the present social formation, therefore, the introductory
period of the history of human society is closed. 195
It is clear from this how such an empirically fallacious view of consciousness leads to the
claim to absolute knowledge. Since bourgeois society is the final stage of the dialectic, to
overcome it is to overcome the dialectic entirely, absolutely -- through contributing to the
downfall of its final stage. Without relegating consciousness to a secondary position, no
social formations could be conceived of as following entirely from determining laws. And
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without the postulate of such determining laws of social reality, a prescription for total
emancipation, "human emancipation", could not be conceived. But what can "human
emancipation" mean if consciousness itself is a product of exactly those contradictions which
are to be overcome? Science is inquiry into the world with the aim of ascertaining what can
be known with universal validity. Philosophy, on the other hand, is knowledge of how the
aims of science can be achieved in differing circumstances, in differing configurations of
power -- this is Jaspers’ operant definition of philosophy:

Although scientific truth is universally valid, it remains relative to method and
assumptions; philosophical truth is absolute for him who conquers it in
historical actuality, but its statements are not universally valid. Scientific truth
is one and the same for all--philosophical truth wears multiple historical
cloaks; each of these the manifestation of a unique reality, each has its
justification, but they are not identically transmissible. 196
Both of those views of philosophy and science can be seen by taking Marx as a counterexample, because he reverses them both in a way that is clear to see. Jaspers recognizes that
Marx also made contributions to the science of economics, apart from this. For Marx,
philosophy has achieved final insight into the circumstances of power in its essentials,
therefore philosophy as it was known is at an end. Science is likewise at an end, because the
final science of society is now available. In Marx these formulations provide the final,
definitive answers that subvert that conscious process by which both philosophy and science
proceed.
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Modern Science

For Jaspers the development of modern science is the defining factor in what would
become an all-embracing historical transformation, beginning in the West and subsequently
spreading across the globe, ushering in modernity -- the age of technology -- everywhere.
Hence, understanding of science becomes crucial in Jaspers’ view: "the great and pressing
task of our epoch is the pure apprehension of the meaning and limits of modern science." 197
Science, both ancient and modern, is characterized by three attributes according to Jaspers:
"It is methodical cognition, cogently certain and universally valid." 198 Jaspers’ treatment of
science in Einführung in die Philosophie achieves greater depth that treatment found in The
Origin and Goal of History, but without the breadth of historical consideration found in the
latter. The difference between modern and ancient science is one of attitude. While ancient
science, typified by Greek science, presented its works as finished, modern science is defined
by an attitude which: "set its own development as its conscious goal." 199 The basic impulse at
the heart of science is the will to knowledge, in modernity its attitude is one that presupposes
its absolute right to freedom; the basis of modern science is in: "the subjective impulse to
universal knowledge." 200 Nothing that exists is outside its bounds; everything is a possibly
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legitimate object of inquiry. Everything, even its own findings, are subject to potential
revision; it leaves behind all: "vague talk, all plausible opinions, all stubborn prejudice and
blind faith." 201 It searches for the highest degree of universally valid knowledge everywhere
and communicates that knowledge in a continuous process of development and revision
involving cooperative work. Insofar as scientifically ascertained knowledge results in
replicable techniques, it takes on the form of technology, and through work, production.
Technique here is not construed to cover the sphere of communication of meanings, but
rather only application of conscious processes in order to achieve a desired transformation in
physical conditions.

However, "science is a whore", says Jaspers, in a curious deviation from his usual
idiom, in echoing Nicholas of Cusa. Cusa writes:

Just as carnal lust finds its consecration and appeasement only when channeled
in the sacrament of marriage, so love of knowledge finds its appeasement only
when channeled in true union with the Bridegroom. So long as the mind
indulges without restraint in vain knowledge, it no more finds the object of its
natural desire than does a man who cohabits with every whore. There can be
no marriage with a fickle woman, only with eternal wisdom. 202
In other words: the validity of science remains governed by its methods and assumptions.
Without a philosophical understanding of how statements of universal validity can be made,
science falls into the role of mere servitude: "into gratuitous convention, meaningless

201

Karl Jaspers, The Way to Wisdom (Einführung in die Philosophie) (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1954), 152.
202

Karl Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, Volume III (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 202.
144

correctness, aimless busy-ness, and spineless servitude." 203 Jaspers says that science, when
properly guided by philosophy: "springs from the logos that does not enclose itself within
itself, but, open to the alogon, penetrates the latter by subordinating itself to it." 204 What is
described here can be thought of as a hermeneutic device by which conscious thought is
evoked out of unconscious conditions of everyday life. An example can make what Jaspers
means more concrete: in prehistory humankind's consciousness necessarily arose
simultaneous with the full biological formation of the species. Anything biologically
recognizable as fully human had to involve conscious thought. At the beginning of the
prehistorical period, men conceivably could have taken many different forms of conscious
action, but we have no empirical evidence aside from the existence of tools and a few other
types of objects. Into tools humankind put a conscious design first evoked in his mind. They
had a meaning for him; they had his logos. In them he could have seen his own conscious
efforts to overcome the sheer compulsion of nature. But then, known through modern
archaeology, a vast, terrible period of perhaps one hundred thousand years or more appears
to intervene in which silence ruled the world. This silence is an example of the alogon.
Something -- something one cannot penetrate by knowledge -- put a brake on conscious
activity. One can only theorize that something akin to the magical pseudo-knowledge
prevalent in primitive peoples whose societies were contemporary with modernity in the
West, and thus were capable of being investigated by modern anthropology, was the general

203

Karl Jaspers, The Way to Wisdom (Einführung in die Philosophie) (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1954), 159.
145

trend across all human societies in prehistory. Thus conceived, the alogon is a kind of "magic
spell" that freezes conscious activity into unconscious repetition like a natural process.
Primitive humankind could have looked at the first tools, recovered their basic purpose, and
further developed that purpose into new and better tools. But, instead, there was a vast
period of stagnation. Primitive humankind could repetitively create tools, but he could not
recover and further develop the logos, or conscious intention, encased within them as their
meaning, for that he would first need to confront that alogon which stood in his way. In his
"science" he proceeded blindly, reproducing primitive technology according to unquestioned
methods. This example is intended to illustrate how Jaspers sees the role of philosophical
inquiry in evocation of consciousness before and as the guiding basis of properly-oriented
scientific inquiry: properly construed, philosophy directs science away from its constant
tendency toward apathetic immersion in the unconscious images of every age.

In modernity, Jaspers argues, owing in part to the thought of Bacon and Descartes,
knowledge has become fallaciously confused with power: "Mastery of nature, ability, utility,
'knowledge is power', this has been the watchword since Bacon. He and Descartes sketched
the outlines of a technological future." 205 This direction is a blind alley for modern science,
however, and one that reverses its essential orientation. It is fundamental for Jaspers that
inquiry and the attainment of knowledge alone does not give direct rise to the dehumanizing
effects that he ascribes to the will to power. Assuming its proper philosophical orientation,
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modern science is seen by Jaspers as the expression of the will to knowledge. He
distinguishes the will to knowledge from the will to power:

Readiness to fit in with nature has always been part of the ethos of the natural
scientist. But he wants to know what nature does and what happens in nature.
For this will to knowledge, this freedom of the knower, who suffers, endures
and lives, not blindly but with his eyes open, is something quite different from
aggressivity and will to power. It is a will to power not as dominion, but as
inner independence. This liberty of consciousness of the knower is able
precisely to grasp pure factuality as a genuine hieroglyph of Being. It is not
aggressivity that is contained in the ethos of cogent, universally valid
knowledge--in contrast to the plausible, approximate, fluid, and ultimately
capricious—but will to clarity and trustworthiness. 206
This distinction is discussed at greater length in Reason and Anti-Reason. Here is the
summation of this distinction as it is drawn there:

It is not easy to understand science. One must have participated in it to have a
trustworthy idea of what it is. If one has no inside knowledge of science and
thinks of it merely in terms of its externals, of the wrong tracks it has
sometimes taken, of its transposition of means into ends, of its technical
applications, then one will misinterpret it... as an expression of the will to
power. 207
The misunderstanding of modern science as will to power can be seen to have a dual aspect:
on the one hand it is prefigured in modern thought specifically and, on the other, it is a
misunderstanding arising upon a critical attempt to understand modern life in general. In the
first aspect, science is conceived of as the possibility of achieving total knowledge of the
world as a whole. Jaspers, through his criticism of Marx, sought to describe this first aspect,
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as discussed above. In the second aspect, the products and effects of science in general are
received and criticized by individuals without the ability to differentiate the authentic
scientific orientation from its either typically inconvenient and unwanted or manifestly
destructive and dehumanizing effects. Modern science essentially involves an assumption of
the ability to know of objects in the world. However, this turns into a misapprehension when
it is conceived to mean the ability to know of the world as a whole. On the basis of that
misapprehension, a further fallacy is construed: that it is only a matter of good will,
operating on the basis of this knowledge, to create a permanent world order of complete
satisfaction and happiness. This result amounts to a scientific superstition or “surrogate
faith”. Upon the inevitable failure of such scientific superstitions which expect the
impossible, repudiation of science in general results. 208 The fallacy of total knowledge arises
when science is not taken as an activity for which its own development is its conscious goal,
but rather when that goal is mistakenly construed as a state of completion.

Technology

Technology is intrinsic to the essence of humankind, insofar as the human is a being
who cannot but separate himself from nature through conscious action. Until the modern
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period, the most powerful technologies had consisted of relatively rudimentary utilization of
physical forces of domesticated animals, fire, wind and water. But with modernity, the scale
of physical forces amenable to utilization increases exponentially, through the steam engine,
the electric motor, and more efficient means of harnessing the energy from sources such as
coal, oil, rivers, and, finally, from an entirely new source in atomic energy. Jaspers defines
technology as: "operation with the substances and forces of nature for the purpose of
producing useful objects and effects." 209 Technology is the outcome of a consciously
formulated technique in response to some situation of faulty functioning. It results in the
production of either sources of energy or goods. It produces everything with a purpose in
mind, but its products can subsequently be utilized alone or in conjunction for other
purposes. The essential nature of technology for the life of humankind in general is evident
when one considers Jaspers’ conception of the human infant, who is "born incomplete" and
matures through both physical growth and conscious exchange of meanings with others. But
technology is not communication -- the latter cannot be simply reduced to a calculation of
means and ends, but rather must necessarily always involve an element of meaning. So
planning in social affairs is not, by this definition, technological. Technology is the way
humankind relates to nature: "its purpose is to liberate man from his animal imprisonment in
nature, with its want, its menace, its bondage." 210 Humankind's relation to nature is always
already -- from birth -- one of faulty functioning in part. This relationship is characteristic of
the difference between human and animal; in Jaspers’ formulation, consciousness is the
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crucial element of this differentiation:

The animal finds its environment ready-made and is unconsciously bound to it.
Despite being likewise bound, man brings forth his environment in boundless
overpassing of his ties. Life in an environment that he has created himself
simultaneously with life in the natural environment, is the hallmark of
humanity. He finds himself in his own creation, not only through release from
want, but also in the appeal that the beauty, appropriateness and form of his
creation has for him. 211
When conscious action separates humankind further from nature it essentially does so in a
way that is self-sustaining. This is what Jaspers means when he points to the authentic
attitude of the natural scientist as one that seeks to fit in with nature. Thus technology is
reducible to a calculation of utility; it is always the formulation of certain means toward the
attainment of a given end. In this way, its technical rationality can be distinguished from
meaningful relationships which proceed from communication. However, at the same time, it
arises out of a subjective decision on the part of humankind to shape his world in a way
conducive to himself. On the basis of this definition, deviant instances of technological
applications would be those where the results take the form of new conditions of constraint
upon humankind's intrinsic spirit of perpetual inquisitiveness or new conditions where
humankind's relationship to nature is destructive, and, hence, unsustainable in the long term.

Work
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For Jaspers, work is that activity for which technology arises and in which technology
is applied. Different technologies require different modes of work. In the age of technology,
the present age, work has undergone as substantial a transformation as has technology.
Jaspers’ conception of work is grounded in his theory of consciousness, insofar as work can
be defined as: "consciousness of participating in the creation of our environment." 212 Work
always involves some combination of mental and physical activity, though tasks of a more
mental nature are more difficult, insofar as they are relatively more original and creative
rather than repetitive. Work is one of the fundamental attributes of humankind and one
which, in its specifically human form, differs from animal activity:

The animal satisfied its needs directly through nature. It finds what it needs
ready-made. Man can only satisfy his needs through conscious and planned
interposition of means. 213
This difference is manifested in the tools humankind makes which separate humans from
nature, and, without which, ultimately he could not remain recognizably human. Animal
actions cause all their effects to disappear, while the work of humankind can often create
enduring objects. In order to live at all, humankind must work by pursuing some ends
through the adoption of some means according to a mental plan, but work in general cannot
be reduced to this one factor for humankind. For animals, on the other hand, the pursuit of
ends and use of means is observable, though in every case this activity is completely
unconscious, completely unplanned.
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However once one enquires into what constitutes work apart from its element of
planned, purposive activity, one encounters that additional element in a theory of its
bifurcation into two seemingly mutually antagonistic factors. Whether or not these factors
are actually combined in practice is a question that is unaddressed by Jaspers -- but nothing
indicates that such a combination is not possible -- in fact it seems likely. Jaspers presents
two different conceptions of work -- both of which are actual for him. This point stands in
need of clarification, because it is not presented particularly clearly in the text. What is at
issue is Jaspers’ subjective view of the value of one conception of actual work activity over
another. The first, the one Jaspers prefers, is that work is not merely functional activity, but
potentially an experience whereby man manifests his essential being through work:

The worker becomes conscious of himself in the mirror of that which he has
produced. His serenity springs from sharing in the life of the existential forms
which he has helped to create, from the creation of something that exists. 214
Jaspers does not elaborate here the necessarily, intrinsically communal and not purely
individual character of this conception of work activity, but that this conception implies that
work occurs within a context of communally-shared meanings clearly follows from Jaspers’
general conception of consciousness as intrinsically communicative in part. For the second
conception, Jaspers quotes Hegel:

...religious labor that brings forth works of devotion which are not intended for
any finite purpose... Such labor is itself an act of worship... Work as pure
creation and as perennial labor is its own purpose and hence is forever
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unfinished... [This conception of work runs from] the merely bodily movement
of the dance to the stupendous and gigantic works of architecture... all these
works fall into the category of sacrifice... the very activity is an offering; no
longer of a purely external thing, but of the inner subjectivity... in this
producing the sacrifice is spiritual activity and the effort which, as a negation
of the particular self-consciousness, holds fast to the purpose that lives within
it in imagination, and brings it forth to outward view. 215
That this is expressed in a religious idiom is not the essential point. What is involved in this
second view is an analogue of the way that the animal "works" in its environment -- its
activities do not create lasting objects, but effects which, rather, all disappear. Here the
analogue of that element is the conception of work as "sacrifice" -- sacrifice not of a purely
external thing, but sacrifice of inner subjectivity. Where the products of animal "work" all
disappear by nature, work under the aspect of sacrifice for humankind causes products to
ritually disappear in a sundering of the intrinsic conscious connection between human and
product. In the first conception, man comes closer to himself in his work, but in this
conception he estranges himself from himself in his work. It is not the mirror in which man
projects his conscious image, but the negation of particular self-consciousness. The objects
produced in this sense may not actually disappear, but in their essence the consciousness of
the worker reflected in his product all but disappears in the face of a domineering task that
demands unquestioned obedience. At this particular point of comparison, Jaspers’
opposition to Hegel's thought is overtly visible. This second view is a picture of work as it is
dialectically transformed into dehumanization. That actual work can, and may usually, occur
in spheres combining both conceptions seems probable.
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Work for Jaspers is essentially communal: "The world of man, the overall condition
in which he lives, grows out of communal work." 216 The communal nature of work
necessitates a division of labor as a constant requirement for all societies. Differentiation of
tasks leads to class formation and mutual separation according to respective work
specializations. At a fundamental level there has to be some social coordination of labor -the quality and quantity of production reflects an awareness of the society in which the
worker produces including awareness of the production of other workers. Division of labor
and organization of production imply the need for exchange. Most products are not directly
consumed by the worker who produced them, but become exchangeable commodities.
Exchange necessitates money, an abstract value imperative. The two ideal types of exchange
relations possible for any society are: a market distribution and planned distribution. Here
again Jaspers differs from Marx. The division of labor for Jaspers is not fundamentally and
by itself an instance of domination. Marx, by comparison, presents a rather implausible
doctrine of the division of labor arising primarily from sexual relations:

There develops the division of labor, which was originally nothing but the
division of labor in the sexual act, then that division of labor which develops
spontaneously or 'naturally' by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g. physical
strength), needs, accidents, etc. etc. ... As soon as the distribution of labor
comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity,
which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. 217
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For Marx the division of labor is essential a relationship of domination through the
alienation of the worker from his product, and it is inseparable from its primary basis in
sexual relations. It is, therefore, hard if not impossible to see how "human emancipation" for
Marx could be achieved for a society in which sexual relations are permitted. For Jaspers,
the division of labor is a constant across all societies, and an unproblematic one. Where
domination arises for Jaspers is in the manipulation of the meaning of work in various
situations. To the extent that work becomes more and more a process of unconscious
repetition, alienation and domination through work increases as well. Jaspers recognizes that
Marx and Engels’ general concern for the importance of work in modern society is
warranted, however, insofar as, unlike in previous periods, the way work is organized and
conducted has become relatively more important in the modern period in relation to matters
of social structure.

The age of technology

According to Jaspers, humankind has embarked upon an age of technology since the
nineteenth century, beginning in the West and gradually coming to encompass the world a
whole. The defining aspect of the age is one of malfunction, where technology's intrinsic
function as a means by which humankind shapes his environment has become, everywhere
and systematically, an end in the service of which man himself increasingly must conform as
a means. Modern technology harnesses exponentially greater natural forces than technology
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in all earlier periods, while at the same time involving itself in all aspects of everyday life to
an unprecedented extent. The average human is at once nearer to advanced technology and
at an increasingly uncomprehending distance from it. Central to Jaspers’ conception of the
age of technology is the status of technology as neutral, neither good nor evil in itself.
Jaspers intends to direct the consciousness of modern humankind towards technology,
because, in his view, the fundamental defect of the age of technology is the systematic
distancing of humankind from conscious awareness of difference between the actual role of
technology in life and its potential role, when rightly oriented, towards the production of an
authentically human environment for humankind generally. The age of technology for
Jaspers is one where a loss of consciousness is systematically brought about on a global
scale:

Where that element of technological activity which consists of performances
that can be learned by practice becomes self-satisfying routine, it ceases to be
an enrichment of life... and becomes instead an impoverishment of life. Work
without the spiritual effort which is an indispensable means of enhancing
consciousness, becomes instead sufficient to itself. Man sinks down into
unconsciousness or lack of consciousness. 218
It seems that, in general, Jaspers’ thought implies that the will to power assumes two primary
functions: domination and nihilation. In the age of technology, both of these functions are
performed through the operation of technology. Domination occurs on two levels in this
situation. The first is the role of the state, which: "through the communications system can
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make itself effective at any moment over wide areas, right into every home." 219 Domination
is also achieved over the individual in his systematic everyday involvement in the life of his
society:

Technological thinking spreads to all spheres of human action. ... In
consequence of the fact that the fashioning of life has become the work of
machines, the whole of society is transformed into one great machine, into a
single organization embracing the whole of life. ... From now on, everything
that wishes to be effective has to be fashioned after the pattern of the machine,
that is, to take on an exact, constrained character and be bound by outward
rules. The greatest power emanates from the greatest and most perfectly
evolved machine... Man himself becomes one of the raw materials to be
purposefully worked over. Hence that which was previously the substance and
meaning of the whole--man--becomes a means. 220
As an illustration of the imposition of machine-qualities upon everyday life, Jaspers cites a
newspaper article in which a twenty-one year old American bomber pilot described his
understanding of his own situation:

I am a cog in the inferno of a vast machine. The more I think about it, the
more it seems to me as though I have been a cog in one thing after another
since the day I was born. Whenever I started to do something I wanted to do,
a thing much larger than I came along and pushed me into a place that was
waiting for me. It's not exactly pleasant, but that's how it is. 221
Concomitant with this system of domination is a process of nihilation: "The conditions of
the age of technology have proved conducive to an outbreak of nihilistic possibilities in the
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whole of the population." 222 Nihilism for Jaspers is essentially the dissolution of cultural
traditions and their replacement by manufactured mass information-patterns. Jaspers is not
nostalgic for rustic life here, but rather thinks that the shift in question has deleterious socialpsychological consequences, such as the rise of mass-movement politics and their
demonstrable tendencies towards totalitarianism. On the one hand there is traditional culture
and authentic science, and on the other there is manufactured mass-existence and pseudoscientific ideologies, e.g. Marxism, Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism -- to name only some of
those ideologies prevalent in Jaspers’ time. Nihilism implies a shift from both elements of
the former to both elements of the latter more or less simultaneously. This, taken negatively,
implies a potential harmony between cultural traditions and authentic science, which,
however, Jaspers does not elaborate.

Jaspers would certainly not think that doing away with technology would be a viable
remedy for the trends of domination and nihilation endemic to the age of technology,
however, even if that were possible. Rather, the root of the problem is in humankind's
orientation towards technology -- and that orientation is at once broader and more amorphous
than technology itself: "The direction of technology cannot be looked for in technology
itself, but must be sought in a conscious ethos. Man must find his way back to the guiding
reins." 223 A change in orientation towards a more humane system of the application of
technology in life, can only gradually occur under conditions of political liberty, in Jaspers’
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view, which will be discussed in the next chapter. No one right model for humankind's
orientation to technology in general can be formulated positively, however, but rather the
point is to provoke awareness of the avoidable, dehumanizing configurations that are
possible for technology in absence of more humane configurations which are sensitive to
both collectivities of cultural meaning and individual freedom of choice. The potential for reorientation, however, lies partially in the neutral status of technology itself. Just as
technology can dehumanize, it can also make living conditions more humane. With
technology has come a new value on labor insofar as physically ruinous labor is more often
expected to be avoided. Technology can integrate without disturbance into the human world;
in this Jaspers sees a kind of admirable technological beauty. New knowledge of the natural
world can be achieved through technological implements such as the microscope and the
telescope. Improved means of transport allow for greater ease of travel and expand the
opportunity for travel to greater numbers of people. Film and audio recordings assist
historical recollection. Technology has a dual relationship to nature. It distances humankind
from nature's compulsive forces, but it also brings him closer to nature in knowledge of
nature's realities. The exercise of these capacities requires, however, the avoidance of
technology's capacity to impose new forms of compulsion and to imprison humankind's
intrinsic inquisitiveness through unconscious and formulaic repetition of equally mechanized
processes of labor and leisure.
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Chapter 4

Liberty

Introduction
Jaspers’ argument is that an international framework of negative liberty is the
precondition for all effective projects of positive liberty. The world situation after the
Second World War is one that he conceived of as a de facto unity facilitated by the
potentially global scope of communication technology. In this situation a diversity of human
groups will persist, as has always been the case in history. Diversity of human groups known
to each other has always brought internal challenges to the bases of legitimacy inherent to all
groups. When legitimacy decreases, the role of force in human affairs increases and vice
versa. Nihilism represents a general tendency towards diminishing legitimacy. It is the
precondition of totalitarianism, or rule by force and fear. In the contemporary situation,
force in human affairs, when combined with contemporary technology, has demonstrated the
potential for greater destructive capacities than at any previous period of history, posing even
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the possibility of total annihilation. While Jaspers thinks all eruptions of the use of force
cannot ultimately be prevented, the enhancement of legitimacy across diverse groups, diverse
ethoi, resulting from a framework of negative liberty offers the best hope for diverse versions
of positive liberty by diminishing the chances of eruptions of force in the long term.

Nihilism

Nihilism, not totalitarian mechanization or liberal democratic order, is the most basic
trend of the present, according to Jaspers. 224 The Origin and Goal of History was conceived
and written in a period the forces of totalitarianism, whether fascist or Communist, seemed
capable of engulfing humankind as a whole in a global reign of terror. From the Bolshevik
revolution, through the rise and defeat of Fascism, and continuing in the form of the Cold
War and the rise of Maoist totalitarianism in China, the question of the fate of humankind
seemed defined by the contentious polarity between the free world and the forces of
despotism. Despite its undeniably tangible reality, this the concept of this distinction,
however, does not penetrate to that deeper stratum at which the spiritual situation of the age
attains its fundamental orientation in nihilism. For Jaspers, nihilism is, in essence, the
specifically contemporary form of that basic systematic by which consciousness is redirected
toward an active unconsciousness and petrified there. Its formula is flexible: its
manifestations vary according to the forms which phenomena of consciousness take, and no
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one manifestation embodies the whole trend of nihilism itself.

In their respective conceptions of nihilism, Jaspers and Nietzsche could not be further
apart. For Jaspers, Nietzsche's thought constituted anything but an example for emulation,
but rather it was the clearest example of those most deleterious excesses of thought towards
which all responsible political thought of the present and future must be opposed. Any
potential ambivalence in Jaspers’ extensive writings about Nietzsche is an expression of
Jaspers’ struggle to find a shared ground of truth even across the sharpest lines of division
between men, in fact especially there. Entering a dialogue of thought with Nietzsche for
Jaspers was like speaking with a patient as a psychiatrist. However in the case of his writings
about Nietzsche, that dialogue is meant to be the model for a public dialogue by which
individuals can come to know the will to power as it manifests itself inwardly and in society
at large. It should therefore come as no overt surprise that Jaspers does not always
unequivocally set his own thought in opposition to Nietzsche. If nothing else, the immersive
method of verstehende psychology forbids alienation from the pathology of the patient.
There was something essential about Nietzsche the man which remained authentically human
and essentially true prior to his expression of a fanatical and malevolent worship of power.
Jaspers’ position is one of an understanding that refuses to confront Nietzsche's thought as
something entirely alien. In so doing it seeks to avoid that lapse into unconscious absorption
in one's own will to power and the concomitant paralysis of any possible inward opposition
to it. This attitude towards Nietzsche, and through him towards nihilism itself, reflects
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Jaspers’ maxim: "What we cannot be at all, we cannot understand either." 225

However, in practical political terms, Jaspers could not be more opposed to that
doctrine of nihilism in both thought and action which Nietzsche, who pathologically thought
of himself as nothing less than nihilism personified, as the "first perfect nihilist", so vividly
describes:

Nihilism does not only contemplate the "in vain!" nor is it merely the belief
that everything deserves to perish: one helps to destroy.-- This is, if you will,
illogical; but the nihilist does not believe that one needs to be logical.-- It is the
condition of strong spirits and wills, and these do not find it possible to stop
with the No of "judgment": their nature demands the No of the deed. The
reduction to nothing by judgment is seconded by the reduction to nothing by
hand. 226
Nihilism for Nietzsche is thus something to be explicitly affirmed, even to be "perfected" in
action by his "masters of the Earth". And towards that intrinsically destructive impulse,
Jaspers is diametrically opposed:

Nietzsche is utterly lacking in that broad, clear, all-embracing flow of thought
through which we cannot only gain a practical orientation but also acquire the
long-range thinking which perseveringly examines and builds. 227
Jaspers’ most lucid description of the pathology expressed in Nietzsche's thought comes in
the form of a parallel with Kierkegaard and Marx. Jaspers’ point becomes lost if one sees the
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pathology as something unique to Nietzsche, or even unique to all three in common, instead
of seeing the three as expressing, in admittedly very different ways, a common nihilistic
trend, which, in its most essential elements is not the work of any one man or of any few, but
rather is at large in the world of modern humankind as a whole:

The study of these three is for each of us a kind of initiation into the depths of
actuality. Without them we would be asleep. They open up the modern
consciousness... anyone who since their time evades them, who rejects them
without having come to know them in their essence, must necessarily remain
unclear in his own being; he falls victim to something that he does not know
but might know, and is defenseless in the modern world. 228
Jaspers’ disapprobation is clear:

These three are by no means the leaders of a new humanity... they are
dangerously ambiguous people. They have shown a unique power to set
things in motion, they promote and create integrity, but they also bring
destruction. They are indispensable educators, but also show an immense
danger. For we still have to learn how to be educated by them in the right and
not the ruinous way. Their intellectual activity does not merely disclose the
ruin which has already befallen, but is in itself a continuing process of
destruction. 229
The common pathology is most specifically described in terms of its role as an obstacle for
consciousness:

They prepare our consciousness for the awakening of new potentials--but at
the same time they bring with them the ideas, fascinating to many, which
immediately submerge this consciousness. 230
For Jaspers the critical issue is to learn to be educated by these nihilistic thinkers in the right
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manner. However, any serious attempt to do so leads to an abundance of difficulties and
little hope for any formulation of a simplified propaedeutic. Through immersive
understanding in these thinkers' works, especially Nietzsche's, to an almost equal extent
Kierkegaard's, and, at least one step removed, those of Marx and Freud, one can encounter,
bring into focus but not actively appropriate, the nihilistic expression of the contemporary
Zeitgeist. The result of this understanding is modeled by Jaspers in The Origin and Goal of
History and elsewhere, but that result is anything but a manifest extension of these thinkers'
doctrinal pronouncements. On the contrary, the more unlimited one's consciousness of
nihilism as expressed in their thoughts becomes, the more circumscribable nihilism in the
world at large becomes, at least inwardly, in thought. And this results in the formulation of
what possibilities for action may be at hand, in the form of political liberty, to run counter to
nihilism and aim to preserve the hope of a more humane ethos.

The falseness of nihilism operates in three dimensions: past, present and future. It
deracinates the past by uprooting cultural traditions as bases for the stability of communal
feeling; it occludes the operation of the will to power in the present; and it forecloses the
future with definitive statements of human nature based on pseudo-knowledge. The political
system that corresponds with nihilism is totalitarianism, but totalitarianism is itself only a
secondary phenomenon, generated out of an extant culture of nihilism. Instead of using
technology as a means, humankind takes on more and more the semblance of a technological
apparatus. In his dysfunctional technological second nature, humankind becomes
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subservient somewhat like the animal living in unconscious subservience to physical nature:

It may seem as though man... could live in his immediacy from his instincts.
But he cannot. ... Man is not merely a creature of instinct, not merely a point
of understanding, but also a creature that is, as it were, above and beyond
itself. 231

But while the animal's enslavement to nature is complete, humankind's subservience
to a second nature of his making is always dependent upon himself. In this condition,
humankind's resolve, his individual capacity for decision, atrophies in disuse and,
consequently, erodes. From out of the collective mass into which man has congealed
himself, the resolve of all individuals is distilled and agglomerated at one point, the locus of
power of the totalitarian machine.

For Jaspers, nihilism is the theoretical opposite of faith. Jaspers’ efforts here seek to
clarify both these concepts, and, in so doing, he presents his own manifold conceptions of
both. With the concept of faith, Jaspers wants to indicate an element that is not exclusive to
any one religious tradition, but rather something that is essential for “man as man”. His aim
in so doing is to enunciate a basis for collective understanding across cultural or religious
divides that at once unites individuals and preserves their cultural or religious particularities.
Faith for Jaspers is ultimately not entirely separable from philosophy and science. This unity
of these three concepts necessarily involves an understanding of faith that does not equate it
with dogma or with any exclusive claim to truth. Faith, rather, for Jaspers, undergirds
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religious and cultural traditions -- alongside and even in spite of any exclusive claims to
truth. It is against this underlying matrix that is conceived of as faith that nihilism exercises
its erosive effect. So faith and the everyday conception of secularism are not ultimately in
tension with each other, for Jaspers. The resolve that nihilism erodes is a property of faith.
The way that this erosion occurs sheds light on the meaning of both terms for Jaspers:

Instead of living in faith, man lives in illusions concerning realities in the
world... The thesis that justifies this out of nihilism runs:
Man always
lives on illusions. History is the course taken by changing illusions. ... The
man without power is particularly disposed to illusions, and today the
individual is perhaps more powerless than ever before. But he can also lay
hold of the only chance open to powerlessness, unconditional striving for
truth. The nihilist declares this in turn to be an illusion. For there is no truth.
Hence he finishes up with the thesis: One must believe, no matter what--the
necessary illusion will be extracted from one's own energies, which can say: I
do not believe it, but one must believe it. 232
The resolve inherent within and definitive of faith is indicated here with the words:
"unconditional striving for truth." This is meant to indicate a form without reference to
particular content. This form undergirds the various particular religious and cultural
traditions of humankind. The effect of nihilism is pictured as running counter to this.
Nihilism seeks to replace the unconditional striving for truth with definitive truth claims. It,
therefore, subverts the intrinsic, inquisitive consciousness of man, which simultaneously
investigates and constructs his reality, with a set of foreordained answers that need not and
must not be questioned. Here power, instead of knowledge, is the real basis of truth claims,
hence their illusory quality in Jaspers’ conception. In other words, if what is taken to be true
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is taken to be so merely because it is ordained by power, it cannot actually be true. Science
and faith for Jaspers are not essentially different. Together they are forms of the expression
of the will to knowledge, in "unconditional striving for truth" on the part of both. The same
way in which scientific truth claims have potential for universal comprehensibility, applies to
the essence of faith, as well. But this conception must hold that what is truly definitive about
any actual tradition of faith is not any exclusive doctrine of truth, but a sort of hope that the
free human consciousness can transcend the imposition of power. In the same way that faith
and science are formally compatible with any particularities of cultural content according to
this theory, so too is political liberty. Jaspers does not bring his concept of faith in any great
theoretical clarity, and this is probably because he would think that individuals need not
necessarily conceive of faith with theoretical exactness, but rather may possess faith as
mediated through particular cultural or religious instantiations. Faith for Jaspers basically
equates to trust. Liberty, science and faith tend to overlap to an extent by implication in
Jaspers’ thought. What these elements seem to share is a kind of transparent universality,
i.e. a potential for universal validity that simultaneously does not obstruct or replace cultural
particularity or individual free resolve. Nihilism, on the other hand, is, in this view,
something of an "anti-culture", a systematic under which cultural particularities dissolve and
by which a homogeneous mass of abstract humanity precipitates.

One implication of Jaspers’ political thought is that if a political liberalism within
which faith and science can flourish does not spread across the globe, nihilism, nevertheless,
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will do so. This is owing to the fact that the present situation, which became definite for
Jaspers after the Second World War, is one of de facto world unity. He writes: "There is no
longer anything outside... The unity of the Earth has arrived." 233 The de facto unity of world,
for Jaspers, owes itself immediately to the technologies of communication and transport that
structure a global situation in which events anywhere can potentially have effects anywhere
else, and, potentially, for the whole. Jaspers’ conception here, is, if anything, more intensely
real today than when the late 1940s when The Origin and Goal of History was published.
The compounded effect of both nihilism and world unity would be the tendency toward a
global mass. Throughout history, the larger part of almost all human populations in settled,
agricultural societies consisted of the peasantry, and, as such, constituted a relatively
intellectually, economically and politically destitute stratum. The analog of this stratum in
the age of technology is, for Jaspers, “the mass”. While the mass mirrors the peasantry of
earlier times in terms of its relative intellectual poverty and relative economic disadvantage,
the former differs from the latter in that it has a vital role in political affairs. In order to
conform to the economy in the age of technology, literacy and some technical education have
become relatively more desirable. But this level of education is not a robust form of
intellectual development, and it corresponds to a political environment in which influence of
the masses through propaganda becomes increasingly prevalent. A mass which has been
“half-educated” for economic purposes can no longer be effectively controlled through threat
of force or sheer economic necessity because even semi- or half-educated individuals are no
longer simple-minded enough to submit to such conditions over the long term. Moreover,
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the development of a technological economy requires social emancipation, with its flexibility
of labor conditions relative to earlier, less fluid, models such as serfdom or slavery. But
under conditions of social emancipation, individuals would necessarily need some
conception on themselves as political agents. This awareness, however, like the education of
the broad population in general, is only partial, only more or less that level necessary for the
adequate functioning of the economy. Under such conditions the mass of the population
becomes possessed of a will, while it is simultaneously lacking in, and structurally incapable
of, the requisite intellectual means of sound, responsible, political judgment. This is not due
to lack of the potential for pragmatic common sense, but rather is due to a general and
structural epistemic impoverishment. The process of mass development is the social
manifestation, therefore, of the intellectual culture of nihilism. Jaspers’ draws up this
conception of the mass with nihilism in mind; it stands in contrast to his conception of a
people; both are conceived of as ideal types for the purpose of comparison:

A distinction must be made between mass and people: The people is
subdivided into orders, is conscious of itself in ways of life, modes of thought,
and cultural heritage. A people is something substantial and qualitative, it
possesses a communal atmosphere; the individual from the people has a
personal character that is partly derived from the strength of the people by
which he is borne. The mass, on the other hand, is not subdivided, is
unconscious of itself, uniform and quantitative, devoid of specific character
and cultural heritage, without foundations and empty. It is the object of
propaganda, destitute of responsibility, and lives at the lowest level of
consciousness. 234
This is not meant to imply that a people is a social arrangement devoid of domination. In
any people, however, a deeper stratum of shared cultural content, by virtue of which social
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relations are deemed legitimate or illegitimate. This basis, while possibly incapable of
rational justification, at least provides some insurance against the sort of excessive change
that can rapidly and blindly occur when a mass is intoxicated by radically new ideas. Jaspers
was no doubt thinking of Bolshevism and Nazism in this regard. The shared cultural content
of a people provides a set of guidelines for what sorts of social action are to be deemed
acceptable and what sorts are not. This implies the mediation of a common narrative history
upon which the collective identity of a society is based. When the guidelines for socially
acceptable action remain relatively stable, even under relatively repressive conditions,
individuals have at least a basis for a predictable life-order, with understandable standards of
achievement for themselves and expectation of others, whereas in a mass all are beholden to
whatever ideology proves capable of animating the majority and achievement takes on a
new, opportunistic, dynamic as it can only be equated with the garnering of mass approval.
Certainly no one people or mass conforms entirely to these ideal typical patterns, however.
In Jaspers’ view of the de facto situation of world unity, the tendency towards the building of
masses is no longer a national phenomenon, but rather is operant on a global scale for the
first time.

Active in the mass, nihilism erodes extant values, and with them, the relatively
"organic" structures of legitimacy. In place of these structures, ideologies arise. In Jaspers’
conception, ideology is essentially nothing more than its dialectical function, while. Jaspers’
model of ideology is drawn up with reference to the most prominent ideologies of his day,
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Fascism and Bolshevism. It also draws upon Jaspers’ conception of the dialectical nature of
theories such as those of Marx and Freud, albeit primarily as means of illustration of this
broader trend. The dialectical nature of ideology is essentially, on the one hand, a claim to
absolute truth, and, on the other, a claim that nothing is true. The practical effect of this
inner contradiction is that no one for whom an ideology is a standard of action admits to
following that ideology as an ideology. Ideology is always the possession of one's enemy,
never one's own beliefs, which, by their very nature as one's own, must be true, or "critically"
apprehended, and not ideological. In such a situation it is impossible not to be absorbed in
self-deception. Jaspers points to this dialectical structure of ideology by saying: "Everything
is an ideology and this thesis itself is an ideology. Nothing is left." 235 An ideology for
Jaspers is rigid and directed against an opponent; it necessarily involves a dichotomy
between "friend and enemy" -- though he does not use those precise terms. In this view, an
ideology's content is not significant -- all ideologies are beholden to the will to power. It
should, however, be noted that the more sophisticated an ideology becomes, the more
"critical" it appears -- but "critique" in this sense merely becomes an internal mechanism
granting the illusion of the pursuit of truth. What is not involved is actual collective
understanding. Any ideological position must be isolated from any real understanding of the
views of "the enemy".

A common thread running throughout Jaspers’ contemporary Zeitdiagnose is an echo
of Francis Bacon's pronouncement: "Half knowledge leads to unbelief, whole knowledge to
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belief." 236 This finds a practical expression in Jaspers’ contention that Freudian
psychoanalysis, a systematic reliant upon what is essentially a reduction of human
phenomena of consciousness to instincts and drives, is effective mainly for individuals of an
intermediate stratum who lack a high level of intellectual attainment but who are not entirely
uneducated. 237 Jaspers’ does not go into detail about what the level of education needed to
become immune to such intellectual systematics -- Freud's is merely an example which
stands for ideologies in general. However, one can assume that the approach of
understanding sociology, versthende Sociologie, practiced by Weber which sought to
illuminate social phenomena through detailed depiction of the particular elements which
ground and define cultures rather than emerge as "superstructural" elements upon an ultimate
basis in a purportedly universal dialectical structure. The central tenet of such an approach is
that all elements of cultures are ultimately particular, regardless of how universal their actual
historical scope may be. That the dialectic is not universal itself, but merely a rather
abnormal particular cultural configuration, is implied in this theory. The universal feature of
this theory is in its conception of human consciousness. Consciousness for Marx, is
constituted out of the dialectic. From the Jaspers’ point of view, this formulation takes over
and mobilizes the core of what it wishes to overcome, i.e. a dominant and false conception of
human nature generally. It is at this juncture that the concept of faith becomes operant in
Jaspers’ thought. On the one hand, Jaspers does not want to deracinate the cultural traditions
that he perceives as embodiments of faith, albeit even if they are partially oppressive. On the
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other hand, his conception of faith implies some element of transcendence, which, however,
remains rather undefined in his attempt to avoid nominating any one tradition of faith as the
correct one. However, one does not have to stop at such a conception of faith without further
theoretical clarification, assuming that whatever its contents might be, that it is already and
immediately understandable. Jaspers’ conception of faith comes into could be clarified in by
formulating in this way: faith is consciousness of the primacy of consciousness. The
postulate that consciousness transcends the dialectical structure of its reversal towards
unconsciousness seems to be the conception of transcendence employed in Jaspers’ works.
Thus when Jaspers’ writes that: "Our era's lack of faith has brought nihilism," he is not
primarily lamenting the degradation of institutions of religion in a nostalgic sense, but
pointing towards that potential for the evocation of consciousness that had grown up within
them, despite, their perhaps factually oppressive -- or potentially liberating -- natures. 238

Conditions antecedent to the age of technology served to inform its partially nihilistic
character:

The fact that technology became operative and was universally adopted was
due to this spiritual world, this way of thought and life which it found waiting
for it. 239(135)
Jaspers identifies three chief contributing factors of this element of the contemporary
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situation: the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and German idealism. The cumulative
effect of these factors became an impetus toward cultural transformation guided by a general
conception of the possibility of a "new man", of starting virtually everything anew for
humankind:

People talked about a new human consciousness, about a new man, about
spiritual creation, about truth and salvation. They looked into a luminous
future -- yet this kind of talk was nothing more than the accomplishment of the
tabula rasa, a symptom of growing loss of consciousness... After great men
had taken the wrong path, the world became a theater for petty place-seekers
and obedient intriguers, who knew no difference between true and false or
good and evil, but were merely tools submissive to the function of power. 240

It is again Marx who serves as Jaspers’ chief example here. In Marx's thought, one can see
this broader trend in microcosm. Marx thought a new man, a new human consciousness,
would be the result of revolution. His theory was founded upon German idealism, while the
prescriptions for action he and Engels made in the Communist Manifesto had their most
typical antecedent in Jacobinism. Rather than overcoming the dialectic in society, Marx's
own emancipatory thought was caught in the net of its own inner dialectic and transformed
outwardly into a doctrine of totalitarian oppression. The elements of Marx's thought which
derive, in one way or another, from German idealism and the French Revolution, have a
common origin in the intellectual culture of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, defined
in terms of its essential outcome, was a process of secularization, a disconnection of the
actual locus of political power from a broader social bond with religious institutions -- it
marked the end of a comprehensive, albeit rather amorphous, sphere of Occidental
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Christendom. A multitude of various new intellectual elements contributed to the
Enlightenment: the press, knowledge of other cultures, other religions, exposure to utopian
dreams of the future, questioning of authorities of all kinds, and the airing of new, and
sometimes scandalous, mores. However, according to Jaspers, the essential outcome of the
Enlightenment, which ushered in the secular age, was not an inevitable result of those and
other sorts of contributing, new cultural factors. On the contrary, all such factors were
intrinsically nothing more than products of knowledge, it was the ways in which they were
incorporated into European culture that lead to the degradation of faith that Jaspers identifies
as nihilism. Again Jaspers returns to the theme that half knowledge leads to lack of faith,
while full knowledge is compatible with faith; referring to the Enlightenment, he writes:

This road need not have led to loss of faith. Only half and misconstrued
enlightenment leads into nothingness, whereas total and unrestricted
enlightenment renders the enigma of the origin really audible for the first
time. 241
Jaspers does not explicitly say so, but the implication here is that objects of knowledge as
such have no intrinsic incompatibility with institutions of faith, or social conditions in which
religious institutions and political power are conjoined, i.e. new knowledge was itself not the
chief impetus of secularization. Rather it was when particular aspects of knowledge,
probably especially radically new conceptions, were taken as surrogates for extant
institutions in which legitimacy inheres that the more disruptive outcomes of the
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Enlightenment arose.

This transformation wrought upon the basis of new knowledge served as the
foundation for the other developments which contributed to the nihilistic situation of the
present: the French Revolution and German idealism. In both developments, Jaspers depicts
an ostensibly original impulse toward emancipation dialectically transformed into its
opposite. In the case of the French Revolution: "although it desired liberty and reason, it
made room for despotism and violence." 242 The case of German idealism, for Jaspers,
likewise carried the seeds of the reversal of its own original intentions:

The philosophy of German idealism--especially of Fichte and Hegel--brought
about an enhancement of philosophical self-confidence, an alleged total
knowledge that knows what God is and desires, and loses all capacity for
astonishment because it fancies itself in possession of absolute truth. This
kind of sham faith was bound to swing over into lack of faith... It was one of
the manifestations of human thought that possessed genius, and its speculative
grandeur cannot be doubted... Here the hubris and waywardness of genius
became an unparalleled seduction. Whoever drunk of this potion became
intoxicated, a promoter of ruin... 243
The excess of German idealism, according to this view, owes itself to a highly explanatory,
highly causal, conception of historical development which, while valid, can appear to
subsume all particularity under its explanatory exposition, whereas Jaspers’ approach,
following upon Weber, seeks to assert the priority of the particular and its corresponding
mode of apprehension, the understanding.
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The crisis of the present could be no more manifest than in the Holocaust and other
instances of genocide perpetrated by totalitarian regimes. In such instances, the extremes of
both poles of the totalitarian-nihilist cultural complex are simultaneously reached, absolute
power and absolute destruction of life:

What man may come to has today, almost in a flash, become manifest through
a monstrous reality that stands before our eyes like a symbol of everything
unspeakably horrible: the National Socialist concentration camps with their
tortures, at the end of which stood the gas-chambers and incinerators for
millions of people--realities that correspond to reports of similar processes in
other totalitarian regimes, although none by the National Socialists have
perpetrated outright mass murder by the gas chamber. 244
For Jaspers, the horror of such events arises from the latent readiness of the perpetrators that
was extant before the crimes themselves:

The fact that this can happen presupposes in the active elements (who were to
a great extent drawn from the internees themselves) a readiness, which was
already present prior to this realization, not only in the existence of the social
outcast, but also in the apparent harmlessness of the trusty bureaucrat or the
tranquil life of the bourgeois. It is this readiness that inspires our horror, when
subsequent events reveal it as having been there all the time. It is the
implementation of unconscious lack of faith, the disappearance of faith
without conscious nihilism, life without roots or the life of apparently secure
puppets on the strings of decorous convention, which can be exchanged
without more ado for the strings of life in the concentration camp. 245
This psychological readiness for totalitarian repression and genocide on the part of
individuals who were not otherwise politically active has its immediate basis in the
ideological orientation of the masses. Ideologies, following the implications of this theory,
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will likely often be difficult to identify with definitive clarity and precision, because, by their
nature, they are intellectual systems of deception by which surrogates for factors such as
solidarity and responsibility are pursued in action that remains beholden to a concealed will
to power. When this theory is adopted, the readiness of broad masses of individuals for
compliance with totalitarianism and genocide can be understood as arising from ideology's
intrinsic logic of illusion. Ideology replaces legitimacy with a doctrine of ideas, static and
definitive in one respect, and, in another, possessed of a surreptitious flexibility and false
dynamic of internal criticism. In a collective, ideology is supported by a tacit or overt system
of rewards and punishments. As a system of potentially almost infinite sophistication,
ideology can turn even exercises of transgression into sources of support for its own rigid
essential core through a dialectical process operating unconsciously in its own adherents'
activities. In Jaspers’ view, ideology remains defined, however, by its imposition of a
variable degree of unconsciousness upon its adherents through an illusion of agency. While
an ideology reduces its adherents to actual powerlessness, through the occlusion of
consciously-apprehended individual decision and the understanding of such decisions of
others, it must simultaneously provide an opportunity to violate others as a way to conceal its
own adherents' nearly complete lack of real conscious agency. That the essence of this
function is not intrinsic to human nature is foundational to Jaspers’ conception, and founded,
as discussed above in Chapter One, upon an empirical conception of the relationship between
the biological and intellectual elements of humankind's make-up. It is only conscious
activity which separates humankind from nature and makes the species possible at all; there
is no intrinsic role for deception or violation of others in this essential process. So,
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accordingly, when instances of deception and violation of others are observed, they must
arise from culturally-particular pathologies and not from a universal basis in human nature as
such. Whereas it is empirically evident that the conscious transmission of meanings through
communication is necessary for the maturity of the human being as such, no role for
deception or violation, or dialectical inversion generally, can likewise observed as necessary
for and, hence, actually universal in human nature. It is in this sense that the dialectic should
be seen as a particular, and not a universal, historical structure. The instances Jaspers
discusses of mass murder in the Holocaust and under totalitarian regimes are clear instances
of such violation of others -- and, in contrast to analogous genocides throughout history,
these recent events can be clearly seen as the outcome of a particularly contemporary form of
mass mobilization through ideology. Jaspers does not elaborate much of these implications
of his theory, however, but he does encapsulate them by saying:

The formation of ideologies is particularly great in its compass today. For in
hopelessness there arises the need for illusion, in the aridity of personal
existence the need for sensation, in powerlessness the need to violate those
who are even more powerless. 246
And:

When faith is no longer the basis of the content of life, nothing is left by the
vacuum of negation. When one is dissatisfied with oneself, the fault must be
someone else's. If one is nothing, at least one is anti-. All ills are heaped onto
a phantom... everything is the fault of capitalism, liberalism, Marxism,
Christianity, etc. 247

246

Ibid., 133.

247

Ibid., 134.
180

This theory, therefore, serves as a basis for the prediction that where instances of ideology
are present as intellectual currents of collective mobilization, the readiness on the part of
their adherents for totalitarian organization and complicity or overt participation in mass
murder is likewise latent within that population. These, however, are, as possible outcomes
of an ideological orientation, extreme ones. Some systematic violation of others should be
observable in some form, however, if Jaspers’ conception is correct.

As a prominent intellectual in Germany after the Second World War, however,
Jaspers made a public attempt to urge Germans to remain conscious of the guilt shared by
society at large, in various degrees of responsibility, for the actions of the Hitler regime. His
efforts took the form of addresses published in English as The Question of German Guilt.
These addresses preceded the publication of The Origin and Goal of History, which,
however, contains an insight into the theoretical foundations upon which those efforts were
based. Nihilism carries the threat of occluding the importance of past events as factors that
condition the present, knowledge of which illuminates the present and future possibilities.
Events such as the Holocaust "leave behind them a hidden horror." 248 Such horror is
conceived of as a Jaspers writes:

That which has happened is a warning. To forget it is guilt. It must be
continually remembered. It was possible for this to happen, and it remains
possible for it to happen again at any minute. Only in knowledge can it be
prevented. 249
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Recollection of such events as the Holocaust provoke an anxiety in society generally that
could run counter to the slip towards unconsciousness brought by a culture of nihilism.
Jaspers conceives of an oppositional relationship between such anxiety and nihilism:

When anxiety ceases in nihilism, in so far as that is possible (for as long as we
continue to believe in man, a hidden seed of humanity remains undestroyed),
man seems like an extinguished being, unconsciously consuming himself in
vital passions. 250

Liberty

In Jaspers’ view, totalitarianism is rule by “force and fear” and is the outcome of the
breakdown of legitimacy. He equates this breakdown with the trend of nihilism. 251 The
question implicit in Jaspers’ political argument is: how can legitimacy in general be
maximized? He writes: “the sole choice is between legitimacy and despotism.” 252 Viewed
in this way, one can see how Jaspers’ political argument arises as an intended response to
nihilism. Jaspers’ argument is that, in a de facto united world, only an international
framework of negative liberty can serve as an effective defense against that erosion of
legitimacy and its replacement by the totalitarian rule of force and fear. Jaspers equates the
absence of legitimacy with the rule of force and fear:

A legitimate government is able to rule without fear, confident of the consent
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of the people. An illegitimate government is afraid of the people, its own
force arouses force in others; out of fear it has to safeguard itself by means of
continually growing political terror, through which, in turn, fear becomes the
fundamental state of mind of all. 253
When force and fear rules, there is no room for trust, which, in Jaspers’ conception is
synonymous with legitimacy:

Trust requires a fixed pole, an inviolable fundament, something that is
respected by all, in such a manner that anyone who violates it can be cast out
as a criminal. This inviolable fundament is called legitimacy. 254
Jaspers differentiates negative liberty from positive liberty:

Legally, scope is left to the individual for the play of his arbitrary will
(negative liberty), through which also he can shut himself off from others.
Ethically, however, liberty consists precisely in the openness of life in being
together that can unfold without compulsion, out of love and reason (positive
liberty). 255
Positive liberty, therefore, is the essence of an ethical order, the essence of an ethos.
Legitimacy, as a condition interior to any given ethos, faces threats from two sources in the
context of world unity: on the one hand, from the diversity of ethoi, of different conceptions
of positive liberty, i.e. different conceptions of what constitutes the good life, and, on the
other hand, from the perpetual threat that force will disrupt legitimate conditions.
Concerning the latter, Jaspers writes:

The will to power, and force, are constantly poised to intervene… In everyday

253

Ibid., 159.

254

Ibid.

255

Ibid., 160.
183

life, force is engaged in a perpetual struggle with free reason. 256
Concerning the former, Jaspers first observes that the diversity of ethoi consist in a diversity
of views as to what constitutes the good life:

As to what liberty is and what is required to achieve it there is at once a wide
divergence of views. Perhaps the deepest human antitheses are determined by
the modes of men’s consciousness of liberty. What is to one the road to
freedom, seems to the other the reverse. In the name of liberty almost
everything is desired by men. 257
At what point does that begin which is not common to all men: world view,
historically determined faith, all the particular tendencies that must have room
to move. The only thing they have in common is their need for room to
move. 258
This diversity places legitimacy in danger owing to the fact that, when a difference of views
on what constitutes the good life becomes known across different ethoi, their respective
bases of legitimacy can be called into question. Jaspers writes: “legitimacy is always in
such danger. The understanding can all too easily cast doubts upon it.” 259 But the
understanding itself is not the problem, as it can not only put one in touch with the different
views of another, but also, and in the completion of its movement, bring to light what is
common between different views:

Politics are concerned with that which is common to all men, with the interests
of existence that are independent of the content of any faith, in which all men
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can understand one another so as to make room for each other… 260
The danger from the diversity of views of different ethoi mutually known to each other arises
when negative liberty, that “room for each other”, is absent:

Man has an urge to consider his own life-form the only true one, to feel every
existence that does not resemble his own to be a reproach, and to hate it. From
this there arises the disposition to enforce one’s own way of life upon
everyone else, as far as possible to model the whole world upon it. 261
Such a disposition can only disrupt the legitimacy inhering in other ethoi. It also follows for
Jaspers that such an effort to impose one conception of positive liberty upon others has the
internal consequence of instrumentalizing the ethos that seeks to dominate, and, thereby
turning its inner conception of the good life into a means instead of an end. That such an
effort is self-defeating rests upon Jaspers’ conception of negative liberty as the condition for
effective positive liberty:

Only when positive liberty has been realized on the basis of
the legal
safeguarding of negative liberty, does the proposition apply: Man is free in the
measure in which he sees freedom around him, that is, in the measure in which
all men are free. 262
The implications of this view are that: Positive liberty, in the absence of negative liberty,
becomes a means, an instrument, for its own propagation beyond its original borders. It
would thereby lose its meaning and assume the role of a function. Legitimacy would erode
within the ethos that seeks to dominate others.
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The dangers to legitimacy therefore fall into two categories: the will to power and
force, on the one hand, and diversity of conceptions of the good life constitutive of, and
legitimate within, different ethoi, on the other. Insofar as the alternative is one “between
legitimacy and despotism”, Jaspers seeks the route to maximal legitimacy. It is the challenge
to legitimacy posed by diversity that can be addressed through an international framework of
negative liberty and, within states, liberal democratic institutions. Jaspers devotes
considerable attention to an outline of liberal democratic institutions. The other factor, the
will to power and force, cannot be entirely overcome:

In legitimate conditions, there is an infinite amount that is inadequate, unjust
and inappropriate… The consciousness of legitimacy accepts great evils as
part of the bargain in order to avoid the absolute evil of terrorism and fear
under despotism. 263
To attempt to eradicate all possible sources of oppression would mean to attempt the
imposition of one view of universal positive liberty upon all humankind. The implication of
Jaspers’ argument is that such an imposition would only be in itself another form of
oppression. Marx’s conception of “human emancipation” and the resultant “new man” with
a new consciousness, is one such universal conception of positive liberty. History shows that
all ethoi face a common set of challenges to legitimacy in the categories of force and
diversity. Jaspers conceives of a framework of negative liberty as the only means by which
the role of force in human affairs can be minimized while the scope for particular
conceptions of positive liberty to attain maximal legitimacy for those who willing participate
in them is simultaneously realized. In other words, to be effective, positive liberty relies
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upon a basis of negative liberty.

Socialism

In Jaspers’ political thought, the concept of socialism represents the general field of
any and all tendencies towards the institutionalization of positive liberty in contemporary
times. 264 Therefore, in Jaspers’ discussion of socialism, the dichotomy between negative and
positive liberty is always implied. The contemporary period, in Jaspers view, is one in which
the theory and social action arising on behalf of conceptions of positive liberty suffers from
inadequate concern for negative liberty. While the highest forms of human selfconsciousness are to be found in the various conceptions of what constitutes the good life,
these, owing to their diversity, are a perpetual source of mutual tension and conflict when
they do not exist within a broader framework of negative liberty. Every ethos seeks to
organize a society around particular values that embody a shared conception of the good life.
In so doing, the act of making claims to truth about what is just in human affairs is
unavoidable. But no one social ethos exists in a vacuum, and no one social ethos is
universal. On the basis of a purported universal knowledge of history, Marx sought to
enunciate such a universal social ethos. In this respect Marx is a representative of that basic
impulse to shape human affairs in community upon a just basis, organized around set of
values held in common with a concern for the welfare of all. In this effort, unification of
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humankind through a single social ethos, a single conception of universal positive liberty is
sought. A purported total knowledge of human affairs is here the basis for a universal social
ethos. Only one vision of the just society, in this view, is warranted on the basis of the
definitive knowledge of human history. But, in Jaspers view, both history and every possible
instantiation of positive liberty remain inherently tied to the sphere of particularity:

The world of history as a whole, however, is incalculable; in detail it is full of
connections of causality, motive, situation and meaning that are susceptible of
investigation. All of them are particular when they become realizable to our
perception. Their cognition will never become a proven cognizance of the
whole. The error of the total conception is shown in monocausal thinking that
traces everything back to a single principle, either through the absolutization
of a tangible causal factor (e.g. the economic factor in history), or through the
totalization of a single process, which has allegedly been apprehended in its
substance (e.g. in the dialectic of the objective spirit in Hegel). 265
Marx's vision again serves as a paramount example. Positive liberty is taken to its theoretical
extreme: nothing sort of a new humanity will result from deliberate refashioning of society,
divesting it once and for all of all sources of tension, conflict and oppression. History has
revealed the root cause of all these social ills, the task merely remains to implement their
remedy. In the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the role of force in this process
is admitted. The relationship between various social ethoi is always bound to be a source of
tension and possible conflict in the absence of a background framework of negative liberty.
Marx's conception is bound to require the imposition, by force if necessary, through the
dictatorship of the proletariat, of his conception of the just society, because of its exclusively
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positive orientation and, simultaneously, its renunciation of any attempt to foster negative
liberty. This involves a dialectical reversal, whereby aims adopted with the desire to free
society from oppression actually result in new forms of oppression. The dialectic is at once
the phenomenon that a Marxist view theoretically equates with all historical change, seeks to
overcome through carrying through its final stage in purposive action but, ironically, falls
prey to itself. On the other hand, the implication of Jaspers’ theory is that when a framework
of negative liberty undergirds a society in which various groups are free to pursue their
particular visions of positive liberty, the effect of the dialectic is minimized, if never
completely eliminated. The dialectic is operant where conscious aims are unconsciously
reversed. This is a pattern endemic to all attempts at building a framework of positive
liberty, building a social ethos. It occurs because all social ethoi must involve some truth
claims about what constitutes the good life, but each society so structured does not exist in a
vacuum, but encounters other societies with variant truth claims. All social ethoi are
attempts to codify the subjective formula by which man separates himself from nature.
Instrumentality expresses the objective formula. Every ethos is thus an effort to actualize
human freedom in distinction to natural compulsion. This is the basic and perennial impulse
for positive liberty. But when any society encounters other societies, a relation is possible
akin to the relationship between humankind and nature, i.e. it is one of tension and the drive
to overcome that tension. In human affairs between groups, this tension eventually leads to
the reversal of the fundamental aim, the achievement of the freedom of humankind vis-a-vis
nature, into a new source of compulsion arising out of the conflictual relationship. When a
society is in conflict, it pays the price in terms of a sacrifice of its own internal conception of
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liberty by turning everything internal into a tool for the prosecution of the war at hand. But
this need not always be the case: if societies would hold a common conception of negative
liberty in addition to their particular conceptions of positive liberty, their aims in terms of
positive liberty would not be subject to dialectical reversal. History, rather than showing that
the dialectic is the universal governing structure of all human affairs over time, in fact shows
that the dialectic is a particular result of a particular orientation towards positive liberty,
towards the structuring of a social ethos, albeit a particular one that is very broad in its
historical manifestations and ramifications. That particular orientation towards positive
liberty that results in the dialectic is one which lacks the dimension of negative liberty, i.e.
some actual and effective basis for coexistence alongside other groups organized around
other values, other claims to truth about what constitutes the good life. Even though this
orientation, positive liberty in the absolute or relative absence of negative liberty, is shared
by almost all actual human societies over time, it is still in itself a particular phenomenon.
Marx is just an exemplar of this deeply historically-embedded trend, in that he posits a
solution to conflict and oppression through a single, universal conception of positive liberty
with no allowance for negative liberty. That, in Jaspers’ view, leads to the certainty that any
such aim will fall prey to the dialectic, and through it to the very forces of conflict and
oppression, which it seeks to overcome.

In Jaspers’ theory, negative liberty, therefore, provides the surest basis for any
instantiation of positive liberty. In the contemporary period, socialism in general represents
all those trends which seek to establish a basis for positive liberty in the context of modern
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society, with its unique conditions of technology and mass society. Jaspers’ emphasis on
negative liberty, far from being an alternative to socialism, in fact expresses his desire to
theoretically ground socialism, i.e. all contemporary conceptions of positive liberty in
general, on a firm foundation. He writes:

All men must be supplied with the necessary consumer goods. Every man has
the right to expect his existence to be made possible... Today the name
socialism is conferred upon every outlook, every tendency and every plan that
aims at the ordering of the life and the work of the community according to
criteria of justice accompanied by the repudiation of privileges. Socialism is
the universal tendency of contemporary mankind towards an organization of
labor and participation in the products of labor that will make it possible for all
men to be free. 266 (172)
The biggest impediment to such conceptions of positive liberty comes from within, from the
attempt to absolutize their own criteria, i.e. their own claims to truth about what constitutes
the good life. This amounts to a neglect of the framework of negative liberty that Jaspers
seeks to cultivate:

Communism may be characterized in contradistinction to socialism as the
absolutization of the tendencies which are true in the first place. They then
become fanatical through this absoluteness, and in practice cease to operate as
a recasting of historical reality, which instead they melt down to a dead
level. 267
The dialectic is clearly in evidence in Jaspers’ account as outlined above:

As long as socialist demands are concretely visualized and thought out they
remain within bounds. It is only when concrete reality is lost sight of and a
fantastic paradise of man is presupposed as possible, that its demands become
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abstract and absolute. Socialism ceases to be an idea and becomes an
ideology. The demand for complete implementation in fact leads away from
its fulfilment. Along the path of coercion it leads to servitude. 268(190)
With his emphasis on negative liberty and his obvious aversion to Marx's thought, in
contradistinction, perhaps, to Marx's economic thought, it is easy to mistake Jaspers as
opposed to a robust conception of economic equality in society -- but, in fact, his theory is
constructed to leave the door open to such a project of positive liberty, but only within the
larger sphere of a liberal political order:

The socialization of the means of production in large-scale undertakings, to
abolish the private appropriation of surplus value, is a goal that one can deem
just and strive after without being a believing Marxist. 269
This conception of social justice, however, is not the aim of Jaspers’ economic theory, but
only presented as one possible alternative within a general field. The implied aim of the
theory is to keep such a field of potential expressions of positive liberty as wide as possible.
Totalitarianism, on the other hand, is not essentially any one set of institutions. The theory
of totalitarianism has developed in reflection upon particular historical instantiations,
specifically Bolshevism and fascism, but Jaspers’ conception aims to divest the general
conception of totalitarianism from any particular institutional arrangements and locate its
essence. That essence is total planning which arises from situations of conflict:

Some distress is always the source of planning. The most profound distress of
all, that caused by war, is the source of total planning... That which is of
practical value to military ventures is established as a permanent condition,
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with a view to a planned or feared war. 270
War here is conceived of here, by implication, as that condition where positive liberty is
pursued to the exclusion of negative liberty. Positive liberty in this sense is essentially the
scope for ideas and actions expressive of the cohesiveness of a particular group. Positive
liberty might not be usually associated with war, but with the instantiation of those
institutions that are thought to make a society just. But in a conflict situation between
groups, it is the action of conflict itself that is considered just. Even an aggressive war would
be considered "just" if it somehow meets a society's internal criteria for self-manifestation.
In war, however, action in pursuit of a goal of positive liberty is taken to an extreme, to the
maximal exclusion of negative liberty permitted by the circumstances. In Jaspers’
conception this is the foundation of total planning, and, in the contemporary period, of
totalitarianism. The institutions associated with totalitarianism are, aside from this, particular
to the historical condition of the present, specifically contingent upon technology:

It is superstitious belief in the universal constructive ability of science that
presses along the road of total planning. The age of technology seeks the
technological realization of the idea of the overall reconstruction of human
existence. 271
This amounts to saying that, socialism, as the term for contemporary efforts at positive
liberty, when it is absolutized, forms a basis for totalitarianism. The root of this development
is not any set of historically contingent conditions, e.g. modern technology, but rather it is
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the condition of difference between human groups. Human group formation as such implies
the adoption of particular values. These values represent the means by which meanings are
consciously transmitted among members of the group in that process which separates
humankind from nature, liberating him from natural compulsion through decisions leading to
acts of self-creation. But the fact that different groups are constituted upon different values,
different claims to truth of what constitutes the good life generally, sets the condition for
conflict in the absence of some framework of collective understanding between groups.
Conflict sets the condition for the reversal of the initial aim of all values to liberate
humankind from natural compulsion by introducing a source of man-made compulsion in its
place, as a second nature. To legislate a single, comprehensive conception of positive liberty
for all humankind would be to extend this logic of conflict by the necessity of imposing such
a logic upon those who do not already possess it or will not accept it in free discourse. It is
with this in mind that Jaspers’ theory seeks to establish an intentional framework based on
negative liberty as that element within which a factually, i.e. economically and
technologically, united world can achieve a greater measure of social order in which
differing conceptions of positive liberty can be pursued by groups without the dialectical
reversal that results in new forms of compulsion when groups exist side-by-side in a
conflictual relationship.

World unity

194

Two basic alternatives structure humankind's political future for Jaspers: world
empire or world order. 272 The situation of the present is one of de facto world unity,
motivated by the will to power and structured through the means of advancing technology.
The modern conception of the state with its assertion of sovereignty, whether actual or
merely a legal fiction, has begun to lose its relevance in this situation. From this situation
one comprehensive order will inevitably arise: "the political unity of the Earth is only a
matter of time." 273 The question becomes whether such an order will be one of domination
through force, fear and mass delusion or a federated world order based on rule of law and
political liberty. World empire in this theory can arise either through force and conquest or
through a de facto arrangement. The latter could be equated with de facto economic
domination: "a government which is in actual fact centralized, but which recognizes the
sham sovereignty of many states." 274 World empire, therefore, does not have to arise out of
conquest on the part of a totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union at the time of the
publication of The Origin and Goal of History. Rather, once the postulate of world unity is
accepted, world empire is any situation where, as a total end result or as a predominating set
of developing tendencies, political liberty is not in evidence as the background framework
for life within and between societies. Jaspers draws a comparison between such a condition
and life in the empires that followed the Axial Age:

A profound transformation of man accompanied the transformation of his
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conditions into those of extended empires. Political impotence altered
consciousness and life. Despotic forces, which seemed inseparable from the
extended empire, threw the individual back upon himself, isolated him,
levelled him down. Where no real share in responsibility and no intervention
in the whole were possible, all were slaves. This slavery was veiled by figures
of speech and shame contrivances from the free past. There was hardly ever
so much talk of Greek liberty, which was again and again guaranteed by the
victors, as when it was finally destroyed in favor of an imperial regime... The
analogy may, perhaps, cast some light on our future, despite the fact that it will
look quite different. It is, at the same time, a warning for all who desire the
liberty of man. 275
The condition of empire, then, is one in which actual political force, and a concomitant
government of fear, is accompanied by some mass delusion of liberty and free participation
where, instead, actual unconscious servitude exists. This means that world empire according
to this view would not necessarily resemble familiar twentieth century instantiations of
totalitarianism, such as Bolshevism or fascism. The two key implications of this
conceptualization of world empire are that: world empire is not defined by any one set of
institutions, but rather is a flexible concept capable of various institutional manifestations
and that, to the extent that political liberty is not the norm within and among at least the
larger part of the world's societies, some condition of world empire is already present. The
model presented here can have theoretical relevance beyond the international logic of Cold
War politics insofar as it does not identify world empire, which would be inherently
totalitarian, with any one specific set of institutions or any one ideological orientation. The
conceptual opposite to world empire here is a global framework of political liberty. The
essence of that concept is likewise not tied to any specific institutional arrangements, but
rather lies in the capacity of individuals to consciously participate in political action with the
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potential to make real decisions, in discourse, non-violent disputation and cooperation with
others. The preservation of this widest possible scope for individual political activity
concomitant with the same political liberty for everyone else, however, would rely upon a
global framework of negative liberty, i.e. a basic framework which would prevent the
infringement of one individual's, or one group’s, aims upon the equal liberty of others. Such
an order should not be constructed upon the basis of a positive conception of liberty, in
Jaspers’ view, because that would, in turn, be detrimental to the pursuit of particular positive
aims by the world's various societies, according to their own values. Furthermore, that
framework should be one which is perpetually up for discussion:

The outcome would not be a world state (that would be a world empire), but
an order, perennially re-established in negotiation and decision, of states
governing themselves within legally restricted domains: an all-embracing
federalism. 276
Such an arrangement would not be, in Jaspers’ view, the end to any and all potentials for
relationships of oppression, but rather a legal order in which arising relations of oppression
could be countered by individuals acting in concert on the basis of political liberty. Within
such a sphere of political liberty, economic oppression could be countered by legal means:

There are, in principle, peaceful means of redressing injustices arising out of
economic power... Economic power must also be prepared to accept selflimitation under laws, and to subject itself to conditions; it too will have to
serve the idea of world order, if the idea is to become a reality. 277
The potential for such an unprecedented world order is, in this theory, conceived as actual
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based on a persistent tendency of humankind to form orderly communities throughout
history. The ancient civilizations were initially such orders, organized with the aim of
providing defense against outside threats and a sphere of peace within:

In opposition to all denials of the possibility of a just and legal order of world
peace, observation of history and our own wills again and again gives rise to
the question: Will this new order not one day become possible, this
convergence of all into a realm of peace? The trail towards it was blazed at
the very beginning, when men founded state communities for the creation of
order among themselves... In such large communities there already prevailed,
even if only for limited periods and under a constant threat, dependability and
the outlook that sustains legal order. There is, in principle, no boundary to the
endeavor to expand such a community, until it becomes the community of all
men. 278
That the world has never been completely at peace is not, for Jaspers, enough evidence to
prove that such a condition of peace is therefore impossible. The age of universal history has
arrived on the basis of a technologically and economically united planet, these are also
unprecedented conditions. However, for such a situation of peace to come about and endure,
a framework of negative liberty would be necessary. The principles of political liberty that
developed in the West, especially in the Anglo-American sphere, need not be considered as
necessarily bound up with their positive expression in institutions, but rather they should be
theoretically reduced to their ultimate, basic principles. Those principles are completely
negative and, hence, transparently universal in their applicability to all cultures. Both the
process of the development of such and order and the condition of its mature state are ones
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where systematic injustices are to be expected as a matter of course, because differing
conceptions of positive liberty are sure to come into tension with each other. The interests of
business may come into conflict with those of labor, or the interests of one particular
religious group with those of another or with those of society at large. But such conflicts
could be redressed to some extent, whereas the alternative would be eventual unification
along the lines of a single positive conception of liberty which would amount to "a new sleep
of the spirit," where consciousness diminishes and men become, "creatures that are hardly
human anymore." 279 The immense power of unprecedented organization of society
evidenced by twentieth century totalitarian regimes shows that an alternative to such an
imperfect order is always latent and at the ready in the spiritual background of the
contemporary situation.

Faith

A theoretical elucidation of Jaspers’ conception of faith must consider the dichotomy
he draws between faith and contents of faith. Jaspers’ conception of the history of
humankind revolves around a relationship between man becoming conscious of himself in
community with others and in his works, on the one hand, and the petrification of the
meaningful products of conscious activity into fixed orders of power, on the other hand. The
major junctures in the history of humankind generally are marked by those instances where
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initial creations of an active conscious process solidify into social formula that channel the
active consciousness into, as much as possible under variable particular conditions,
unconscious routine: the Promethean age and the subsequent silence of prehistory, the birth
of the ancient agricultural civilizations and their subsequent stagnation in the ancient
empires, the brief fluorescence of liberty and science in the Axial Age and the subsequent
universal empires of homonoia. This process of reversal is the dialectic. On the other hand,
the process by which humans awaken to consciousness in communication with others is a
maieutic, or a process whereby truth is brought forth. Maieutic is a Greek word associated
with birth, specifically with the art of causing to be born, or midwifery. This is a fitting
image since the human, distinct from the animal, is physically born incomplete and only
attains all the requisites for human life with the later birth of his consciousness in meaningful
communication. Plato evocatively describes the awakening consciousness: “like a light
flashing forth when a flame is kindled, it is born in the soul and immediately nourishes
itself.” 280 One might speculate, moreover, that the development of consciousness requires
both the exercise of communicative and of instrumental rationality, the latter in play and
work. In the contemporary period, the function of the dialectic is what Jaspers identifies
with nihilism, which, by analogy, seems to reduce man to the level of animal, the sort of
creature whose orientation to the world is wholly unconscious. Conscious activity always
involves a community in which meanings are mutually exchanged in discourse. This always
amounts to the existence of an ethical sphere, or a sphere of positive liberty, in which the
views of what constitutes the good life are cultivated in the actions and institutions of a
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society. Instrumental rationality always implies some necessary conscious activity by means
of which man separates himself, with the work of tools, from the otherwise sheer compulsion
of nature. Upon such a conception, despite the pressure of even the most rigidified social
orders, man and the activity of his consciousness can never be wholly separated. Faith is
equated with consciousness by Jaspers when he identifies it as what distinguished human
from animal:

Faith alone sets in motion the forces that master man's basic animal instincts,
deprive them of overlordship, and transform them into motors of upsurging
humanity. 281
That Jaspers equates faith and consciousness is not made explicit, however it is certain,
because he elsewhere describes the difference between human and animal in terms of
consciousness, which he also equates with thought and Geist:

Interrelationship between men is does not consist essentially in their
zoological structure, but in the fact that they can understand each other, that
they are all made up of consciousness, thought and Geist. Here there is an
intimate affinity between men, whereas an abyss divides them from even the
closest of animals. 282
In this sense, faith is conceived apart from any contents of faith. Here faith means when the
contents of faith are philosophically conceived in their essence as means for the construction
of ethoi, or the organization of subjectivity in human societies. This conception theoretically
reduces them to their essential relationship to consciousness. Different institutions of faith,
such as different religious traditions, are instances of such ethoi, or organizations of
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subjectivity. Structurally conceived as such, there is no essential theoretical difference
between an ethos and an ethnos. Any nation, any ethnos, is just as much an ordering of
subjectivity as any community of faith; both are ethoi. To say the same thing, both are
expressions of positive liberty, i.e. the scope for expressions of ethical order. However, their
variant principles of objective order, variant objective ways in which they actually exist in
relation to other aspects of social reality, would necessarily involve their differentiation in
terms of the empirical aims of the human sciences. This structural identity of both on the
theoretical level is implied in Jaspers’ view. On that basis his theory deals with both alike.
On the one hand, his view of a possible world order takes the form of negative liberty as a
foundation for a federated world. Likewise the same principle applies to the sphere of
traditions of faith:

If it be deemed improbable that a world order will develop without unity of
faith, I venture to assert the reverse. The universality of a world order
obligatory to all (in contrast to a world empire) is possible only when the
multiple contents of faith remain free in their historical communication,
without the unity of an objective, universally valid doctrinal content. The
common element of all faith in relation to world order can only be that
everyone desires the ordering of the foundations of existence, in a world
community in which he has room to evolve with the peaceful means of the
spirit. 283

It is at the level of the "foundations of existence" that the framework of negative liberty in a
possible world order would operate. Here again one can see that for Jaspers effective
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positive liberty is thought to rest upon a framework of negative liberty between groups.

This view of an order in which various particular cultures, secular or religious, can
coexist. But this is not a mere modus vivendi, or agreement to halt hostilities for a temporary
period. Rather it aims at the source of conflict. What is fundamentally constitutive of an
ethos is incompatible with the compulsion necessarily brought about by war. War arises
when one ethos sees another, or several others, as a threat, as a potential source of
compulsion, and then takes positive action to remove that perceived threat. This differs from
the more basic, general use of force, which could take other forms, such as actions taken in
the maintenance of legitimate internal order. The defensive side in an actual war, in this
view, would not be considered to be at war, but merely using force for the maintenance of
legitimate internal order. No war starts for both sides simultaneously, so there is always an
aggressor. War as aggression is a positive act. Theoretically, it shares an essential basis with
positive liberty, the construction of an internal ethical sphere. War is the aggressive
extension of positive liberty beyond the bounds of its original ethos. Externally, as a
response to such a potential threat, war seeks the imposition of the values of one group upon
another, the imposition of institutionalized compulsion through exploitation, i.e. slavery, or
annihilation. This definition rules out reactive defensive action and internal enforcement of
legitimate order – both are forms of the maintenance of order. Internally, war turns the ethos
into a means for the conduct of war. Even if the enemy is completely annihilated, a source of
compulsion remains internally, insofar as every ethos consists of the cumulative meaning of
its essential actions, the history of its institutions. This historical memory will create an
203

internal tension going forward, as the ethos tries to divest itself of the historical memory of
internal compulsion which it cannot completely accomplish without altering its identity. In
its effects, both internally and externally, i.e. upon a conquered population, the necessary
result of war is the historical dialectic. Since the origin of every ethos is the conscious
liberation from natural compulsion, every subsequent source of compulsion introduced by
humankind will result in tension with this most basic conscious orientation of all ethoi. An
ethos can never be founded upon compulsion, either upon internal compulsion or upon that
imposed by conquest. The history of any group consists of the way in which its past
conditions its present. The effect of war introduces institutions into an ethos that run counter
to its essential origin. That this is Jaspers’ view can be seen in the following passage where
he describes a shift from an original condition to one of absolute power through war:

That which is of practical value to military ventures is established as a
permanent condition, with a view to a planned or feared war. Thereupon a
fresh motive comes into being. The condition of absolute power, necessitated
by war, is to be carried over into the peace as a permanent condition of
absolute sovereignty. 284

When this new conditions persists in the absence of active warfare, this is, in principle, the
equivalent of war itself. Such a condition of persistence of war in principle appears as the
result of a dialectical reversal: from an original intention to overcome natural compulsion to
the imposition of a second nature of artificial compulsion. The potential for the durability
such an imposed compulsion would seem to be very great. In the vast period of the silence
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of prehistory such a condition existed. Totalitarianism aims at creating such a silent
condition anew. In both examples, humankind is systematically distanced from the activity
of the free consciousness and reduced to an animal-like existence in a society whose chief
principle is one of aggressive war. The purpose of a framework of negative liberty among
different ethoi would be the alleviation of that condition in which the principle of aggressive
war arises, the condition of the potential for the perception of cultural difference as a threat.
The philosophy of history shows that humankind creates sources of compulsion sometimes
seemingly even greater than those imposed upon humankind by nature, and hence the
internal contradiction of cultures that is the inevitable outcome of the adoption of institutions
defined by a principle of aggressive war. In other words, the greatest threat to positive liberty
is its absolutization in the absence of a framework based on a principle of negative liberty
structuring relations among cultures.

Both science and institutions of faith, or trust, share a common root in the basic
human phenomenon of consciousness. But science is consciousness directed towards
objective phenomena, whereas contents of faith concern subjective phenomena. This
conception that holds what might otherwise be thought of as quite distinct aspects of the
human experience together runs throughout Jaspers’ thought. The essence of philosophy
throughout history for Jaspers has always been to remind both science and institutions of
faith of their essential conscious element. He writes:

In view however, of the possibility of a totalitarian world empire and a
284
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totalitarian doctrinal truth corresponding to it, the only hope left is for the
individual, for innumerable individuals, as they have lived from the Axial Age
until today, from China to the West, to preserve the stream of philosophy,
however narrow it may become. The independence from both Church and
State of the deepest inner being of man related to transcendence, his liberty of
soul, that draws courage from discourse with the great cultural heritage, this
remains the last refuge, as it has been so often before in evil periods of
transition. 285
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Chapter 5

War

For Jaspers, history is the history of consciousness. Consciousness is what essentially
separates human from animal. But what is consciousness? Since it is here taken as what is
essentially human, to define it would be to posit an anthropology, when that term is taken to
mean a doctrine of what ultimately it is to be human. Consciousness for Jaspers is both
unique in the world; it is what is distinguishes humanity, but is it also completely indefinite,
i.e. it has no necessary qualities: no “true” consciousness and no “false” consciousness. The
only characteristic of all consciousness is a formal one: is that it shows up either subjectively
or objectively, either as meaning or as instrumentality. Meaning is conceived of here as what
gives substantial life to human groups, all factors from, for example, specific values of
justice or virtue to conventions of oral pronunciation. Among human groups, such meanings
will show at least some differences and such differences constitute the recognizable
differences between human groups. Nothing here precludes the conception of actually
overlapping or ambiguous formations of meaning involving more than one human group. As
consciousness shows up subjectively, it shows up as meaning, and this is never solely a
matter of individual arbitrary preference, because, for Jaspers, except perhaps in the cases of
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the severely mentally ill, individual subjectivity is a matter inseparable from the
communicative environment in which the human being lives. The sphere of meaning is
inherently divided into categories such as those of: good and bad, appropriate and
inappropriate, desirable and undesirable. Ethical order or ethos denotes a group conceived
on the basis of shared meanings. As Jaspers succinctly puts it: “human community is
founded on conscious meaning.” 286 This is really dealt with so briefly by Jaspers that one
can easily miss the essential theoretical relationship between Jaspers’ concept of the
communicative constitution of human groups and nihilism, the latter theme being crucial to
Jaspers’ contemporary Zeitdiagnose and his conception of totalitarianism. Nihilism, the
erosion of meaning, is theorized here to consist of a logic of instrumentalization. And, again,
this connection between Jaspers’ conception of the instrumental aspect of consciousness and
nihilism is left largely to implication. Furthermore, when compared with Hegel’s idealist
conception of the instrumental, or objective and necessary, constitution of human groups or
ethical orders, Jaspers’ conception appears in contrast; for Hegel: “the ethical order is
freedom or the absolute will as what is objective, a circle of necessity…” 287 However for
Jaspers, the instrumental, objective, aspect of consciousness is that mode through which the
human being deals with nature. Nature presents a constant source of necessity for humans.
There are the regular necessities such as those for food, for the maintenance of health against
injury and disease, for shelter from inhospitable weather and for the avoidance of dangerous
animals; the ultimate necessity is death. It is through the manifestation of the objective
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aspect of consciousness, instrumentality, that humans can partially overcome natural
necessity. The difference between instrumentality and meaning, can be seen in way the
contemporary mind encounters prehistoric artifacts: a prehistoric cutting tool can be
recognized as a knife, even in the absence of any understanding of what role in the cultural
life of a prehistoric people it played. Its instrumentality is objective and recoverable, but
whatever its meaning originally was is not recoverable. Technology is essentially
instrumental: it is any technique of operation with the substances and forces of nature
proceeding according to a purpose. 288 Technology must have a purpose, therefore it is
dependent upon meaning. However, for human life to be possible at all, some means of
dealing technologically with nature must be present owing to the relative lack of instincts
which leaves humans helpless when compared to animals. The human consciousness is
pictured here as relating technologically to nature ab origine. By implication, technology
itself is not intrinsically tied to any meaningful content that any culture might ascribe to it.
The unearthed prehistoric knife could have been something as exotic as an instrument of
ritual human sacrifice or it could have been the most mundane culinary implement; there is
simply no way to know, because its instrumental essence and its original cultural meaning
are wholly divisible aspects. This divisibility derives from the very subject-object dichotomy
within consciousness itself.
Only humans create meanings; only humans develop technology. But in both of these
essential and distinct aspects one does not fix upon any doctrine of what is definitively
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human, upon any positive anthropology. Jaspers does not explicitly say so, but it is implied
that neither instrumentality nor meaning can be said to precede or determine the other
entirely; so neither is the more primary element to which the other can be reduced. And both
of these elements are empty forms, waiting to be filled with specific contents. Jaspers should
be seen, therefore, to articulate a negative anthropology insofar as there is crucial stress to be
placed upon what is essentially and distinctly human, but that factor, consciousness, admits
of no singular, universal definition or admits of as many possible definitions as there are
ethoi. The first formulation of this negative anthropology appears in Man in the Modern
Age, but it developed out of the verstehende, or understanding, methodological orientation
adapted by Jaspers for psychopathology from German historicism more than two decades
earlier and which was to prove decisive for Max Weber’s development of verstehende
Soziologie. 289 But the negative anthropology in Man in the Modern Age would have to wait
nearly twenty years until it was elaborated by Jaspers beyond its first, comparatively terse,
formulation: “Man is always something more than he knows of himself. He is not simply
once and for all, but is a process… endowed with possibilities through the freedom he
possesses to make of himself what he will by the activities on which he decides.” 290 In The
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Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers elaborates his negative anthropology by illustrating his
theory of consciousness by means of the findings of the empirical anthropologist Adolf
Portmann, whose position he summarizes by saying: “the historically determined
environment is a co-factor in inducing the first step toward physical maturity,” in humans. 291
This is interpreted by Jaspers to mean: “Geist is already operative, even in the biological
realm itself.” 292 Both statements amount to saying that in the human being, the subjective
sphere of communication of meanings and objective physiological reality are so closely
intertwined that the latter cannot develop without the former and vice versa. It is in
emulation, within a sphere of communication, between the human infant and older humans
that the infant matures. Therefore, humans possess a unique ontogeny, insofar as it requires
conscious communication of meanings unlike the ontogeny of any other species. Noam
Chomsky would later show that this principle explains the psychophysical process of
language acquisition in infants. This unique ontogeny leaves humans radically and uniquely
undetermined by nature. In the Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers reiterates his earlier
position: “Man is boundlessly open in his potentialities, his being has not attained
consummate shape and can never do so.” 293
It is on the basis of this negative anthropology that Jaspers constructs his universal
history. This history is universal in the sense that it is the history of consciousness, that
element identified by negative anthropology as essentially human. What is not universal in
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this account is any single subjective or instrumental principle: there is no eschatological
ideal manifesting the “truth” of itself in history, nor is there a soteriological instrument that
will bring history to an “end”. Jaspers divides his history into three ages: prehistory, the
ancient civilizations, and the period from the Axial Age until the present. Because even
prehistory gives definite evidence of consciousness, through remains that show tool use and a
cultural diversity of human groups, there must be postulated a time at the threshold of
prehistory when humanity became fully human. This threshold of hominization Jaspers
refers to as the “Promethean Age”. 294 A definitive moment of hominization must be
postulated, even in the absence of any evidence that it occurred. This is indicated by Jaspers
when he writes: “The moment of becoming completely human is the deepest enigma of all…
Such figures of speech as ‘a gradual process of transition’ merely serve to obscure it…
whenever we try to picture man coming in to being, our imagination sees him already
there.” 295 Without the postulate of such a moment, one cannot maintain a negative
anthropology since then a factor prior to hominization would be taken to be solely
determinative of hominization, reducing hominization, and thus humanity and consciousness
to the necessity of nature. With no distinction between consciousness and nature, one is left
precisely with a positive anthropology, a doctrine of total knowledge of what humanity
essentially was, is, and must always be. The point at which human ontogeny became
dependent upon meaning set the species infinitely apart from nature; here is the event of
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hominization. This is implied in Jaspers formulation: “the nature of man is his
artificiality.” 296
The first of Jaspers’ three ages of humankind is prehistory. 297 Based on
archaeological evidence, prehistory spans an immense period, probably more than one
hundred thousand years from beginning to end. In the complete absence of any linguistic
evidence, conceivable only in the form of written records, meaning cannot be apprehended
from the remains from this period. What one can know, however, and this is only implied in
Jaspers, is that technology was almost completely stagnant during this period. There was no
technology of writing, and there was virtually nothing more than the most rudimentary
technologies that would have kept humanity as closely tied to nature as possible. A further
implication is that the subjectivity of prehistoric communities must have been oriented
somehow towards maintenance of this condition of technological stagnation. When modern
exploration and colonization, and later empirical anthropology, discovered primitive peoples
untouched by contact with civilization, be it by either Western or Eastern civilization, these
primitive groups were first encountered living in circumstances that may be supposed to be
similar to the prehistoric condition of humanity, generally. Such conditions evince a
dominant prohibition of inquiry in both technological and communal matters. Just as
technology remained stagnant, the group’s factors of collective identity would not have been
amenable to question, and, therefore, would likewise have remained stagnant. Hence it is
when a modern empirical anthropologist would enter such an isolated culture, upon merely
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enquiring into its values, but thereby throwing those values into unprecedented question, that
the group would inevitably undergo irrevocable internal transformation. In prehistory one
sees two distinct trends, the origin of technology and the inhibition of technological
development through primitive configurations of subjectivity which are themselves
unrecoverable by direct means to contemporary science, but, nevertheless such factors must
have been present and must have inhibited technological development with extraordinary
efficacy over a period of probably around one hundred thousand years. Within a period
spanning roughly three thousand years, beginning around 4000 B.C., the ancient civilizations
developed in the Middle East, Egypt, the Aegean region, India and China. 298 It is
conceivable that a process of diffusion originating in the Middle East was operative. The
ancient civilizations broke radically with prehistoric human life through a combination of
new technologies, such as writing, agriculture and irrigation, architecture, transportation and
horsemanship, and, simultaneously, new conceptions of communal life. The origin of the
ancient civilizations was in defensive communities intended to prevent the perpetual
invasions of prehistoric peoples. 299 These defensive communities turned into empires built
upon conquest with caste formations and a condition of relative technological stagnation. It
is clear that the concepts of large scale community organization, combining different ethoi
without assimilation, and the radical difference in levels of technological development set the
ancient civilizations definitively apart from prehistoric peoples. The historical character of
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the ancient civilizations today is entirely owing to the ability to translate their written records
and coordinate their recoverable meanings with the extant expressions of their subjectivity,
e.g. in paintings, sculptures, or narrative images. For Jaspers the Axial Age, a period from
roughly 800 B.C. to 200 B.C., marks the beginning of the third of his principal historical
periods, that which includes the present. When Jaspers describes the Axial Age as a period
of the: “awakening of the specifically human spirit,” he is referring to a change in
consciousness. 300 People began to see themselves as conditioned by decisions of other
people in the past, rather than regarding themselves as mere objects in the purportedly
immutable mythological order that the ancient civilizations imposed upon them. A new
spirit of inquiry called the purported legitimacy of prevailing conditions into question and
sought to transform them in efforts to establish legitimate conditions on new bases. History
seems to have begun to become relatively popularized beyond the control of the dominant
scribe classes in the ancient civilizations. History is the methodical recollection of meaning
and instrumentality, of consciousness in general. In the Axial Age the revolutionary trend
was the recollection of subjectivity, i.e. the subjective reality of what were purportedly
objective conditions of social life under the mythological order. The result was
demythologization. In the world of mythos, different peoples had different gods, but in the
new world, the place of the gods, the persistent domain of sacred ritual, would be taken by
the universal religions of the three great regions, the West, India and China. Nowhere since
the Axial Age has anything like the social model of an ancient civilization arisen. The
caesura was definitive. The legacy of the Axial Age, however, is ambivalent, and this is
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owing to the fact that in each of the three Axial regions, universal empires of homonoia, i.e.
singlemindedness, terminated this age of relative liberty, the Macedonian, Indian and
Chinese Empires. 301 Whereas in the world of mythos, where the “will of the gods” and the
power of the ruler effectively coincided, subsequently spiritual and temporal worlds would
fluctuate irregularly between periods of conflict and cooperation. One example is the
flexibility Christianity has demonstrated either by resistance to political power or
collaboration therewith, e.g. between the sentiment that: “My kingdom is not of this world,”
and the doctrine of divine right of kings. 302 However, this trend is ubiquitous in the legacies
stemming from Axial Age religious thought, as, for example, in the Daoist intellectual
distance in its contrast with the Confucian practical engagement with the mundane world. In
such examples, one sees the legacy of the Axial Age insofar as it is a promulgation of a
conception of a universally true order of human affairs, which may or may not coincide with
the mundane orders of politics, economics and society. Seen in contrast with prehistory, the
inception of the ancient civilizations might seem like a more significant diremption than the
Axial Age itself. It was the essence of that breakthrough that was intensified in the Axial
Age. The unfathomable silence of the human consciousness during a hundred thousand
years of prehistoric life had been overcome: by means of unprecedented technologies that
distanced humanity further from natural necessity accompanied by unprecedented large scale
community organizations. It was not until the Axial Age in the three regions of the West,
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India and China that both science and contemplation of the “right” order of communal affairs
again, and roughly simultaneously, began to have a diremptive impact upon extant order.
The ancient civilizations appear historical by virtue of one’s ability to understand their
words, but these became historical by virtue of their own successful efforts to realize that
what had been objective rules of human order in prehistory had actually been subjective
decisions. That the Axial Age moment of ferment led to the formulation and establishment
of homonoetic conceptions of communal order simultaneously sets the condition for
subsequent history and the rubric for the problematization of all contemporary conceptions of
consciousness.
Jaspers intends his philosophy of history to elucidate the present in terms of a tension
between nihilism and legitimacy. For Jaspers these two are virtually antithetical concepts,
but their opposition can be clarified beyond where Jaspers has left it. Nihilism is the
condition where subjective ideas appear to be objective realities. The subjective intention of
those in power is taken to be the objective, and therefore necessary, order of the world and
human affairs. 303 In prehistory, human life was barely distinguished from natural necessity,
bound by subjective conditions which constrained the consciousness to its most minimal
existence. However these conditions were taken to be objectively true. One can assume the
presence of a corresponding “science” of shamanism that would have explained the ultimate
reality of everything by deduction from a first principle, in fact nothing other than
subjectivity ritualized as shamanism. Though the human intelligence which first gave rise to

303

Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, 127-134, 215.
217

the technologies of tools, rudimentary architecture and use of fire, was always fully capable
of further technological advancement, it actually did not achieve such advancement in
prehistory, owing to the fact that nature and her necessity were not seen as objective realities
impinging upon the human’s subjective capacity and freedom to shape his own world. The
world was not conceived as something to be studied objectively, through science, and
transformed indefinitely. Rather, humankind lived in a ritualistic relationship to nature in
which the order of human affairs was taken to be an extension of natural necessity. Jaspers’
account of history thus describes a prehistoric nihilism, though he does not use that term. He
does, however, see prehistory as a period in which human affairs took on the semblance of
natural necessity, saying that prehistoric humankind was: “as though bound to the
substratum of natural life,” where, “everything that happened was akin to the unconscious
processes of nature.” 304 This theme is repeated in the characterization of contemporary
nihilism, which would reduce humans almost to the unconscious level of animal life. For
Jaspers this is not entirely possible, but such a condition is approachable, and insofar as
humankind approaches this condition by seeking: “to live self-evidently from nature like the
beasts, he can follow this path only in conjunction with the consciousness of nihilism.” 305
Therefore, the conditions of humankind in prehistory and under the contemporary form of
nihilism are conceived to share the same essential structure. What is common to both forms
is that the subjective “glue” which holds an ethos together begins to dissolve, to become
replaced by a normative economy based primarily on the threat of force. For Jaspers this
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process can never be total, however, because without some meaningful communication of
subjectivity, the human organism could not survive in a purely biological sense. Nihilism in
its contemporary form is manifested for Jaspers in the transition from a “people” to a
“mass.” 306 A people here is conceived of as constituted by a relatively strong and shared set
of values; it is not a state of unconscious or coerced obedience to such values but rather is:
“conscious of itself in ways of life, modes of thought, and cultural heritage.” 307 By
implication the validity of such shared values within an ethos is conceived by Jaspers as not
relying upon the threat of force as a consequence of lack of compliance. Such values, the
subjective sphere of an ethos, constitute its “authentic world”, in addition to the objective,
instrumental relationship with nature. This is another way of saying that an ethos, as a
people, is constituted by a strong sense of legitimacy, or the condition where the predominant
values are accepted by the community as true independent of economic consequences. By
contrast, human life in the mass is where the authentic world of a people is reduced to mere
economic functionality: “the condition where corporate human life can be made use of, set
to work, or deported, and is treated in light of qualities which can be given a number and
counted by means of tests.” 308 The mass becomes uniform, quantitative and devoid of
cultural heritage. 309 The result is a collective loss of consciousness. Because this is a human
mass, some shared subjectivity must hold it together, but that subjectivity is not recognized
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as subjectivity by the members of that mass, rather it is seen as objective necessity. Though
nothing but nature poses a source of objective necessity for humans. Insofar as individuals
begin to see themselves as “cogs in a machine”, as instrumentalized, they begin to act in
accordance with what they see as an objectively necessary order of power, rather than out of
a sense of legitimacy attached to the shared subjectivity within their community. This,
however, is a loss of consciousness insofar as the subjective aspect of human consciousness
is impaired. And in this sense legitimacy and consciousness should be seen to go hand in
hand for Jaspers. The mass is really a psychopathological outcome for Jaspers, though he
does not use that term. The erosion of legitimate subjectivity, with its role in coordinating
actions within a community on the basis of trust, through this process of instrumentalization
leads to a situation where force, fear and flattery of human universal biological impulses
become factors capable of motivating obedience. This is the crucial connection between
nihilism and totalitarianism for Jaspers. It is once nihilism has proceeded to erode legitimate
subjectivity that totalitarianism will emerge from: “life without roots or the life of apparently
secure puppets on the strings of decorous convention, which can be exchanged without more
ado for the strings of life in the concentration camp.” 310 He writes: “the sole choice is
between legitimacy and despotism.” 311 Jaspers employs Max Weber’s conception of
legitimacy which he interprets in his own words: “Trust requires some fixed pole, an
inviolable fundament, something that is respected by all, in such a manner that anyone who
violates it can, without difficulty, be cast out as a criminal. This inviolable fundament is
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called legitimacy.” 312 There is a parallel between Jaspers’ conception of the subject-object
dichotomy and Weber’s three types of legitimacy. 313 Charismatic legitimacy is individual,
exemplary, immediate, and noneconomic, but it becomes routinized into either
traditionalistic or rational types of legitimacy. Rational legitimacy is essentially the
consciousness of correctness in correspondence between a general principle and particular
instances. It is purely formal; in any given case of its application, the content of the general
principle and particular instances is completely open; the legitimacy involved derives purely
from the consciousness of correctness. Traditional legitimacy in its purest case simply
results from individual loyalty owing to a common upbringing. The former parallels Jaspers’
conception of objectivity, the latter parallels his conception of subjectivity. When Jaspers
and Weber are compared, the conclusion can be drawn that Jaspers’ description of prehistory
is one in which Weber’s conception of rational legitimacy is predominant. The two accounts
are complementary. Prehistoric nihilism bound the free development of consciousness in a
ritualistic objectivity. Prehistoric groups simply did not record past events; if they had done
so, they would have been historical. So traditional legitimacy was clearly not an important
factor in prehistoric human life. Charismatic legitimacy breaks out of established routines of
communal life. But in prehistory communal life changed in all respects only extraordinarily
slowly. A highly routinized rational legitimacy conforms very well to the conditions that can
be known concerning prehistory: everything, humanity and nature, must have had to have
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been conceived of as conforming to laws that were conceived of as objective truths over and
above ordinary humans. The virtually unchangeable character of both technology and values
in prehistory must mean that such “laws”, which would have been conceived of as absolute
necessities, must have been in place. Jaspers and Weber construct parallel accounts, based
on a shared conception of legitimacy. In modernity, what for Jaspers is nihilism is
bureaucratization, or the “iron cage” of rationalization, for Weber. This parallel can be seen
in Jaspers’ own definition of bureaucracy: “Bureaucracy is sovereignty based on regulations
and orders issued by officials of the civil service. It functions like a machine.” 314 The
rational criterion of legitimacy is inherent to human consciousness, but it is formal rather
than bound up with specific subjective content, as the other types of legitimacy are. To the
extent that in the real world this rational criterion edges out the other types, and charismatic
legitimacy really had its historical efflorescence in the Axial Age, one can observe a
diminution of values, a formalization of subjectivity. In terms of consciousness, both terms
denote an objectification of the rational criterion of legitimacy to the increasing exclusion of
other types of legitimacy. The immense silence of prehistory seems to demonstrate the
potential durability of, in Weber’s words: “the polar night of icy darkness”. 315
When humankind deals with nature, it is an objective, instrumental relationship, a
relationship of force. But in community, the relationships between humans are subjectively
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mediated. Following from Jaspers’ negative anthropology, human ontogeny could not be
conceived of without such subjective mediation, i.e. without communication involving
sphere of values. But there is no indication that an instrumental application of force among
humans plays any role in human ontogeny at all. It is with such communication that the
human becomes fully human, and this applies equally to all human groups, regardless of
differing contents of their values, how they see themselves, others, and the world. It is in this
relationship that legitimacy in general comes to consciousness. However, rational
legitimacy, which is consciousness of formal agreement, i.e. correctness, alone, has an
entirely objective character. It is the type of cognition properly involved in dealing
scientifically with nature, whether that be external nature or human biology. Insofar as
human groups take on a more and more rationalized aspect, the freedom of the subjective
consciousness within them diminishes. This accounts for the tendency of homonoetic
projects to diminish cultural distinctiveness in the effort to construct as uniform a population
mass as possible. Liberty and legitimacy are complementary concepts here, but rational
legitimacy with its fundamentally objective orientation towards formal correctness alone is
insufficient for liberty, insofar as liberty also implies liberty of the human subjective sphere
of communication. This principle should apply to all ethoi, regardless of the content of their
values. Jaspers’ conception of liberty divides liberty into positive and negative aspects. The
negative aspect of liberty corresponds to the objective aspect of consciousness. In an
orientation of negative liberty, the objective reality of other human individuals and groups
comes to light. The objective reality of other individuals and groups is that they are
themselves subjective entities. They are potentially understandable, even if one does not
223

wish to understand them. Negative liberty is rationally legitimate: all particular humans and
their groups correspond to the general concept of subjective entities. Hence it is correct to
see them as such. To interfere with them by force would be to treat them as a source of
objective necessity, i.e. as nature. Each human group has the potential to treat itself as a free
subjective entity, i.e. as one which is capable of articulating a conception of itself as worthy
on the bases of whatever values it might hold. On the basis of this free pursuit of the
realization of its values a group becomes fully human. Here again we see Jaspers’ negative
anthropology, insofar as this view holds that there is no single “true” definition of “human
nature”. But it would be a mistake to equate this conception with “pluralism” insofar as that
concept sees its goal, a plurality of ethoi, as the ideologically correct order of human affairs.
In Jaspers’ conception, an ideology that demands a dutiful willing of peaceable coexistence
is not involved at all; everything relies only upon negative liberty alone, an expectation of
persistent differences and not their affirmation. In contrast with prior empires, such as the
Achaemenid, all imperial projects after the Axial Age appear in some fashion to aspire to a
homonoetic ideal. “Pluralism” already dictates what should be the case for all. It already
articulates some version of positive liberty, necessarily a univocal one. But in so doing, one
has already assumed that every particular sphere of subjectivity has an objective purpose
above itself, i.e. “pluralism”, for which it is the instrument. The Achaemenid Empire was a
pluralistic despotism. Following upon Jaspers’ view, subjectivity therefore has become
instrumentalized already, and, hence, unfree. In any case, such “pluralism” has no monopoly
on real plurality, in fact quite the contrary. It is, therefore, his position that only within a
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sphere of negative liberty among all ethoi and individuals can the most authentically free
articulations of positive liberty be realized:
Only when positive liberty has been realized on the basis of the legal
safeguarding of negative liberty, does the proposition apply: Man is free in the
measure in which he sees freedom around him, that is, in the measure in which
all men are free. 316
Elsewhere, Jaspers applies this same principle to communities of faith:
The universality of a world order obligatory to all (in contrast to a world
empire) is possible only when the multiple contents of faith remain free in
their historical communication, without the unity of an objective, universally
valid doctrinal content. The common element of all faith in relation to world
order can only be that everyone desires the ordering of the foundations of
existence, in a world community in which he has room to evolve with the
peaceful means of the spirit. 317
It is clear that what Jaspers intends is a most broad conception of human groups, one
encompassing all types of groups, including communities of faith; it is in this sense that the
broad term ethos is most appropriate. All such ethoi are expressions of subjectivity, i.e. of
freely differing values of positive liberty. Nihilism, on the other hand, is the diminishing of
the subjective consciousness. Since one can observe both prehistoric nihilism and
contemporary nihilism, it is apparent that technology, i.e. the application of objective
consciousness, stands in a neutral relation to nihilism. The ethos, a community of shared
subjectivity, becomes, under nihilistic conditions, something appearing objective and
instrumental. What would be otherwise constituted by a shared vision of positive liberty, is
turned into a rationalized “iron cage” or machine in which individuals seem to be mere
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functional parts. Under such a condition, the scope for negative liberty is also diminished.
What is meant by negative liberty is broad, equating it with: “ordering the foundations of
existence.” This means that anything that can be dealt with truly objectively is included
within the potential sphere of negative liberty that should inform the relations between all
ethoi and individuals. It is in this sense that the provision of goods under “socialism” is not
conceived of as incompatible with negative liberty here. 318 Jaspers conceives of nihilism as
the product of war in his philosophy of history:
Some sort of distress is always the source of planning. The most profound
distress of all, that caused by war, is the source of total planning. The meaning
and justification of such planning in times of distress are then transformed by
the fact that the State’s will to power… reaches the maximum degree of
momentary energy through total planning… Existence is staked on military
conquest, which alone is capable of reversing one’s own bankruptcy by the
plunder of others. That which is of practical value to military ventures is
established as a permanent condition, with a view to a planned or feared war.
Thereupon a fresh motive comes into being. The condition of absolute power,
necessitated by war, is to be carried over into the peace as a permanent
condition of absolute sovereignty. 319
Nihilism is the result of this instrumentalization of an ethos on account of war. What Jaspers
is referring to here is the aggressive side in a war, i.e. the side where: “existence is staked on
military conquest.” For this side, war is an attempt to replace distress arising from relations
with another group with a planned “right” order of affairs that proceeds without scope for
negative liberty with regard to that other group. In other words, it is an attempt to maximize
the aggressor’s positive liberty while providing no scope for negative liberty vis-à-vis the
defensive group. This account focuses solely upon the aggressor group, but one can infer
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that the use of defensive force in war is not likewise instrumentalization, but rather that it is
essentially no different from measures routinely taken to perpetuate legitimacy within the
group, e.g. such as forceful measures taken against criminals. Jaspers’ argument amounts to
saying that war, so conceived, results in the opposite of what it was intended to achieve. The
picture here is one in which an ethos undergoes an inner instrumentalization, where it begins
by pursuing its subjective conception of a right order of affairs, where this, nevertheless,
results in the construction of an objectified inner order. Its original subjectivity begins to
take on an ideational objectivity, a second nature in addition to the material objectivity of
nature itself. Its values are no longer values, but instruments for the prosecution of war or
the perpetuation of the “condition of absolute power”. This process is in tension with the
negative anthropology, insofar as therein understanding is as intrinsic as force is alien to
human ontogeny. Even though Jaspers does not make it explicit, his conceptions of nihilism
and war are, thus, intrinsically connected. His concern for negative liberty arises from this
conception of war wherein negative liberty is completely neglected to the detriment of both
the defensive side, and, and even more so, to the aggressive side in any war.
The distinction between Jaspers and Marx can be no more clearly seen than in their
antithetical conceptions of nihilism and alienation. It is clear from Jaspers’ works as well as
from his notes, that he held a no more acutely oppositional relationship with any prior thinker
than with Marx. While Jaspers’ conception of both history and politics develops consistently
from his negative anthropology, Marx develops everything from a positive anthropology.
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According to the “Marxist humanist” Erich Fromm the conception of alienation holds
constant throughout Marx’s oeuvre: “the concept of alienation was and remained the focal
point of the thinking of the young Marx who wrote the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, and the ‘old’ Marx who wrote Capital.” 320 For Jaspers, alienation is a reality in
the form of: “mindless work in the machine age,” but he rejects Marx’s principle: “that
private property brings about total alienation from being-human.” 321 For Marx, this total
alienation from humankind’s “species-being” is the essential principle upon which his
version of universal history is based. Fromm provides the clearest, and sympathetic,
exposition of this point by saying that, for Marx: “the history of man was at the same time
the history of man’s alienation.” 322 In light of this, all history becomes the struggle for
“species-being”, for humankind’s unalienated nature. The keystone of “Marxist humanism”
cannot but be the doctrine of alienation, as Fromm’s account, the most lucid which exists,
makes clear. Nevertheless, Fromm confuses Marx’s thought here with existentialism:
“Marx’s concept of socialism is a protest, as is all existentialist philosophy, against the
alienation of man.” 323 But this cannot be the case, insofar as Jaspers coined the term
“Existenzphilosophie”, loosely translated as “existentialism”, and from the beginning equated
it with an opposition to what he characterized as nihilism. The intrinsic connection between
Existenzphilosophie and the negative anthropology elaborated in The Origin and Goal of
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History was first articulated in Man in the Modern Age. There Jaspers characterizes his
opposition to the positive anthropology of Marx: “the Marxists believe themselves
scientifically enabled to grasp the true being of man.” But, in doing so, it becomes, in
Jaspers’ view, nihilistic, inclined to: “destroy what has been of worth to man.” 324 What is
implied here is what really becomes more fully elaborated in The Origin and Goal of
History, where human subjectivity is characterized as essential to human ontogeny and to
human group formation. Without a conception of this role of subjectivity, humankind is seen
as reduced to the status of a merely natural phenomenon, and the history of humankind
becomes not the history of consciousness but that of an objective mechanism, one, in Marx’s
case, operating according to the logic of “class struggle” alone. Such a view is a naturalistic
reduction, a bracketing of subjectivity, or, as Jaspers puts it, a position that: “paralyzes
freedom by involving it in naturalistic necessity.” 325 This position itself is, by implication,
an extension of the instrumentalization that Jaspers conceives of as arising from war. It is
pictured here as nihilistic, as erosive of the subjectivity, the sphere of values, held by human
groups and individuals. The further implication is that Marx’s thought is, and this would
hold true of “Marxist humanism” as well, intrinsically in tension with legitimacy in general.
This logic is clearly repeated, as in but one example, by Herbert Marcuse, who writes in
Reason and Revolution: “The world is an alienated and untrue world so long as man does
not destroy its dead objectivity… He will try to… make the world what it essentially is,
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namely, the fulfillment of man’s self-consciousness.” 326 Alienation emerges again as the
central thesis of his later work, One Dimensional Man, where he writes: “the subject which
is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence. There is only one dimension, and it is
everywhere…” 327 Marcuse’s own appropriation of the theme of alienation prevents him
from seeing the real, though different, subjectivity actually within his category of “dead
objectivity” against which he can only respond with the postulate of a universal and singular
“fulfillment” of consciousness. That Marcuse sought to “existentialize” Marxism by way of
Heidegger does not alter the basic tension between this line of thinking and legitimacy in
general. In that effort Marcuse attaches primarily to Heidegger’s conception of technology,
which is itself a pseudoexistential rearticulation of the theme of alienation from “beinghuman” in toto. 328 Heidegger equates technology with, “Ge-stell”, or “enframing”, his own
neologism, which, for him: “does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and
everything that is… it banishes man…” 329 In a clearer statement in a letter to Jaspers,
Heidegger characterizes technology simply as an “assault”. 330 This is merely the total
alienation theme revisited: technology is not value neutral instrumentality but in itself an
alienation from “true being-human”. Technology for Heidegger appears virtually
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synonymous with private property for Marx. The irreconcilability of this position with
existentialism is apparent, as Jaspers writes in Man in the Modern Age:
“Existenzphilosophie… can only become real in the multiplicity of thought proceeding from
extant origins in the communication one to another… Existenzphilosophie would be instantly
lost if it were once to imply a belief that we know what man is.” 331 The contrast here can
appear in sharper focus when one considers Marx’s concept of alienation in relation to work.
From the early to the late Marx, both the categories of alienated humankind and “speciesbeing” are tied to the process of work. As he puts it in Capital: “All human servitude is
involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all types of servitude are only
modifications or consequences of this relation.” 332 In an emancipated society: “labor has
become not only a means of life, but life’s prime want.” 333 What is missing here is any
consideration of subjectivity, of, specifically, freedom to work according to different values.
Instead, both categories already presuppose an objectively known, singular and universal
human nature, as Marx puts it in Capital: “We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as
exclusively human… At the end of every labor process, we get a result that already existed in
the imagination of the laborer at its commencement.” 334 But this account, while it does have
a purely mental element, does not include a specifically subjective element. This is apparent
when one considers, again as an example, a prehistoric knife: the objective instrumentality

331

Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age, 176.

332

Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, ed. Friedrich Engels (New York:
Charles H. Kerr, 1906), 396.

333

Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton,
1978), 531.
231

that was intended is apparent, but the subjective role the knife took on in its original culture
is irrecoverable without corresponding written records. In Marx’s account, work only puts
something “exclusively human” into the product, but products of work have both an
objective reality recognizable by anyone and a particular meaning that is only accessible to
the understanding. The human “creates” himself and his world through work in Marx’s
conception, but only in an instrumental sense. To add free subjectivity to this account would
derail its intrinsic logic of alienation, because then there would be no dichotomy between
alienated humankind and “species-being”, as that dichotomy rests upon the assumption of
what is “true” and what is “false” for all humanity. History, as history of alienation, thus
cannot be a history of consciousness, but rather a picture of humankind trying to escape from
a universal and singular mechanism of oppression which depicts all humankind as an
instrument for the achievement of a singular, universal, and “true” end. This formulation
leads to a singular and universal vision of positive liberty, “human emancipation”, and, as
such, leaves no scope for negative liberty as understanding of differing particular views of
positive liberty. This blueprint for the instrumentalization of humankind in general arising
from an initial emancipatory aim is, from Jaspers’ point of view, the intensification of the
dialectic and not its resolution. In articulating a universal history of consciousness, in both
its subjective and objective aspects, Jaspers seeks to ground an argument for negative liberty
in a world of differing subjective views of positive liberty. Jaspers’ history provides an
understanding of the origin of the fallacious concept of total alienation itself, a concept
extending far beyond Marx through thinkers such as Fromm, Marcuse and Heidegger, as

334

Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, 197-198.

232

arising from the instrumentalization resulting from war, the source of nihilism. The result of
the work of such thinkers and others appears to be a broadly ramified and enduring legacy of
dissonance between theory and legitimacy in general.
Against Marx’s instrumental conception of history and its culmination in a
prescription of a singular and universal positive liberty, Jaspers sought to articulate a
universal history as the history of consciousness, accounting for both objective and
subjective aspects. His is a universal history of both meaning and instrumentality. Unlike
Marx, Jaspers had access to the findings of empirical anthropology which demonstrated the
uniquely and intrinsically conscious aspect of human ontogeny. Central to the theoretical
structure of the work is the account of war as intended conquest, that situation from which a
nihilistic inner instrumentalization of an ethos is conceived to arise. This leads Jaspers to
argue that only within a general sphere of negative liberty can positive liberty be truly
realized and, hence, free, insofar as the latter is the exercise of subjectivity. In its aspect as a
universal history of meaning, this work was intended to counter the trend of nihilism by
exhibiting the principles with bearing upon the freedom and unfreedom of the varieties of
human subjectivity over time. On this basis, Jaspers’ prescription is one of expectation for
the future oriented within the dichotomy: despotism or legitimacy.
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Conclusion

Jaspers’ philosophy of history in his work The Origin and Goal of History has begun
to generate and impressive literature and will continue to do so. However, subsequent
literature should consider the inherent connection between Jaspers’ historical and political
theses. This study has attempted to encourage that direction by offering a systematic
reassessment of The Origin and Goal of History in its relevant context of Jaspers’ other
works. Jaspers most significant intellectual relationship by far was his friendship with Max
Weber. It was from Weber, Jaspers says, that he begun to think politically for the first time.
The following passage from his three essays on Weber, first published in German in 1933, is
indicative of the influence of Weber upon his political thought:

Totalitarian domination is the negative mirror image of what Max Weber had
in mind when he spoke of the difficult path that leads to the realization of
political greatness. Totalitarian domination means the end of politics as Max
Weber conceived of it. He lived in the continuum of political freedom that
began with the Greeks. 335
In his youth, Jaspers’ father’s disdain for German nationalism had led Jaspers to eschew
intellectual engagement with political questions. Later, his chronic illness prevented him
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from serving in the First World War. He felt for several years later that his inability to serve
in the military disqualified him from taking public political positions. In the 1920s this
began to change, however, as he prepared the work of which he remained the most proud, his
three volume Philosophy. As a “concrete preface” to that work, in 1931 he published his Die
Geistige Situtation der Zeit, translated in English as Man in the Modern Age. This work is
the blueprint for his later political interventions. He writes:

The reality of the world cannot be evaded. Experience of the harshness of the
real is the only way by which a man can come to his own self. To play an
active part in the world, even though one aims at an impossible, an
unattainable goal, is the necessary precondition of one’s own being. 336
Here his chief targets are the ideological extremes that menaced the West at that time:

Bolshevism and fascism… These forms of dictatorship are substitutes for true
authority, achieved at the cost of renouncing, on the part of almost all of us,
the right to be ourselves. 337
The exclusive focus of this work is on the concepts of nihilism of totalitarianism though
Jaspers does not use the latter term:

The coercion of the life-order enforces an entry into the various associations,
and interferes with the freedom of individual activity in every possible way…
But this ideal of world order is intolerable to those who know their being to be
established upon a claim to freedom. 338
In the Origin and Goal of History, the themes of Man in the Modern Age are further
articulated. Central among these is the same relationship between nihilism and
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totalitarianism. The relationship between the two concepts in the latter work is prefigured in
the former. In one aspect, nihilism appears in both works as the sundering of humankind’s
connection with history. One can see how Jaspers’ thinking about history in Man in the
Modern Age leads to The Origin and Goal of History. Historical awareness itself is thought
by Jaspers to be crucial in the fight against totalitarianism. His view is that without
understanding of the importance of past events as conditions for the actualities of the present
and the basis for expectation for the future, human beings become more amenable to the
machinery of social domination that is totalitarianism:

The melting away of historical interconnections until they become a mere heap
of individuals replaceable at will as functions in the apparatus, tends to
disintegrate man into the brief perspective of the contemporary present. 339
This, he explains, happens due to the disintegration of cultural ties and the subsequent entry
of new forms of authority in the vacuum left by the former. The political importance of The
Origin and Goal of History in Jaspers’ view can be nowhere more clearly seen than in this
passage from Man in the Modern Age, in which he equate historical understanding with the
concept of freedom:

The historical is assimilated, not as mere knowledge of something, not as a
Golden Age which is to be restored because it should never have been allowed
to fall into decay. Assimilation occurs only through a rebirth by means of
which the past is transformed thanks to the entry into a spiritual region
wherein I become myself in virtue of my own originality… Without purpose
or plan there will ensue true assimilation; but the realizing force of
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remembrance will be incalculable. The contemporary situation with its
attendant danger of a breach in the continuity of history, makes it necessary
that we should deliberately grasp at the possibility of this remembrance. For if
the breach were allowed to become established, man would destroy himself. 340
This destructive potential of historical rupture is not really brought into a clear focus by
Jaspers. Why does he equate historical rupture with humanity’s self-destruction? The
answer can be extrapolated from The Origin and Goal of History. There, the development of
the human organism from embryo to adulthood, human ontogeny, is depicted as inseparable
from human conscious activity. Such activity is more than biological mechanics insofar as it
involves a factor which all other biology does not: the presence of meanings. History for
Jaspers is the study of such meanings, and the philosophy of history is that study in the
broadest and most essential possible sense. Jaspers diction is, at times, somewhat vague, e.g.
“a spiritual region wherein I become myself in virtue of my own originality”. However what
he means can be stated with more precision: this “spiritual region” is geistige, or intellectual,
in the sense that it is the realm of conscious meaning. The definitive step in hominization is
this separation of humans from nature through conscious decision. And why this happens
cannot be explained in terms of biological causality, but only understood. The search for
that understanding of hominization is the framework of Jaspers’ philosophy of history, the
structure into which all other historical phenomena are organized. In this way, the whole
intellectual project that Jaspers is attempting in The Origin and Goal of History can be seen
to follow his intention to counter what he sees as nihilism, the degradation of meanings,
generally. Meanings are constitutive of what we are, in this view. But, on the other hand, a
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nihilistic systematic is possible, and is actual in Jaspers view, which evacuates meanings in
general. This opens the door to the imposition of normativity by coercive authority. And,
following from this theory, such normativity is inimical to human freedom on the most
essential level, the freedom to be authentically one’s self. The maximization of coercive
normativity is Jaspers’ concept of totalitarianism. Above, in the Introduction and Chapter
Three, I have attempted to show how Jaspers’ thought here should be interpreted to mean
that such nihilism derives from the inner instrumentalization of an ethos concomitant with
aggressive war. The equation of the loss of history and the destruction of humankind follows
from the inversion of Jaspers’ ultimate maxim: “What we cannot be at all, we cannot
understand either.” 341 It is in this fashion that the inherent connection between Jaspers’
philosophy of history and his political interventions should be seen.
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